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OF 


Hon.WM.  WARNER,  OF  DETROIT, 

IN  THE  LEGISLATURE  OF  MICHIGAN, 

JANUARY  28,  1864, 

ON  SOLDIERS’  SUFFRAGE. 


The  Committee  of  the  whole  House,  haying 
under  consideration  the  subject  of  extending 
the  Elective  Franchise  to  Michigan  Soldiers, 

- when  absent  from  their  places  of  residence  in 
the  Army  and  Navy  of  the  United  States,  ei- 
ther by  means  of  what  is  called  “the  field  sys- 
tem,” or  “ the  proxy  system,”  Mr.  WARNER 
' remarked  substantially  as  follows : 

Mr.  Chairman  : I do  not  get  up,  because 
I am  about  to  attempt  to  make  a speech  on 
this  subject,  in  the  technical  sense  of  the  term. 
I have  no  such  purpose.  And  yet,  I feel  that 
I owe  it  to  myself,  to  the  members  of  this 
House,  and,  especially,  to  those  whom  I rep- 
resent on  this  floor,  whether  in  the  Army, 
or  at  home,  to  say,  at  least,  so  much  as  shall 
be  necessary  to  explain  some  of  the  reasons  for 
the  vote  I expect  to  cast,  when  either  of  the 
bills  now  presented  for  our  consideration, 
shall  be  put  on  its  final  passage. 

How  One  Is  Liable  to  be  Misunder- 
stood—A Precaution  Against  It. 

Mr.  Chairman  : In  times  of  great  popular 
excitement,  when  the  current  of  general  sym- 
pathy runs  high  and  urgently  in  one  direction, 
a person,  especially  one  in  any  public  station, 
is  very  liable  to  be  so  far  misapprehended  as 
to  be  put  in  a false  position,  even  before  those 
whom  he  much  esteems,  and  whose  opinions 
are  justly  entitled  to  respect,  if  he  cannot, 
consistently  with  his  convictions  of  truth  and 
duty,  fall  in,  and  go  with  the  current,  on  all 
collateral  and  accidental  questions,  as  well  as 
on  all  that  are  truly  cardinal. 

To  guard  against  such  misapprehension, 
somewhat,  and  the  injustice  attending  it,  per- 
mit me,  Sir,  to  say  right  here,  that  this  war  of 


self-preservation  on  the  part  of  the  Union,  has 
my  earnest  approbation ; and  that  our  brave 
citizen  soldiers  engaged  in  it,  have  my  fervent 
sympathy,  and  have  had,  and  shall  continue  to 
have,  all  the  practical  aid  and  comfort  in  my 
power  to  render  them,  till  their  work  shall  be 
fully  done,  and  the  rebels  shall  be  coerced  to 
submission,  and  civil  authority  and  public 
tranquility  fully  restored. 

And,  if,  Mr.  Chairman,  I shall  feel  called 
upon  to  vote  against  the  passage  of  either  of 
these  bills,  or  of  both,  I shall  do  so,  not  be- 
cause my  heart  is  not  alive  to  the  interests  and 
wishes  of  our  noble  brothers  in  the  field,  but 
because  my  heart  is  also  alive  with  love  and 
respect  for  that  same  authority  of  constitu- 
tional law,  to  maintain  and  enfore  which,  they 
freely  peril  all;  it  will  be  because  I shall  feel 
bound  to  follow  the  clear  dictates  of  my  un- 
derstanding and  conscience;  it  will  be  because 
I feel  bound  to  do,  here,  on  this  floor,  what 
they  are  giving  their  blood  and  lives  to  secure, 
namely,  obedience  to  the  fundamental  law  of  the 
land . 

These  Measures  a Ground  of  Real 
Solicitude. 

Mr.  Chairman:  I frankly  confess  to  you, 
and  to  the  members  of  this  Committee, 
that  I approach  the  subject  now  before 
us,  with  feelings  of  unaccustomed  solicitude 
— a solicitude  mingled  with  sad  surprise,  and 
strange,  ill-boding  fears.  It  is  fair  to  suppose 
that  these  measures  indicate  the  nature  of  the 
feeling,  and  the  tendencies  of  mind,  into 
which  a large  share  of  the  people  have  fallen. 
These  measures  are,  doubtless,  both  the  pro- 
duct— the  natural  out-growth— and  exponent 
of  the  majority.  This  is  a chief  reason  why 
I contemplate  them  with  such  painful  anxie- 


2 


ties.  I feel  as  though  the  majority  of  this  Leg- 
islature, and  perhaps  of  the  people  of  the  State, 
are,  consciously  or  unconsciously — in  some  in- 
stances the  lormer,  and  in  others  the  latter — 
calling  on  us  through  these,  and  other  incon- 
siderate measures,  to  launch  into  lawless 
chaos.  Such  seems  to  be  the  strong  tendency 
of  the  majority.  I deplore  it.  I shudder  as  1 
look  into  the  future,  and  forecast  the  conse- 
quences which  may  spring  from  these  unbid- 
den experiments,  and  from  the  state  of  public 
feeling  in  which  they  originate.  If  these  pro- 
clivities and  tendencies  are  to  run  on,  uncheck- 
ed and  uncontrolled,  and  are  to  work  out  their 
natural  and  ultimate  consequences,  what  have 
we  that  we  can  look  upon  as  secure?  Al- 
ready, as  this  family  of  measures  are  pressed 
upon  us,  under  one  pretence  and  another,  and 
as  their  adoption  becomes  more  and  more 
certain,  I seem  to  feel  the  very  foundations 
giving  way  under  my  feet. 

Adherence  to  First  Principles  Essen- 
tial in  These  Times. 

Sir,  in  a day  like  this,  when  our  country  is 
in  a hard  life-and-death  struggle,  in  the  abyss 
of  civil  war;  when  the  whole  fabric  of  our 
free  institutions  is  shaking  from  top  to  bottom 
under  the  shock  of  a vast,  and  long  protract- 
ed rebellion,  aimed  at  its  utter  overthrow ; it 
seems  to  me  that  it  is  no  time  for  us,  here,  to 
break  away  from  safe  moorings,  or  voluntarily 
destroy  well-settled  landmarks  by  our  course 
of  legislation.  We  should  not  suffer  ourselves 
to  depart  from  the  well-known  and  well-tried 
course  of  safety,  unless  actually  compelled  to 
do  so,  by  an  overruling  necessity.  We,  here, 
in  the  loyal  States,  should,  and,  if  wise,  will, 
hold  fast  to  all  fundamentals,  so  that  what 
ought  not  to  be  shaken,  shall  remain. 

Side  Issues  Thrown  About  this  Subject 
by  the  Message,  aud  Otherwise. 

But  we  will  draw  nearer  to  the  merits  of  the 
question  in  hand.  And  here  I feel  compelled 
to  make  this  further  preliminary  remark : It 
not  unfrequently  happens,  Sir,  as  we  all  well 
know,  that  when  a great  matter  is  brought  for- 
ward for  consideration  and  decision,  very  spe- 
cious, but,  at  the  same  time,  really  foreign 
questions  work  themselves  up  before  the  at- 
tention, get  control  of  it,  and  divert  it  from 
the  actual  issues  in  the  case,  to  themselves. 
In  this  way  it  is  that  these  false,  irrelevant, 
but  seductive  questions,  often  seem  to  many 
minds,  to  be  the  very  hinges  on  which  the 
whole  case  turns : whereas,  they  are  in  reality, 
not  in  the  case  at  all,  but  are  wholly  outside 
of  it,  are  not  related  to  it,  and  should  have 
nothing,  whatever,  to  do  with  it. 

And,  now,  Sir,  I feel  fully  warranted  in  say- 
ing that  the  case  under  discussion  is  one  of 
the  most  conspicuous  of  this  class  of  cases. 
These  foreign,  false,  yet  extremely  meretri- 
cious and  seductive  issues  have  so  crowded 
themselves  into  it,  about  it,  and  over  it,  and 
under  it,  that  the  most  cautious  and  discrim- 
inating among  us  are  in  great  danger  of  mis- 
taking them  for  the  real  issue  in  question.  It 
may,  therefore,  be  quite  profitable  for  us  to 
search  out  these  delusive,  side  issues,  in  this 
case,  ‘ and  brand  and  cast  them  out,  so  that 
they  will  deceive  no  more.  What,  then,  are 
they?  I answer,  that  one  clearly  is  this:  “If 
these  volunteer  citizen  soldiers  should  not 


have  a voice  in  the  civil  administration  of  the 
government  for  which  they  fight,  then  it 
would  be  well  to  inquire,  who  is  worthy  of  it?” 
— See  Message,  page  10. 

Now  mark : In  the  present  condition  of  our 
election  laws,  soldiers,  when  absent  from  their 
places  of  residence,  cannot  vote  at  our  State 
or  local  elections;  but  it  is  proposed  that  this 
Legislature  pass  an  act  enabling  them  to  do 
so.  The  essential  question  arises  here  in  the 
outset,  namely : “ Is  it  competent  for  the  Leg- 
islature^ pass  such  an  act?  ” This  is  a Consti- 
tutional question.  It  depends,  wholly,  on  the 
wording  of  our  State  Constitution.  But  this  side 
issue,  thus  artfully  presented  to  us,  as  a sort 
of  preamble,  would  have  the  question  turn, 
not  on  the  wording  and  plain  sense  of  the 
Constitution,  but  on  the  worthiness  of  the 
soldiers : just  as  though  an  admission  that  our 
citizen  soldiers  are  worthy  of  the  right  to  vote, 
is  the  same  thing  as  to  decide,  that  the  word- 
ing of  the  Constitution  of  Michigan  is  exactly 
such  as  to  enable  this  Legislature  to  confer  on 
them  the  right  to  vote,  in  our  State  and  local 
elections,  when  they  are  out  of  the  State,  or  to 
give  this  body  the  undoubted  right  to  send 
the  ballot  box  to  them,  out  of  the  State,  or 
out  of  the  town  or  ward  where  they  reside,  or 
to  authorize  them  to  vote  by  proxy.  Why, 
the  worthiness  of  our  volunteers  is  one  thing, 
and  I assure  you,  sir,  that  I claim  it  to  be  a 
very  great  thing ; but,  yet,  the  wording  of  our 
Constitution,  by  which  the  powers  of  this  Leg- 
islature are  determined,  is  a verydifferent  thing. 
And  while  these  two  things  from  their  very 
nature,  cannot  be  opposed  to  each  other,  they 
of  course  have  no  legal  or  logical  connection. 

Again.  It  is  said:  “The  volunteer  army 
of  the  United  States  is  composed  of  the  peo- 
ple of  the  United  States.  They  have  left  their 
various  occupations,  not  to  become  profes- 
sional soldiers,  not  to  renounce  civil  life  and 
the  pursuits  of  peace,  but  to  establish  upon  an 
enduring  basis  the  right  to  both,  for  them- 
selves and  their  posterity.  They  are  absent 
from  the  polls  of  the  elections,  in  their  several 
towns  and  wards,  beating  back  the  power  of  a 
causless  and  cruel  rebellion,  in  order  that 
these  very  elections  may  be  held  in  peace,  and 
that  the  right  to  hold  them,  and  to  have  their 
results  respected  and  obeyed,  shall  continue 
forever.  If  these  volunteer  citizen  soldiers 
should  not  have  a voice  in  the  civil  administra- 
tion of  the  Government,”  (that  is,  if  they  are 
not  permitted  to  vote,  although  ever  so  far 
away  from  their  several  places  of  residence) 
“then,  who  is  worthy  of  it?”— Message,  page 
9—10. 

Exactly  so.  This  is  all  just  and  well,  as  a 
tribute  to  our  noble  soldiers.  But  the  ques- 
tion very  naturally  suggests  itself  to  a fair, 
logical  mind,  how  does  even  such  a well  de- 
served commendation  affect  the  question  as  to 
the  constitutional  right  of  Michigan  soldiers 
to  vote  in  our  elections,  when  they  are  either 
out  of  the  State,  or  away  from  the  town  or 
ward  in  which  they  reside?  We  may  go  still 
further  and  claim,  and  get  it  universally  ad- 
mitted, that  they  are  very  models  of  patriot- 
ism. These  eloquent  representations  and 
awards  may  deeply  move  our  admiration  and 
sympathy,  but  it  will  hardly  do  for  us,  as  leg- 
islators, sworn  to  follow  the  Constitution,  to 
adopt  them,  as  sufficient  reasons  for  passing 
either  of  these  bills.  The  generous,  manly,  seffi 


3 


sacrificing  patriotism  of  our  citizen  soldiers  is 
one  thing;  but  the  powers  of  this  Legislature, 
under  the  unmistakable  wording  of  our  or- 
ganic law,  is  quite  another  matter.  We  will 
honor,  reward  and  rely  on  the  former,  in  all 
such  ways  and  degrees  as  become  us  to  do ; 
but  the  latter  furnishes  the  rule  for  our  legis- 
lative action,  and,  on  no  consideration,  may 
we  depart  from  it. 

Again.  It  is  said:  “Surely,  he  who  stands 
faithfully  by  his  country  in  the  shock  of  bat- 
tle, may  be  safely  trusted  at  the  ballot  box, 
though  it  should  be  carried  to  him  at  Vicks- 
burg or  Chattanooga.” — See  Message,  p. 
10.  Grant  it.  Nay,  affirm  it,  and  re-affirm 
it,  and  affirm  it  again,  and  let  every 
body  admit  and  assert  it  at  home  and 
abroad,  from  this  day  forward.  But  what 
then?  What  has  any  or  all  of  that  to  do  with 
the  wording  and  sense  of  our  State  Constitu- 
tion? Does  it  enlarge  any  of  its  provisions, 
or  remove  any  of  its  limitations?  Does  it 
work  any  amendments  to  it,  or  a meaning  into 
its  words,  not  before  there  ? Or  is  any  settled 
rule  of  interpretation  thereby  done  away  with, 
or  others,  new  and  unthought  of  before,  orig- 
inated and  established  in  their  stead?  Not  at 
, ail.  The  safety  of  sending  the  ballot  box  to 
Chattanooga,  the  Potomap,  to  Texas,  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  or  Islands  of  the  Sea,  is  one  thing; 
but  the  special  wording  of  the  Constitution  by 
which  the  action  of  this  Legislature  is  limited, 
is  another  and  very  different  thing,  indeed. 
And,  as  clear-headed  men,  desirous  of  clearing 
this  subject  of  all  extraneous  matter,  we  shall 
be  careful  to  mark  these  entire  differences, 
and  shut  out  what  is  wholly  irrelevant. 

I am  well  aware,  that  some  may  undertake 
to  claim,  in  reply,  that  what  has  been  cited 
thus  far,  as  false  issues,  tending  to  bias  the 
mind  and  lead  it  to  commit  erroneous  acts, 
are  only  considerations,  offered  to  show  the 
eminent  fitness  of  an  enactment  by  this  Legis- 
lature, enabling  absent  soldiers  to  vote,  provi- 
ded the  Constitution  will  really  admit  of  it. 

In  answer  to  such  a plea,  it  should  seem 
quite  sufficient  to  say,  that  the  remarks  re- 
ferred to,  falling  from  whom  they  did,  to 
whom  they  did,  when  and  where  they  did,  and 
appealing  as  they  did  and  continue  to  do,  to 
feelings  already  formed,  and  to  sympathies  al- 
ready strong,  are  actually  received,  taken  up 
and  used  by  the  many,  here,  and  throughout 
the  State,  as  a kind  of  preamble,  expressing  the 
conclusive  reasons  for  the  action  recommend- 
ed, and  now  sought  by  the  friends  of  these  re- 
spective bills.  Such  is  the  effect  of  them,  un- 
der the  circumstances : such  is  the  use  made  of 
them.  They,  therefore,  practically  raise  false, 
seductive,  and  dangerous  issues. 

But,  Mr.  Chairman,  I have  not  quite  done 
with  this  species  of  reasoning.  For  it  is  stated 
as  a good  reason  why  one  or  the  other  of  these 
bills  should  pass,  that  the  soldiers  desire  to 
vote ; that  they  will  vote  right ; and  that  a big 
victory,  at  the  ballot  box,  would  do  more  to- 
wards relaxing  the  rebellion,  and  saving  the 
Union,  than  several  great  victories  by  our 
arms.  These  points  were  dwelt  upon,  and  em- 
phasized in  this  Hall  the  other  evening,  and 
they  are  taken  up,  repeated,  and  urged  as  de- 
cisive arguments  in  favor  of  these  measures. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  the  comparative  ef- 
fect of  these  two  victories  here  spoken  of,  is 
at  least  but  the  prediction  of  an  advocate ; but 


for  the  sake  of  the  argument,  just  admit,  if 
you  please,  that  these  premises  are  all  valid. 
What  then?  What  has  that  to  do  with  the 
languageof  the  Constitution,  by  which  this 
Legislature  is  to  be  governed?  The  desire  of 
the  soldiers  to  vote  may  be  ever  so  strong, 
their  politics  ever  so  sound,  and  the  effect  of 
their  voting  ever  so  gratifying,  yet  all  that 
does  not  make  the  wording  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, regarding  the  same,  other  than  what  it 
is,  and  must  continue  to  be,  until  changed  in 
a constitutional  way. 

Another  Side  Issue  as  to  Constitu- 
tional Doubts— The  Binding  Rule  as 
to  Sucli  Doubts— Evils  of  Departing 
from  it. 

It  is  claimed  by  the  friends  of  this  measure, 
that  if  there  is  “ doubt,”  as  to  its  Constitution- 
ality, the  soldier  of  right  and  justice,  is  enti- 
tled to  the  benefit  of  it.  (Senate  Doc.  No.  1, 
p.  10.)  This  plea  is  on  the  tongue  of  the 
many,  and  we  meet  it  at  almost  every  turn. 
There  is  evidently  an  illusion  about  the  words 
of  this  plea  to  which  it  owes  its  plausibility 
and  effect.  And  it  seems  to  arise  in  this  way : 
In  criminal  law,  a person  is  deemed  innocent 
until  proved  to  be  guilty ; and  when  the  ac- 
cused is  on  trial,  he  is  entitled  to  the  full  ben- 
efits of  all  real  doubts  in  the  matter  of  proof. 
And  the  argument  now  is,  that  if  this  is  so, 
in  case  of  everybody  accused  of  crime,  much 
more  should  it  be  so,  in  case  of  the  soldier, 
when  his  right  to  vote  is  being  settled.  If  the 
reputed  criminal  is  entitled  to  the  advantages 
of  all  the  doubts,  it  is  said,  that  the  soldier  is 
much  more  entitled  to  them,  in  this  case. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  in  the  first  place,  it  so 
happens,  that  the  soldier  is  not  on  trial,  here ; 
but  the  Constitution  of  the  sovereign  State  of 
Michigan,  ordained  by  the  people,  is  on  trial , 
and  it  is  undergoing  a hard  trial,  too,  not  so 
much  from  the  want  of  a perfect  case,  as  from 
the  biases,  the  moral  inability,  and  foregone 
conclusions  of  those  sitting  upon  it.  And  in  the 
second  place,  it  is  not  admitted  by  the  friends 
of  the  Constitution,  that  there  are  any  real 
doubts  about  this  matter.  There  are  sophistries 
enough  thrown  about  it,  it  is  true,  and  side 
issues,  illusions  and  “petty  fogs,”  but  no  real 
doubts,  so  far  as  I have  been  able  to  see.  And, 
in  the  third  place,  if  there  are  doubts  about  it,  * 
and  if  the  maxim  referred  to  has  any  applica- 
tion here  at  all,  certainly  the  Constitution, 
established  by  the  sovereign  people,  as  it  was 
understood  when  it  was  adopted,  and  as  it  has 
been  understood  and  acted  on,  from  that  day 
down,  is  emphatically  entitled  to  the  benefit  of 
all  of  them.  If  doubts  exist,  surely,  in  this 
time  of  civil  and  political  upheavals,  the  old, 
time-hallowed,  well-attested  course  of  safety 
should  have  the  advantage  of  them. 

And,  right  here  Mr.  Chairman,  let  me  ad- 
vert for  a moment  to  a notion,  with  which 
honorable  gentlemen  seem  to  be  so  very  well 
satisfied,  namely : “This  subject,”  they  say, 

“ we  find  to  be  embarrassed  by  very  formida- 
ble doubts,  in  a constitutional  respect.  We 
find  ourselves  unable  to  solve  them.  Men  of 
ability  and  large  learning  in  the  law,  may  be 
able  to  do  it.  Consequently,  the  shortest  and 
best  way  for  us  to  dispose  of  the  matter  is  to 
pass  the  bill,  let  the  law  go  into  effect,  and 


4 


then  let  the  courts  settle  the  question  as  to  its 
constitutionality.” 

Now,  Sir,  overlooking,  if  you  please,  the  ab- 
sence on  the  one  hand,  and  presence  on  the 
other,  of  the  spirit  and  qualities,  denoted  by  this 
somewhat  remarkable  plea,  it  is  observable 
1.  That  the  very  nature  of  our  office,  as  mem- 
bers of  this  House,  makes  us  not  only  legisla- 
tors, but,  at  the  same  time  judges  of  the  con- 
stitutionality of  our  proposed  acts.  We  stand 
here  in  this  two-iold  capacity.  The  exercise 
of  the  legislative  powers  of  the  State  is  com- 
mitted to  our  discretion,  subject  always  to  the 
Constitution.  It  is  presumed  that  we  know 
what  the  Constitution  contains,  and  that  we 
will  pass  no  law,  unless  we  are  first  well  satis- 
fied, after  faithful  examination,  that  it  i6  agree- 
able to  its  intent  and  meaning.  Our  official 
oath  is  based  on  this  idea.  By  it,  we  declare, 
uuder  the  most  solemn  sanctions,  that  we  will 
faithlully  discharge  the  duties  of  this  two-fold 
office  of  a State  representative,  according  to 
the  best  of  our  ability,  and  that,  in  this  two- 
fold capacity,  we  will  support  the  Constitution 
of  this  State— that  we  will  faithlully  give  our 
time  and  best  thoughts  to  this  very  business. 
Now,  tell  me,  how  all  this  can  be  done,  unless 
we  not  only  legislate,  if  need  shall  be,  but 
also  adjudge  the  constitutionality  of  our  legis- 
lation, and  see  to  it,  that  it  is  beneficial  on  the 
one  hand,  and  in  keeping  with  the  Constitu- 
tion on  the  other?  Theie  can  be  no  other 
way.  We,  then,  as  legislators,  are  to  act  as 
judges,  in  the  first  instance,  of  the  constitu- 
tional validity  of  our  acts.  And  in  discharg- 
ing this  part  of  our  duty,  we,  of  course,  are  to 
be  guided  by  the  same  principles  as  govern 
the  courts  in  like  cases.  This  is  admitted  on 
all  hands,  and  denied  by  none.  But  see  now 
what  necessarily  coines  of  it : “It  i6  a well-set- 
tled principle,  that  the  courts  cannot  interfere 
and  declare  a statute  void,  unless  the  inva- 
lidity is  placed,  in  their  judgment,  beyond 
reasonable  doubt”  (Adams  vs.  Howe,  14  Mass., 
345.  Clark  vs.  The  People,  26  Wend.,  599.) 

The  points  I make  here  are  these : 1.  The 
courts  cannot  rightfully  or  lawfully  act  against 
their  reasonable  doubts.  (5  Mich.  251.)  2. 
This  rule  is  just  as  applicable  to  the  Legisla- 
ture as  to  the  court.  The  Legislature  must 
be  governed  by  the  same  rules  of  interpreta- 
tion as  the  court,  and  can  no  more  go  against 
its  substantial  constitutional  doubts  than  the 
court  can  against  theirs. 

Senate  Doc.  No.  1 holds  out  the  idea,  and 
many  seem  to  have  fallen  into  the  dangerous 
error,  that,  if  a measure  is  only  so  embarrassed 
with  constitutional  doubts,  that  the  court  will 
not  be  fully  satisfied  of  its  unconstitutionality , 
and  cn  that  account  will  not  declare  it  void,  it 
is  then  all  right,  as  between  us,  as  legislators, 
on  the  one  hand,  and  the  Constitution  on  the 
other,  to  pass  it.  Whereas,  the  rule  is 
this:  We,  as  legislators,  must  be  first 

satisfied  that  a statute  would  be  consti- 
tutional before  we  can  enact  it;  while  the 
court  must  be  first  satisfied,  that  it  is  actually 
^constitutional  before  they  will  declare  it 
void;  and  if  we,  as  legislators,  have  a sub- 
stantial doubt  as  to  whether  an  act  would  be 
constitutional,  we  are  to  pause ; while,  on  the 
other  hand,  if  the  court  have  a substantial 
doubt  as  to  the  ^constitutionality  of  an  act, 
they  are  to  likewise  pause.  3.  It  being  admit- 
ted by  the  plea  referred  to,  and  otherwise  by 


the  members  of  this  body  favorable  to  this 
measure,  that  both  of  these  bills  are  embarras- 
sed with  substantial  constitutional  doubts,  it 
thence  follows,  that  we  are  firmly  bound,  for 
that  very  reason,  were  there  no  other,  to  pause 
in  our  attempts  to  pass  either  of  them,  and, 
in  due  course,  dismiss  one,  and  vote  down  the 
other.  And, 

2.  Consider  what,  surely,  must  be  the  con- 
sequences of  the  opposite  course.  If  we  are 
to  allow  ourselves  to  pass  laws  of  whose  con- 
stitutionality we  are  not  satisfied,  or  of  which 
we  entertain  substantial  doubts  in  this  regard, 
on  the  plea  that  the  courts  will  properly 
adjuge  and  dispose  of  them,  then  we  may  bid 
“ a last  adieu  ” to  all  system  and  harmony  in 
legislation.  Our  statute  books  will  soon  be- 
come a great  body  of  questionable  and  oppos- 
ing acts,  by  which  the  people  and  all  the 
branches  of  Government  will  be  thrown  into 
“ confusion  worse  confounded.”  And  the 
courts  can  afford  no  relief,  because  substan- 
tial constitutional  doubts  stand  in  their  way, 
and  they  are  justifiable.  We,  all  the  while, 
keep  on  in  these  ways  of  anarchy,  because  we 
are  not  to  be  restrained  by  constitutional 
doubts,  although  never  so  grave  and  sub- 
stantial! Thus  the  indifference  to  constitu- 
tional landmarks,  already  too  apparent,  will 
intensify  and  spread,  and  so  far  as  it  shall  pre- 
vail, just  to  that  extent  we  shall  have  nothing 
to  go  by,  no  common  ground  to  stand  on,  no 
common  rule  to  act  under,  no  common  stand- 
ard to  judge  by.  In  very  truth  we  should  then 
have  neither  rule  nor  standard  at  all.  Reason- 
able doubts  no  longer  detering  us,  we  should 
launch  our  legislation  out  on  the  tumultuous 
and  harborless  6ea  of  uncertainty,  and  this  old 
Ship  of  State,  committed  to  our  management, 
would  roll,  and  pitch,  and  strain,  and  suffer 
fearful  damage,  if  not  a total  wreck  at  our 
hands. 

Let  us  then,  Mr.  Chairman,  meet  this  case 
as  men,  as  good  legislators,  investigate  and 
adjudge  it  with  care  and  candor,  respecting 
and  following  our  well-formed  convictions, 
and  pausing,  as  we  are  most  solemnly  bound 
to  do,  at  our  reasonable  doubts — being  duly 
forewarned,  on  the  highest  of  all  authority, 
that  “ he  that  doubteth,  and  yet  eateth,  is 
surely  to  be  condemned.” 

Another  Side  Issue— Party  Policy  Re- 
quires that  the  Responsibility  of  This 

Matter  be  Shifted  from  the  Legisla- 
ture to  the  Courts, 

This  mischievous  side  issue,  calls  for  a re- 
mark. It  may  be  stated  thus : The  soldiers 
and  the  people  are  clamorous  for  the  passage 
of  this  measure ; their  feelings  are  excited  and 
resolute  about  it;  they  cannot  be  made  to  un- 
derstand why  it  should  not  be  passed;  if  it  be 
not  passed,  the  dominant  party  will  be  held 
responsible  for  the  failure,  and  will  be  very 
likely  to  suffer  great  damage  as  a party  by 
reason  of  it;  and  that,  consequently,  policy 
requires  the  passage  of  this  measure,  so  as  to 
shift  the  responsibility  of  its  defeat  (if  defeat- 
ed it  must  be)  from  the  party  in  power  to  the 
courts,  under  the  belief  that  if  it  is  killed  by 
the  court,  that  party  will  suffer  much  less  in- 
jury than  it  will,  if  it  is  killed  by  the  Legis- 
lature. To  this  plea  I reply : 

1.  That  we,  as  legislators,  as  we  have  al- 


5 


ready  seen,  are  bound  to  act  as  judges  in  tbis 
matter,  in  the  first  instance,  and  that  we  can- 
not shirk  this  duty  without  committing  a 
breach  of  trust. 

2.  The  question  for  us  to  consider  is,  not 
what  would  promote  the  interests  of  this, 
that,  or  the  other  political  party,  but  is  this 
measure  agreeable  to  the  Constitution,  and 
does  the  best  good  of  the  State  require  its 
passage?  We  are  to  act  here  for  the  best 
good  of  the  entire  State,  and  not  exclusively 
or  chiefly  for  a particular  locality,  and  not  at 
all  for  Jhe  aggrandizement  of  any  political 
party  as  such.  Our  official  oath  knows  no 
party.  It  recognizes  only  the  State  and 
National  Constitutions,  and  the  best  good  of 
the  entire  people  of  Michigan. 

3.  In  the  better  days  of  the  Republic,  it  was 
deemed  the  dictate  of  wisdom  to  place  ju- 
dicial officers  above  the  influences  of  party 
politics,  or  the  fluctuations  of  popular  feeling. 
Consequently  they  were  appointed  by  the 
Legislatures  for  all  the  courts  within  their 
respective  States ; but  in  these  latter  days  a 
change  has  taken  place  in  this  respect,  and  now 
these  judicial  officers  are  elective  of  the 
people.  Thus  far,  however,  the  sense  of 
sacredness  which  attaches  to  the  courts,  has 
to  a good  degree,  shielded  them  from  the 
debasements,  which  too  often  and  too  strong- 
ly mark  the  election  of  other  public  officers, 
and  the  administration  of  their  trust.  But, 
Sir,  it  is  painful,  that  we  are  not  able  to  say, 
that  all  of  our  courts  are  clear  and  above  re- 
proach in  this  direction.  We  should  not  forget 
that  judges  and  magistrates  are  human,  are 
subject  to  the  same  susceptibilities  and  weak- 
ness as  other  men;  and  that  wisdom  and  safe- 
ty require  that  they  should  not  be  tempted 
above  what  they  are  able  to  bear;  nor,  on  the 
other  hand,  is  it  safe  to  do  anything,  which 
shall  tend  to  diminish  in  the  common  mind 
the  respect  and  sense  of  sacredness  felt 
towards  courts  of  law  and  justice.  But  let  us 
pause  and  ask : what  do  they  propose  who  seek 
to  escape  responsibility  in  the  matter  before 
us,  and  throw  it  upon  the  court?  Why,  they, 
in  effect,  propose,  instead  of  preserving  and 
strengthening  the  safeguards  about  our  courts, 
io  turn  the  excited  and  clamorous  feelings  of 
the  army  and  the  populace  towards  the  courts 
to  surge  and  beat  against  them.  What  would 
be  the  natural  consequence?  Would  it  not  be 
in  substance  this:  that  if  the  courts  should 
stand  firm,  and  not  shape  their  action  by  the 
popular  demand,  but  by  a careful  adherence 
to  the  letter  and  spirit  of  the  law,  they  would 
either  be  overthrown,  or  the  upright  and  un- 
flinching judges  would  be  discarded,  and 
others  elected  in  their  stead,  who  would 
accommodate  their  official  acts  to  the  popular 
feeling?  That,  sir,  would  be  an  evil  day  for 
our  State.  But  this  is  the  very  condition  of 
things,  which  this  plea,  if  acted  on,  would 
naturally  bring  about,  as  every  candid  man 
must  admit,  who  will  trace  out  its  legitimate 
consequences.  Hence,  this  plea  in  behalf  of 
this  measure  is  not  to  be  entertained  tor  a 
moment.  It  is  not  only  utterly  false  and 
irrelevant  in  principle,  but  it  is  especially  dan- 
gerous in  its  tendencies. 

So  much,  Mr.  Chairman,  for  some  of  the 
many  seductive  side  issues,  that  have  been 
thrown  around  this  subject,  which  I have 
thought  best  to  clear  away. 


We  now  come  directly  to 

Tbe  Main  Questions  at  Issue— Wliat 
They  Are— The  Controlling  Features 
of  these  Bills. 

1.  The  Senate  bill  No.  3,  Sections  1 and  2, 
provides,  that  qualified  and  duly  registered 
voters  of  this  State,  shall  be  permitted  to  vote 
by  proxy,  or  by  an  agent,  at  every  general  elec- 
tion, who  shall  be  absent  from  the  township 
or  ward  in  which  they  reside,  on  the  day  of 
election,  in  the  military  or  naval  service  of  this 
State  or  the  United  States. 

2.  The  House  bill  No.  5 provides,  that 
polls  shall  be  opened  for  each  regiment,  or 
detached  portion  of  each  regiment  or  com- 
pany of  Michigan  soldiers,  when  absent  from 
the  township  or  ward  in  which  they  reside,  in 
the  military  service  of  this  State  or  of  the 
United  States ; that  such  polls  shall  be  opened 
on  the  same  day  that  is  provided  for  by  Title 
3,  Chap.  6,  of  the  compiled  laws;  that  Com- 
missioners shall  be  appointed  to  take  the 
votes  of  such  absentees ; that  the  votes  shall 
be  canvassed  immediately  after  the  polls  shall 
be  closed ; that  the  results  shall  be  certified  to 
by  the  inspectors  unto  certain  canvassers  in 
the  State,  and  one  copy  sent  by  mail  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  at  Lansing,  and  another 
handed  to  one  of  the  Commissioners;  and 
that  each  elector,  voting  by  virtue  of  these 
provisions,  shall  be  considered  as  voting  in 
the  town  or  ward  in  which  he  had  a residence 
at  the  time  of  his  entering  the  military  ser- 
vice. Such  are  the  controlling  features  of  the 
House  bill. 

In  a few  words,  the  Senate  bill  provides, 
that  absent  citizen  soldiers  may  vote  by  proxy. 
The  House  bill,  on  the  other  hand,  provides 
for  sending  the  ballot  box  to  these  soldiers  to 
receive  their  votes.  These  are  the  two  central 
propositions  which  I propose  to  consider. 
If  either  of  these  are  upheld,  details  can  be 
readily  adjusted  to  it ; but  if  each  fails,  then 
all  falls  to  the  ground.  Let  me  then  state 
these  two  controlling  questions,  again,  that 
all  may  clearly  understand  just  what  each 
one  is. 

1.  Would  an  act  of  the  Legislature  author- 
izing citizens  of  the  State,  who  shall  be  absent 
from  the  township  or  ward  in  which  they 
reside,  in  the  military  service  of  this  State,  or 
of  the  United  States,  to  vote  by  proxy,  at  our 
public  elections,  be  constitutional? 

2.  Would  an  act  of  the  Legislature,  requir- 
ing polls  ta  be  opened  on  the  day  of  our  pub- 
lic elections,  among  our  citizen  solders,  who 
shall  then  be  absent  from  the  township  or 
ward  in  which  they  reside,  in  the  military  ser- 
vice of  this  State,  or  of  the  United  States,  be 
constitutional;  and  would  votes  thus  given  and 
taken,  be  valid,  and  entitled  to  be  counted  in 
the  public  elections  of  this  State  ? 

Mb.  Chairman:  I am  constrained  by  the 
convictions  of  my  understanding,  and  the  dic- 
tates of  my  conscience,  to  answer  both  of 
these  questions  in  the  negative.  And  now, 
lease  hear  me  with  candor  and  patience  while 
explain  my  reasons. 

Provisions  of  tlie  Constitution  Appli- 
cable to  This  Subject. 

It  is  admitted  on  all  hands,  and  denied  by 
nobody,  that  all  there  is  in  the  Constitution 


relative  to  this  subject  is  contained  in  Sec- 
tions 1,  2 and  5 of  Article  7.  All  there  is  in 
Section  5,  which  applies  to  this  question  is 
this,  namely:  “No  elector  shall  be  deemed  to 
have  gained  or  lost  a residence  by  reason  of 
being  employed  in  the  service  of  the  United 
States  or  ot  this  State.”  Sec.  2 provides, 
that  “ all  votes  shall  be  given  by  ballot , ex- 
cept for  such  township  officers  as  may  be 
authorized  by  law  to  be  otherwise  chosen.” 
Sec.  1 reads  thus : “ In  all  elections,  every 
white  male  citizen,  every  white  male  inhabit- 
ant residing  in  this  State  on  the  24th  day  of 
June,  1835;  every  white  male  inhabitant, 
residing  in  the  State  on  the  first  day  of  Janu- 
ary, 1850,  who  has  declared  his  intention  to 
become  a citizen  of  the  United  States,  pur- 
suant to  the  laws  thereof,  six  months  preced- 
ing an  election,  or  who  has  resided  in  this 
State  two  years  and  six  months,  and  declared  j 
his  intention  as  aforesaid,  and  every  civilized 
male  inhabitant  of  Indian  descent,  a native  of  j 
the  United  States,  and  not  a member  of  any 
tribe,  shall  be  an  elector  and  entitled  to  vote ; I 
but  no  citizen  or  inhabitant  shall  be  an  elector  or  \ 
entitled  to  vote  at  a7iy  election , unless  he  shall  be  j 
above  the  age  of  twenty-one  years , and  has 
resided  in  the  State  three  months , and  in  the  town - j 
ship  or  ward  in  which  he  offers  to  vote , ten  days  j 
next  preceding  such  election .” 

Exposition  of  These  Parts  of  the  Con-  1 
stitution— Certain  Errors  in  the  Mes- 
sage exposed. 

Now,  keeping  distinctly  in  view  the  provis- 
ions of  Sections  2 and  5,  what  is  the  true  intent 
and  meaning  of  Section  1,  just  quoted?  What  ! 
is  the  real  intendment  of  it,  just  as  it  stands,  ! 
in  its  connections,  whether  it  be  contained  in 
affirmative  or  negative  word6,  or  by  what  they  : 
necessarily  imply?  For  it  is  the  real  intend-  j 
ment  that  we  should  seek,  because  that  must 

fovern:  just  as  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  New 
ork,  in  Newell  vs.  The  .People,  3 Shedd.  97, 
say:  “ Whether  we  are  considering  an  agree- 
ment between  parties,  a statute  or  a Constitu-  I 
tion,  with  a view  to  its  interpretation,  the  I 
thing  we  are  to  6eek,  is  the  thought  which  it 
expresses.” 

Look  at  the  words  of  this  Section.  Each 
one  must  have  some  meaning,  and  no  one  of 
them  can  have  but  one  meaning,  where  it 
stands,  and  it  is  to  be  presumed,  that  that 
meaning  is  a sensible  one.  But  what  is  it?  Take  : 
the  following,  for  example:  “ Has  resided ,” 
has  domiciled,  has  dwelt,  as  in  a • settled  and 
fixed  home.  But  the  word  “resided”  is 
modified  and  limited  by  the  words  “ in  the 
township  or  ward.”  Residence  is  thus  restrict- 
eclto  one  or  the  other  of  these  places.  And 
wlat  are  these  places?  They  are  subdivisions 
of  the  territory  of  Michigan,  whose  boundar- 
ies are  marked  out,  recorded,  and  declared  by 
public  authority.  These  divisions,  districts, 
or  narrow  precincts  are  known  in  law  by  the 
name  and  style  of  “townships  or  wards,” 
as  the  case  may  be.  They  not  only  limit  and 
restrict  the  word  “ resided  ” in  this  sentence, 
but  are  themselves  also  limited  and  restricted 
by  the  words  “ in  which  he  offers  to  vote.”  “ In 
which  ” denotes  here  the  identity  of  “ the  town- 
ship or  ward,”  with  the  place  of  voting.  The 
word  “ in”  denotes  the  place  at  or  within  which 
something  is  said  to  be  or  to  be  done.  Here  it 


denotes  the  place,  the  township  or  ward  within 
which  the  citizen  may  vote.  It  denotes  actual 
presence,  and  that  the  act  of  voting  must  be 
performed  within  the  township  or  waid,  and 
not  out  of  it.  “In”  has  here  exactly  this 
meaning — in,  as  distinguished  from  out. 

Residence , then,  is  restricted  to  some  one 
township  or  ward,  in  the  State,  and  denotes 
and  fixes  the  location  or  piace  within  which  the 
citizens  may  vote.  Thus  our  Constitution 
makes  the  place  of  voting  an  essential  ingred- 
ient of  the  right  to  vote.  It  attaches  the 
place  of  voting  to  the  essential  requisites  of  a 
voter. 

“ Offers.  ” The  etymological  sense  of  this 
word  is  here,  also,  the  obvious,  practical  sense 
of  it.  As  every  scholar  well  knows,  it  is  of 
Latin  origin,  and  is  compounded  of  ob,  signi- 
fying to  or  before , and  ferro,  signifying  to  bear , 
to  bring , to  present.  Put  together,  they  make 
the  Latin  word  offerro , which  means  to  bring 
to,  to  present  to;  and  the  word,  offerro , is  ex- 
pressed in  English  by  the  woid  “ offer,”  the 
primary  sense  ot  which  is  to  present  lor  ac- 
ceptance or  rejection;  to  exhibit  something 
which  may  be  received  or  rejected.  (See  Web. 
Die.)  This  is  both  the  literal  and  ordinary, 
practical  meaning. 

“ To  vote.”  These  words  are  to  be  con- 
strued in  reference  to  Sec.  2 of  Art.  7,  which 
declares  that  all  votes  at  public  elections  shall 
be  given  by  ballot,  except  for  township  officers. 
“ To  offer  to  vote,”  then,  at  a general  elec- 
tion, means  to  tender  a ballot.  Who  is  to  do 
it?  The  Constitution  says,  “he,”  (not  some 
one  in  his  stead,  but  “ he,”)  the  identical  elec- 
tor in  person. 

And  right  here,  perhaps  as  well  as  anywhere, 
I may  advert  to  a certain  point  made  in  the 
Message.  Alter  quoting  the  latter  member 
of  Sec.  1,  the  Message  says,  page  13:  “ These 
are  fit  words  to  establish  the  qualifications  of 
voters,  but  not  to  control  the  Legislature  as 
to  places  where  polls  of  election  shall  be  es- 
tablished and  votes  offered  and  received.” 
But  what  qualifications  do  these  words  estab- 
lish? 1.  age;  2,  residence  in  the  State  three 
months;  3,  a residence  for  the  ten  days  next 
preceding  the  election,  in  the  township  or  ward 
in  which  he , the  elector,  offers  to  vote.  The 
thought  to  be  pressed  here  is,  that  the  town- 
ship or  ward  residence,  and  the  place  of  voting  are 
one  and  the  same,  and  in  this  state  of  identity, 
they  actually  constitute  one  of  the  qualifica- 
tions of  the  voter,  “established”  by  “these 
fit  words  ” of  the  Constitution.  These  words, 
in  prescribing  the  requisites  of  the  voter,  de- 
rive a chief  element  of  their  potency  from  the 
place  ol  voting;  so  true  is  this,  that  were  this 
element  taken  away,  these  words  would  be 
emptied  of  a principal  part  ot  their  contents. 

The  Message,  p.  13,  further  says  that  “ these 
words  speak  directly  as  to  age  and  residence, 
and  only  to  these  qualifications.”  Grant  it, 
if  you  please.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  it  can- 
not escape  the  mind  of  any  one  who  will  be  at 
the  pains  to  analyze  the  sentence,  that  the 
framers  of  the  Constitution  were  careful  to 
make  the  place  of  voting  a constituent  part  of 
residence.  This  is  all  set  forth,  in  due  form,  in 
the  predicate  of  the  sentence,  so  that  when 
the  Message  claims,  that  qualifications  are 
only  stated  here,  we  may  safely  grant  it,  be- 
cause these  qualifications  include  the  place  of 
voting.  This,  then,  makes  good  the  6aying: 


7 


“ The  wise  shall  he  taken  in  their  own  crafti- 
ness.” 

The  Message  sees  fit  to  try  to  avoid  the  plain 
import  of  this  Section  by  holding  ont  (p.  13) 
that  no  greater  scope  can  be  given  to  this  part 
of  it  than  that  “ the  elector  must  have  resided 
in  some  particular  township  or  ward  ten  days 
next  preceding  the  election  at  which  he  offers  to 
vote.” 

Now,  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  remind  fair- 
minded  men,  that  the  Constitution  does  not 
read  in  this  way  by  any  means,  and  that  it  con- 
veys no  such  idea  as  the  one  here  expressed. 
It  does  not  say : “ the  election  at  which,”  &c., 
but  it  says : “in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he 
offers  to  vote .”  Place  of  voting,  as  we  shall  pres- 
ently see,  is  thus  made  an  element  of  suffrage 
in  our  Constitution  to  better  identify  the 
voter,  test  his  qualifications,  and  thus  preserve 
the  purity  of  elections. 

The  natural  sense,  therefore,  to  be  put  on 
the  expression,  “ in  the  township  or  ward  in 
which  he  offers  to  vote,”  is,  in  the  township  or 
ward  in  this  State,  in  which  he,  the  elector  in 
person,  is  to  present  his  ballot  to  the  proper 
officer  to  be  received  or  rejected  by  him,  as 
the  law,  and  the  facts  in  his  case  shall  require. 
The  Hitherto  Universally  Received  j 
Exposition  Summed  Up. 

Wherefore,  I submit,  that  the  total  effect  of  ! 
Sec.  1 is  to  determine,  definitely, 

1.  Who,  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  State, 
shall  be  entitled  to  vote,  at  our  public  elec- 
tions. On  this  point  all  are  agreed. 

2.  That  the  elector  must  vote  in  person,  if 
at  all.  This  follows:  1,  from  the  very  nature 
of  the  process  of  offering  to  vote  by  ballot ; 2, 
from  the  principle  of  common  law,  requiring  i 
electors  to  vote,  personally,  at  public  elec-  | 
tions,  or  forego  the  privilege ; 3,  from  the  fact 
that  the  affirmative  words  of  the  Sec.  confer  j 
on  the  citizen  the  right  to  vote,  and  from  the  j 
further  fact,  that  the  Constitution  no  where  be-  j 
stows  on  him  the  right  of  voting  by  another;  I 
and,  4,  from  the  fact,  that  the  exercise  of  this 
right  requires  the  exercise  of  integrity  and 
discretion,  and  consequently  cannot  be  deliga- 
ted  without  special  Constitutional  authority. 

3.  Another  and  last  effect  of  this  Section  is 
to  determine  the  place  in  which  each  elector 
must  appear  in  person  and  vote  personally,  if 
at  all,  namely:  in  the  township  or  ward  in 
which  he  has  his  legal  residence.  The  place 
of  voting  is  thus  definitely  determined  by 
what  the  words  of  the  Sec.  point  to,  assume, 
presuppose,  appropriate  and  necessarily 
imply ; and  for  that  reason,  by  what  must  of 
necessity  enter  into  their  very  essence  and 
meaning. 

As  this  is  the  material  point  in  this  contro- 
versy, let  me  dwell  on  it  for  a moment,  al- 
though I may  but  reaffirm  what  I have  already 
suggested. 

The  Constitution,  then,  requires  that  the 
citizen  shall  have  a home,  a domicil,  a settled 
abode,  a legal  residence  in  some  township  or 
ward,  in  this  State,  at  the  time  of  a public 
election  in  order  to  be  entitled  to  vote  thereat; 
and  that,  having  such  residence,  he  must  carry 
his  ballot  to  the  polls,  opened  in  the  township 
or  ward  where  his  residence  is,  and  there  per- 
sonally tender  his  vote,  or  not  vote  at  all.  The 
controlling  idea  here  is,  that  the  elector  must 
reside  in  the  township  or  ward,  where  he 


votes,  and  that  he,  in  person,  must  vote,  if  at 
all,  in  the  township  or  ward  where  he  resides. 
One  proposition  involves  the  other.  If  for 
any  cause  the  farmer  is  not  permitted  to  work, 
except  in  his  own  field,  then  in  his  own  field 
must  he  work,  if  at  all.  According  to  our 
Constitution,  the  place  of  residence  and  the 
place  of  voting  are  one  and  the  same.  Conse- 
quently, an  elector  having  his  legal  residence 
in  Lansing  cannot  vote  in  Corunna,  and  have 
his  vote  certified  unto  the  inspectors  of  elec- 
tions in  Lansing.  No:  the  Constitution  re- 
quires that  the  elector,  in  exercising  the  right 
of  suffrage,  shall  observe  the  territorial  subdi- 
visions of  the  State,  established  by  public  au- 
thority, and  recognized  in  that  insrument,  as 
election  districts.  His  residence  determines 
what  district,  that  is,  what  township  or  ward  he 
must  be  in , personally , when  he  performs  the 
act  of  voting.  What  can  be  more  conclusive? 

Other  Principal  Reasons  for  tills  Ex- 
position. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  I submit,  with  all  sin- 
cerity and  confidence,  that  the  exposition  I 
have  given,  fairly  states  the  intent  and  mean- 
ing of  the  Constitution  in  relation  to  the  mat- 
ter now  before  us.  And  some  of  the  principal 
reasons  lor  this  opinion  beyond  those  already 
suggested  in  the  exposition  itself,  are  briefly 
these : 

1.  This  exposition  adds  no  new  word  to  the  text , 
and  takes  none  from  it , while  it  gives  to  the  whole 
Section , just  as  it  stands , and  to  every  word  of  it , 
an  obvious , consistent  and  practicable  meaning. 
And  although  some  of  the  friends  of  this 
measure  claim  that  the  effect  of  this  Section 
is  not  such,  in  some  respects,  as  I have  stated 
it  to  be,  yet  I am  sure,  that  what  I have  just 
said  as  to  what  this  exposition  does,  and  does 
not  do,  is  so  manifestly  true,  that  all  will  ad- 
mit it  at  once.  All  will  admit,  whether  they 
adopt  my  exposition  or  not,  that  it  gives  to 
the  Section  an  obvious,  consistent  and  practi- 
cable meaning-just  such  an  one  as  the  people 
have  received,  acted  on,  and  carried  out,  for  a 
long  course  of  years ; so  that  particular  illus- 
trations to  show  that  this  exposition  does  ex- 
actly what  I claim  for  it,  under  this  head,  are 
wholly  needless.  No  one,  furthermore,  will 
think  of  doubting  that  it  is  essential  to  a just 
exposition  of  this  Section,  or  any  other,  that 
it  should  do,  and  not  do,  just  what  I claim  for 
this.  For  all  will  admit  that  Chief  Justice 
Tindel,  in  2 Scott,  N.  C.,  p.  521,  well  says: 
“ It  is  the  duty  of  ail  courts  to  confine  them- 
selves to  the  words  of  the  Legislature,  nothing 
adding  thereto  and  nothing  diminishing;” 
also,  Ernesti,  p.  7:  “Every  word  must  have 
some  meaning;  ” also,  the  Supreme  Court  of 
Massachusetts,  7 Cush.,  p.  53,  89:  “In  putting 
a construction  upon  any  statute,  it  shall  be  so 
expounded,  if  practicable,  as  to  give  some  ef- 
fect to  every  part  of  it;  ” and,  likewise,  Chief 
Justice  Parker,  15  Mass.,  p.  205:  “It”  (the 
law)  “ is  to  be  construed  sensibly,  and  with  a 
view  to  the  object  aimed  at  by  the  Legisla- 
ture.” 

Now  the  point  I make  here  is  this,  that  the 
exposition  I have  given  commends  itself  to  us, 
for  the  reason,  among  others,  that  it  adheres 
to  the  principles  thus  expressed  by  these  dif- 
ferent authorities,  and  because,  also,  an  adher- 
ence to  them  necessitates  it. 

2.  Another  reason  in  favor  of  the  exposi- 


8 


tion  stated  is  this,  namely:  That  it  is  ar- 
rived at  by  giving  the  words  of  the  Sec- 
tion their  natural  import  in  the  order  in 
which  they  are  placed.  In  other  words,  it 
results  not  only  from  the  best  of  learning  and 
reasoning  applicable  to  the  subject,  but  also 
from  taking  the  words  of  the  Section  in  their 
ordinary  signification  and  in  their  actual  and 
proper  grammatical  arrangement— just  as  or- 
diuarj , sensible,  and  fair-minded  men  have  al- 
ways received  and  understood  them.  Let  me 
illustrate : The  Section  says,  in  plain  words, 
that  “every  white  male  citizen,”  of  certain 
qualifications  therein  specified,  “shall  bean 
elector  and  entitled  to  vote,”  but  the  right  of 
substitution  is  not  granted.  Now,  then,  the  nat- 
ural import  of  these  words  is,  that  this  is  a 
personal  right,  a personal  privilege  or  franchise 
— a right,  privilege,  or  franchise  which  is  per- 
sonal with  the  elector,  and  is  to  be  enjoyed 
and  exercised  by  him,  personally,  if  at  all.  He. 
himself,  in  person , is  to  do  his  own  voting,  or  it 
is  not  to  be  done,  at  all.  This,  Sir,  is  exactly 
the  impression  naturally  produced  on  the  mind 
of  every  body  of  common  sense  by  an  atten- 
tive reading  of  this  Section.  This  is  the  im- 
pression which  has  always  been  produced  by 
it,  and  always  will  be.  So,  too,  where  the 
Constitution  says  the  Executive  power. of  the 
Government  of  the  State  shall  be  vested  in  a 
Governor,  the  natural  import  of  the  language 
is,  that  this  is  a personal  trust,  which  the  Gov- 
ernor is  to  discharge  himself,  personally,  and 
not  by  proxy.  What  can  be  plainer? 

Again.  Take  these  words  of  this  Section : 
“No  citizen  shall  be  an  elector  or  entitled  to 
vote  at  any  election,  unless  he  shall  be  above 
the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  and  has  resided 
in  the  State  three  months,  and  in  the  township 
or  ward,  in  which  he  offers  to  vote,  ten  days 
next  preceding  such  election.” 

Now  is  not  the  natural  import  of  these 
w ords  this : 1.  That  the  elector  to  be  entitled 
to  vote,  must  have  lived  in  the.  State,  township 
or  ward,  the  time  named;  2,  that  he  must  be, 
at  least  twenty-one  years  old ; 3,  that  he  must 
reside  in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he 
votes ; and,  4,  that  he  must  vote  in  person,  in 
the  township  or  ward,  in  which  he  resides,  if 
he  votes  at  all?  Moreover,  does  not  every  un- 
prejudiced man  of  common  6ense  naturally  re- 
ceive the  impression  on  reading  these  words 
of  this  Section,  that  they  peremptorily  pre- 
scribe the  place  where  the  elector  shall  vote,  if 
at  all,  namely,  in  the  township  or  ward  in 
which  he  resides,  just  as  clearly  as  they  do  his 
age  and  time  of  residence?  Can  anything  be 
more  certain?  Why,  you  say  to  George, 
James  and  John:  “you  may  go  a skating  this 
afternoon,  but  neither  of  you  shall  skate,  ex- 
cept on  the  mill-pond.”  Now  then,  what  is 
the  natural  import  of  your  words,  as  to  the 
place  where  these  lads  are  to  skate,  if  they 
skate  at  all?  Can  there  be  any  manner  of 
doubt  about  it?  I:  your  words  are  taken  in 
their  ordinary  signification — taken  just  as  sens- 
ible men  think,  speak  and  write,  and  just  in 
the  sense  which  you  intend  to  express  by 
them,  what  possible  room  can  there  be  to  a 
fair  mind  to  doubt  that  the  lads  are  to  skate 
on  the  mill-pond,  and  not  elsewhere,  it  at  all? 
Just  so,  in  relation  to  the  language  of  this  Sec- 
tion. Taken  in  its  obvious  and  ordinary  sig- 
nification, the  clear,  unsophisticated  mind, 
naturally,  nay  necessarily,  receives  from  it  the 


thought  that  it  prescribes  the  place  of  voting 
just  as  imperatively  as  it  does  age,  residence, 
or  any  other  condition  of  voting. 

But  the  question  naturally  arises  here,  is  it 
proper  in  ascertaining  the  meaning  of  the 
Constitution,  or  a statute,  to  take  the  words 
of  the  law  in  their  natural  and  ordinary  im- 
port, in  the  order  in  which  they  arc  placed? 
Is  this  a sound  rule  of  interpretation?  We  an- 
swer yes,  because 

1.  The  Constitution  is  the  act  of  the  people. 
It  was  ordained  by  them  for  the  government 
of  all  within  its  jurisdiction.  It  is  in  the  lan- 

fuage  of  the  people — such  as  ordinary  sensi- 
le  men  use  and  are  familiar  with  in  active, 
practical  life.  It  is  not  full  of  subtleties,  or 
embodied  in  dark  words,  which  mean  one 
thing  to  an  ordinary  man  of  common  sense, 
and  a very  different  thing  to  a few  who  have 
been  initiated  into  the  mysteries.  It  is  in 
plain  words,  such  as  ordinary  people  of  com- 
mon sense  can  understand.  And  what  a mons- 
trous absurdity  it  would  be  were  it  otherwise  l 
—absurd  in  the  last  degree,  to  enact  laws 
by  which  the  people  are  to  reerulate  their  con- 
duct, which  they  are  to  observe,  obey  and 
carry  out,  or  expose  themselves  to  the  loss  of 
property,  to  fines  and  imprisonment,  and  yet, 
on  the  other  hand,  embody  them  in  such  dark 
and  mysterious  words,  that  the  people  cannot 
tell  what  they  mean ! Why,  were  this  indeed 
so,  the  laws  of  the  land  might  about  as  well  be 
in  Greek  or  Chaldee,  as  far  as  the  people  are 
concerned.  But,  Sir,  this  is  not  so.  Far  ffom 
it.  And  yet  it  is  not  to  be  disguised,  that 
there  is  a great  error  in  the  popular  feeling 
with  regard  to  this  very  matter.  The  many 
seem  to  have  a feeling,  that  Constitutions  and 
statutes  are  but  little  else  than  a body  of  enig- 
mas, whose  hidden  meaning  can  be  divined 
only  by  the  initiated  few.  As  a natural  result 
of  this,  when  they  take  up  a law-book,  it  does 
not  6eem  to  occur  to  them,  that  it  is  to  be 
read  and  understood  in  the  same  way,  substan- 
tially, as  a history,  or  as  a treatise  on  morals, 
science,  the  useful  arts,  or  any  other  produc- 
tion, in  human  language,  that  is,  by  the  exer- 
cise of  “good  faith  and  common  6ense,”  (by 
far  the  most  important  requisites  for  a sound 
interpreter)  but  they,  at  once,  lay  these  quali- 
fications aside,  or  suspend  their  action,  as  be 
ing  now  out  of  place,  and  with  intellects  thus 
neutralized,  they  begin  to  stare,  vacantly,  at 
the  mazes  before  them,  and  grope  for  hidden 
meanings.  Whereas,  law  is  the  product  of 
j common  sense,  it  is  in  language  of  common 
sense,  and  is  to  be  read  and  understood  in  a 
common  sense  way,  according  to  its  natural 
and  ordinary  import,  except  in  case  of  special 
definitions,  which  of  course  are  to  be  regarded. 
There  may  be,  also,  an  apparent  exception  to 
this  rule,  in  case  of  technicalities,  but  there  is 
none  in  principle,  because  even  technicalities 
are  to  be  taken  in  the  ordinary  sense  in  which 
they  are  used,  as  such. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  rule  which  requires 
that  the  words  of  the  Constitution  be  taken 
in  their  natural  and  ordinary  signification  in 
the  order  in  which  they  are  placed,  if  we  would 
ascertain  their  true  intent  and  meaning,  is 
founded  on  the  solid  basis  of  common  sense. 
But  this  is  not  all.  That  this  rule  of  interpre- 
tation is  as  good  inlaw,  as  in  reason,  is  shown, 
2.  By  the  opinions  of  the  courts,  and  of  the 
most  approved  elementary  law  writers.  Kent, 


9 


Vol.  I.,  p.  521,  says:  “The  words  of  a stat- 
ute, if  in  common  U3e,  are  to  be  taken  in  their 
natural,  plain,  obvious  and  ordinary  significa- 
tion and  import.”  Blackstone  lays  it  down, 
as  his  first  rale  of  interpretation,  that  “ Words 
are  generally  to  be  understood  in  their  usual 
and  most  known  signification;  not  so  much 
regarding  the  propriety  of  grammar,  as  their 

General  and  popular  U3e.”  (Vol.  I.,  p.  59.) 

'he  Supreme  Court  of  New  York,  by  Judge 
Bronson,  29,  Wend.  555,  &c.,  say:  “ The  cur- 
rent of  authority  at  the  present  day  is  in  favor 
of  reading  statutes  according  to  the  natural 
and  most  obvious  import  of  the  language, 
without  resorting  to  subtle  and  forced  con- 
structions for  the  purpose  of  either  limiting  or 
extending  their  operations.”  I might  quote 
other  authorities  in  abundance.  But  these  | 
will  suffice  to  show  how  they  stand. 

Now  then,  the  exposition  I have  stated,  be- 
ing arrived  at  by  giving  the  words  of  the  Sec-  j 
tion  their  natural  and  ordinary  import,  in  the  ! 
order  in  which  they  are  placed,  as  we  have 
fully  shown,  and  this  method  of  interpreta-  ; 
tion  being  supported  by  such  an  array  of  rea- 
son and  authority,  we  have,  in  all  this,  for  the 
purposes  of  this  argument,  a very  clincher. 

3.  That  the  makers  of  the  Constitution  es-  ! 

Jeciallv  intended  by  the  words  of  said  section  ; 

, relative  to  the  place  of  voting,  to  deffiaitely 
establish  the  place  in  which  each  elector  shall 
appear  in  person  and  personally  cast  his  vote,  1 
if  he  vote  at  all,  namely,  in  the  township  or 
ward  in  which  he  resides,  is  demonsrrated,  not  | 
only  by  the  natural  and  ordinary  import  of  the 
words  themselves,  but  also  by  ths  particular 
considerations  which  led  to  their  being  engrafted, 
as  an  amendment,  into  the  Constitution  of  1835 
and  also  to  their  beinj  carried  into  the  Constitution 
now  in  force.  These  considerations  show  ths  evil 
felt  and  the  specific  remedy  which  the  authors  of 
the  Constitution  mast  deliberately  intended 
to  create  and  apply  by  requiring  each  elector 
to  vote,  if  at  all,  in  the  place  and  manner  thus 
fixed  ond  limited.  The  facts  in  this  matter 
are,  in  substance,  these:  In  the  Constitution 
of  1835,  it  was  provided  that  no  citizen  or  in- 
dividual should  be  entitled  to  vote  except  in 
the  district,  county  or  township  in  wnich  ha 
resided  at  the  time  of  election.  A difference 
in  opinion  as  to  the  effect  of  this  provision 
arose  among  the  inspectors  of  elections  in 
different  parts  of  the  State.  Many  boards  held  j 
that,  under  this  provision,  an  elector  was  en- 
titled to  vote  for  State  officers  and  Congressmen  ! 
anywhere  in  his  election  district;  for  county 
officers  anywhere  in  his  county,  but  for  town  j 
officers  he  must  vote  in  his  township,  or,  if  l 
polls  should  not  be  opened  in  his  township,  j 
he  might  vote  anywhere  in  his  county.  From  j 
these  difierent  rulings,  in  different  localities, 
much  confusion  and  dissatisfaction  resulted,  i 
But  the  worst  thing  of  all  about  it  was,  that  I 
it  opened  the  door  to  much  illegal  voting,  and  | 
in  this  way:  Unscrupulous  electors  were  ac- 
customed  to  go  from  one  town  to  another  in 
their  election  district,  on  the  day  of  election, 
and  vote  in  each  one.  By  this  means  great 
frauds  were  committed  and  the  elections  were 
not  a little  corrupted.  The  evil  became  se- 
rious. Good  citizens  throughout  the  State 
felt  that  it  should  and  mu3t  be  stopped.  But 
how— “that  was  the  rub.”  At  length  they 
hit  on  this  expedient,  namely:  to  narrow  down 
the  territory  or  district  within  which  an  elec-  l 


tor  might  vote  to  the  smallest  practicable 
limits ; to  make  it  an  essential  qualification  of 
suffrage  that  the  elector  should  reside  and  vete 
in  one  and  the  same  district ; to  thus  bring  the 
polls,  as  near  as  conveniently  may  be,  to  the 
settled  abode  of  each  citizen  so  that  his  rights 
as  a voter  would  be  personally  known  to  the 
inspectors  and  to  his  neighbors  about  the  polls 
and  consequently  might  be  readily  and  satis- 
factorily tested  They  judged  that  the  safe- 
guards to  be  thus  afforded  would  be  a good 
remedy  for  these  much  felt  evils.  Conse- 
quently the  Legislature  of  1838  proposed  “ that 
so  much  of  the  Constitution  as  prescribes  the 
place  in  which  an  elector  may  vote  and  which 
is  in  these  words,  to-wit:  “ district,  county  or 
township,”  be  abolished,  and  that  the  words 
“township  or  ward”  be  substituted  in  their 
place,”  thus  making  the  sentence,  if  amended 
as  proposed,  read  thus:  “ No  citizen  or  inhab- 
itant shall  be  entitled  to  vote  except  in  the 
township  or  ward  in  which  he  shall  reside  at 
the  time  of  election.”  This  proposed  amend- 
ment was  agreed  to  by  the  Legislature  of  1839, 
and  was  submitted  to  and  ratified  by  the  peo- 
ple in  the  same  year.  .This  provision  remained 
in  this  form  till  1850,  when  the  Constitution 
was  revised  and  the  qualifications  of  electors 
and  the  requirement  as  to  the  place  of  voting 
were  cast  in  the  form  in  which  we  find  them 
in  Section  1,  already  quoted.  By  this  change 
the  qualifications  of  electors  were  stated  more 
guardidly,  but  the  thought  and  requirement 
as  to  the  place  of  voting  remained  the  same. 
That  is,  in  either  case  it  was  to  be  performed 
by  the  elector,  if  at  all,  in  the  township  or 
ward  in  which  he  resided. 

That  the  people  understood  the  words  of  the 
Constitution  of  1835,  above  referred  to  a3  pre- 
scribing the  place  of  voting,  and  that  they  in- 
tended to  prescribe  the  place  of  voting  by  the 
amendment  of  1839,  is  shown  not  only  by  the 
general  history  of  the  amendment,  which  dis- 
closes that  such  was  the  object  of  it,  but  also 
by  specific  words  made  use  of  in  the  very 
proposition  to  amend.  The  proposition  says: 
“ So  much  of  the  Constitution  as  prescribes  the 
place  in  which  electors  may  vote.”  What  can  be 
more  decisive  ? That  the  people  also  intended 
to  prescribe  the  place  of  voting  by  the  words 
of  said  Section  1 of  the  Constitution  of  1850, 
is  clearly  proved  by  this,  as  well  as  by  many 
other  irrefutable  arguments,  namely : 1.  The 
thought  and  requirement  of  the  amendment 
of  1839,  were  carried  into  the  Constitution  of 
1850  and  that  too  by  the  very  people,  for  the 
most  part,  who  effected  the  amendment  of 
1839;  and  2,  The  people,  and  all  the  authorities, 
have  pursued  the  same  course,  exactly,  under 
the  Constitution  of  1850  as  to  the  place  and 
manner  of  voting  as  they  did  under  the 
amendment  of  1839.  In  this  respect  there 
was,  and  has  been,  no  manner  of  change. 
Now,  as  then,  and  then,  as  now,  each  elector 
was  required  to  appear  in  person  at  the  polls 
in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he  resided, 
and  personally  cast  his  vote  or  not  vote  at  all. 

Such,  Sir,  was  the  specific  remedy  incorpora- 
ted into  the  Constitution  against  illegal  voting. 
And  the  precise  thought  which  I wish  right 
here  to  press  on  the  minds  of  the  members  of 
the  committee  is  this,  that  in  this  very  remedy 
we  clearly  see  the  spirit  and  object  of  these 
particular  words  of  the  Constitution  pre- 
, scribing  the  place  of  voting— w hat  led  to  their 


10 


insertion — what  they  were  designed  to  effect 
and  what  is  their  true  intent  and  meaning. 
And  in  this  mode  of  reasoning  I urn  sustained 
by  high  authority.  Blackstone  (vol.  I p.  01) 
says : “ The  most  universal  and  effectual  way 

ol  discoverin';  the  true  meaning  of  a law, 
when  the  words  are  dubious,  is  by  considering 
the  reason  and  spirit  of  it,  or  the  cause  which 
moved  the  legislator  to  enact  it.”  To  the 
same  effect,  Vattel  says,  in  his  essay  on  the 
rules  of  construction,  that  “the  reason  of  a 
law  or  of  a treaty — that  .is  to  say,  ot  the  mo- 
tive which  led  to  the  making  of  it  and  the  ob- 
ject in  contemplation  at  the  time — is  the  most 
certain  clue  to  lead  us  to  the  discovery  of  its 
true  meaning.”  Kent,  vol.  1 p.  521  says: 
“When  the  words  are  not  explicit,  the  inten- 
tion is  to  be  collected  from  the  context,  from 
the  occasion  and  necessity  of  the  law,  from 
the  mischief  felt  and  the  object  and  remedy 
in  view.”  Puffendorff  says : “ But  that  which 
helps  us  most  in  the  discovery  of  the  true 
meaning  of  the  law  is,  the  reason  of  it,  or  the 
cause  which  moved  the  Legislature  to  enact 
it.”  The  United  States  Supreme  Court,  by 
Marshall,  Chief  Justice,  lay  down  the  same 
doctrine  in  9 Wheat,  p 189.  And  finally  the 
Supreme  Court  of  this  State,  in  Streeter  vs. 
Paton,  7 of  Mich.  p.  141,  lay  down  the  same 
principle  in  these  explicit  terms:  “Our  ! 

present  Constitution  was  not  the  formation  of 
a new  government,  but  the  continuation  of  a 
government  formed  under  a previous  Consti- 
tution, whose  supposed  or  real  defects  it  was 
intended  to  correct;  and,  in  construing  it,  we  ; 
are  bound  to  look  to  the  distribution  of  ju-  j 
dicial  power  under  the  old  Constitution,  and 
to  discover  if  we  can  the  evil,  if  any,  arising  ! 
from  that  distribution  and  intended  to  be  cor-  j 
rected  by  the  new  Constitution.”  Thus  the 
principle  of  construction  contended  lor  here 
is  clearly  and  authoritatively  settled. 

Wherefore,  when  the  words  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, relative  to  the  place  of  voting,  are  view'ed 
in  the  light  of  a remedy,  just  as  the  facts  show 
that  they  should  be:  when  the  causes  which 
led  to  their  introduction  into  the  Constitution 
are  inquired  into;  when  the  object  aimed 
at  by  their  use  is  more  fully  explained  by  refer-  i 
ence  to  the  well-known  facts  of  history ; then 
the  conviction  becomes  irresistable,  that  their  j 
true  intent  and  meaning  is,  that  each  elector  i 
6hall  vote,  personally,  if  at  all,  in  the  town-  I 
ship  or  ward  in  which  he  resides  and  not  by  j 
proxy,  or  in  any  other  place.  Here,  then,  is  j 
another  clincher  in  favor  of  the  exposition  I 
have  offered. 

4.  Another  consideration  of  special  impor- 
tance, in  favor  of  the  exposition  I have  given, 
is,  That  it  is  sustained  by  the  uniform  practice , 
custom , or  usage  of  the  citizens  and  authorities  oj 
the  State  for  nearly  a quarter  of  a century — that 
is , fr  om  the  origin  of  the  State  government. 

The  well  settled  doctrine  is  laid  down  in 
Kent,  vol.  I.,  p.  524,  that  “ Where  the  penning 
of  a statute  is  dubious,  long  usage  is  a just 
medium  to  expound  it  by.”  The  rule  is  this, 
that  “long  usage”  may  be  resorted  to,  in  or- 
der to  explain  a law  or  written  instrument,  but 
not  to  defeat  it. 

What  then  has  been  the  usage  or  practice 
touching  this  question?  When  did  it  begin?  i 
Was  the  beginning  at  or  about  the  time  the 
Constitution  was  adopted?  With  whom  did 
it  originate?  Did  the  men,  with  whom  it 


originated,  live  at,  or  about  the  time  that  in- 
strument was  made  and  went  into  operation? 
Had  they  fit  opportunities  for  knowing  the  cir- 
cumstances, under  which  it  was  framed,  sub- 
mitted, and  ratified?  And  what  was  the  true  in- 
tent and  meaning  of  the  members  of  the  Con- 
vention, who  drafted  it,  and  of  the  people,  who 
adopted  it?  And  has  the  practice  been  uni- 
form, and  as  extensive  as  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  Constitution?  Sir,  I recognize  these  as 
material  inquiries  in  this  connection,  and  they 
are  answerable,  affirmatively,  ana  in  a few 
words. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  the  citizens  of  this 
State  of  all  classes,  understood  that  the  words 
of  the  amendment  of  1839,  just  spoken  of,  im- 
peratively required  each  elector  to  vote  prrson- 
ally,  or  not  at  all,  in  the  township  or  ward  in 
which  he  resided,  and  that  they  were  intro- 
duced into  the  Constitution  for  that  very  rea- 
son. And  from  the  time  that  amendment  took 
effect  all  voting  at  State  and  local  elections,  pro- 
ceeded on  that  idea.  The  present  Constitu- 
tion was  framed  and  adopted  in  1850,  by  the 
6am e citizens,  substantially,  as  effected  the 
amendment  of  1839.  The  same  idea  expressed 
in  the  amendment  relative  to  the  place  of 
voting,  was  carried  into  the  new  Constitution, 
but  in  the  words  already  quoted,  namely: 
“No  citizen  or  inhabitant  shall  be  an  elector 
or  entitled  to  vote,  at  any  election,  unless  he 
has  resided  in  the  State  three  mouths  and  in 
the  township  or  ward  in  which  he  offers  his 
vote  ten  days  next  preceding  such  election.” 
Now  mark  this:  The  members  of  the  Con- 
vention who  drafted  this  provision  and  the 
people  who  adopted  it,  understood  at  the  time, 
and  especially  intended,  that  its  natural  and 
necessary  effect  should  be  to  prescribe  and 
fix  the  place  of  voting,  and  require  every 
elector,  the  same  as  the  amendment  of 
1839,  to  appear  in  person  at  the  polls,  in  the 
township  or  ward  in  which  he  resides,  in  order 
to  vote,  and  there  vote  personally,  or  not  at 
all.  But  how  do  we  know  all  this?  Because, 
1.  Such  is  the  natural  and  ordinary  import  of 
these  words,  as  we  have  clearly  seen.  2.  The 
greater  part  of  them  are  still  living,  and  they 
assure  us  that  such  was  their  earnest  inten- 
tion. Some  of  them,  standing  high  on  account 
of  character,  intelligence  and  legal  ability,  who 
were  also  members  of  the  constitutional  con- 
vention, have  assured  me  that  such,  certainly, 
was  their  understanding  and  intention.  3.  The 
very  members  of  that  convention,  and  the 
people  who  adopted  the  Constitution,  of 
course  knew,  exactly,  what  they  meant,  and 
they  said  what  they  meant  and  meant  what 
they  said;  these  all,  with  one  accord,  and 
without  question,  acted  on  this  idea  from  the 
start,  and  from  that  time  down,  the  same  idea 
has  prevailed,  and  all  voting  at  State  and  local 
elections  has  been  done  from  year  to  year  in 
exact  conformity  with  it  for  nearly  fifteen 
years,  under  this  Constitution,  and  nearly 
twenty-five  since  the  amendment  of  the  old 
one. 

Now  sir,  what  do  we  see  in  all  this,  which 
touches  our  present  purpose?.  See,  Sir? 
Why,  we  see  the  men  who  framed  the  amend- 
ment of  1839,  and  also  our  present  constitu- 
tion, and  the  great  people  of  Michigan  who 
adopted  both,  together  with  all  subsequent 
accessions  to  their  numbers,  who  as  they,  em- 
brace citizens  of  all  classes,  of  every  political 


11 


party,  of  every  description  of  business,  and  of 
every  kind  and  degree  of  intelligence,  all  com- 
ing up,  in  every  part  of  the  State,  at  a fixed 
time,  from  year  to  year,  in  unbroken  succes- 
sion, for  nearly  a quarter  of  a century,  and 
unanimously  illustrate,  declare  and  confirm  by 
what  they  do,  that  the  true  intent  and  mean- 
ing of  the  words  of  said  Section  1,  relative  to 
the  place  of  voting,  is  that  each  elector,  in 
order  to  vote  at  all,  shall  appear  in  person  at 
the  polls,  in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he 
resides,  and  there  personally  tender  his  vote  to 
the  proper  officer. 

Sir,  in  view  of  a practical  exposition  such  as 
this,  where  the  precedent  is  commensurate 
with  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  and  ac- 
quiesced in,  and  acted  upon  since  that  time 
by  an  unbroken  chain  of  practice,  we  may  say 
as  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
said,  in  1 Cranch 299 : “It  has,  indeed,  fixed 

tne  construction.  It  is  a contemporary  inter- 
pretation of  the  most  forcible  nature.  This 
practical  exposition  is  too  strong  and  obsti- 
nate to  be  shaken  or  controlled.”  Again,  by 
the  same  Court,  5 Cranch  22,  M’Keen  v.  De- 
laney’s Lessee,  a case  arising  under  the  act  of 
Pennsylvania,  of  1715,  which  required  deeds 
to  be  acknowledged  before  a Justice  of  the 
Peace  in  the  county  where  the  land  lay.  It 
had  been  the  contemporaneous  and  uniform 
practice  from  1715  to  the  date  ot  the  deed  (1775) 
to  acknowledge  deeds  before  a Justice  of  the  Su- 
preme Court,  although  the  act  of  1715  did  not 
authorize  such  a practice.  The  Court  held, 
“as  that  practice  had  prevailed  for  so  long  a 
period,  it  must  be  considered  a correct  expo- 
sition of  the  statute,  or  good  evidence  of  such 
construction  by  the  judicial  tribunals  of  Fenn- 
sylvaniaF  In  Packard  v.  Richardson,  17  Mass. 
121,143.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Massachu- 
setts say:  “ A contemporaneous  is  generally 
the  best  construction  of  a statute.  It  gives 
the  sense  of  a community  of  the  terms  made 
use  bf  by  a Legislature.  If  there  is  ambiguity 
in  the  language,  the  understanding  and  appli- 
cation of  it,  when  the  statute  first  comes  into 
operation,  sanctioned  by  long  acquiescence  on 
the  part  of  the  legislative  and  judicial  tri- 
bunals, is  the  strongest  evidence  that  it  has 
been  rightly  explained  in  practice.  A con- 
struction under  such  circumstances  becomes 
established  law.” 

And  now,  Sir,  if  it  be  possible,  that  any 
doubt  can  remain  in  the  mind  of  any  member 
of  the  committee,  it  will  be  effectually  re- 
moved by  the  words  of  the  Justices  of  the  Su- 
preme Judicial  Court  of  New  Hampshire,  ut- 
tered in  reference  to  a measure  like  the  one 
now  before  us.  Their  words  are  these : “ The 
language  of  the  Constitution  is  to.  be  understood  in 
the  sense  in  which  it  was  used  at  the  time  of  its 
adoption .”  Am.  Law  Reg.  for  Oct.,  1863. 

In  what  sense  the  language  of  Section  1,  in 
question,  was  used  at  the  time  the  Constitu- 
tion of  this  State  was  adopted,  is  a matter  of 
proof;  and  that  proof  we  have  from  thousands 
of  living  witnesses,  and  in  an  unbroken  chain 
of  historical  facts,  as  I have  before  shown,  and 
shall  still  further  show. 

Now,  Sir,  on  the  principles  established  by 
these  decisions  it  follows,  unavoidably,  that 
the  living  testimony,  and  the  long  practice  of 
which  I have  spoken,  relative  to  the  prescribed 
place  of  voting,  also,  as  to  the  personal  presence 
of  the  elector  at  the  polls,  his  voting  there. 


personally , and,  especially,  as  this  practice 
originated  in  the  sense  given  to  the  words  of 
the  Constitution  before  and  at  the  time  the  in- 
strument was  adopted,  and  has  been  univer- 
sally acquiesced  in  and  partaken  of  by  the 
people  and  by  the  officers  of  the  Government, 
in  all  of  its  departments— I repeat,  that  ac- 
cording to  these  decisions,  this  practice  is  now 
to  be  accepted  by  us,  and  by  all  concerned,  as 
the  correct  exposition  of  said  Section  1,  and 
is  to  be  treated  as  tantamount  to  such  a con- 
struction by  the  Supreme  Court  of  this  State. 

So,  Sir,  we  have  here,  in  this  long  and  uni- 
versal usage,  thus  enforced  by  thousands  of 
living  witnesses,  another  clincher  in  favor  of 
the  exposition  I have  given,  so  strong  that  no 
one  can  break  it,  or  escape  from  it. 

5.  Another  consideration  in  favor  of  this  ex- 
position is  derived  from  Legislative  acts  passed 
at  the  time , or  very  soon  after  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution. 

In  the  case,  The  People  vs.  Green,  2 Wen- 
dell 274,  it  was  held,  that  in  the  construction 
of  a statute,  great  deference  is  certainly  due  to 
a legislative  exposition  of  a constitutional  pro- 
vision, especially  when  it  was  made  almost 
contemporaneously  with  constitutional  pro- 
vision, and  may  be  supposed  to  result  from 
the  same  views  of  policy  and  mode  of  reason- 
ing, which  prevailed  among  the  framers  of  the 
instrument  expounded. 

Now  for  the  application  of  the  rule.  Our 
present  Constitution  was  submitted  to  the 
people  and  approved  in  November,  1850.  The 
Legislature  met  shortly  thereafter.  At  its  first 
session,  after  the  adoption  of  the  Constitution, 
our  general  election  law  was  passed.  It  was 
approved  in  June,  1851.  [So  the  act  was 
passed  almost  contemporaneously  with  the 
adoption  of  the  Constitution.  Now  it  is  but 
reasonable  to  suppose,  that  if  the  authors  of 
that  instrument,  or  the  people  who  adopted  it 
entertained  any  such  notion,  as  to  the  effect  of 
Section  1,  Art.  7,  in  relation  to  elections,  as 
arc  now  advanced  by  the  friends  of  either  of 
the  bills  before  us,  the  members  of  that  first 
Legislature  would  have  possessed  it,  also,  and 
that  it  would  have  been  embodied  by  them  in 
the  general  election  law;  or,  at  all  events, 
that  they  would  have  given  expression  to  it, 
in  some  form  or  other.  Is  it  conceivable 
that  it  could  have  been  otherwise?  No,  sir. 
Well  did  they,  in  way,  directly  or  indirectly, 
indicate  any  such  notion?  Not  by  any  means. 
But  on  the  contrary,  they  did  most  distinctly 
indicate  the  same  views,  as  to  the  effect  of 
Sec.  1,  that  are  expressed  in  the  exposition  I 
have  stated.  For,  our  general  election  law 
which  they  passed,  provides  that  a general 
election  shall  be  held  in  the  several 
townships  and  wards  of  the  State,  on 
Tuesday  succeeding  the  first  Monday  of  No- 
vember, 1852,  and  on  the  same  day  every 
second  year  thereafter.  It  also  provides,  that 
the  polls  shall  be  opened  at  8 o’clock  in  the 
forenoon  of  that  day,  and  close  at  5 o’clock 
p.  m.,  and  that  the  canvass  of  the  votes  shall 
take  place  immediately  thereafter,  and  the 
result  declared.  These  provisions  remain  to 
this  day  unaltered.  And  you  will  please  ob- 
serve, that  the  same  idea  is  expressed  here 
as  to  th & prescribed  place  of  voting,  that  is  con- 
tained in  the  Constitution.  You  will  note 
this  too,  that  the  business  of  voting,  counting 
the  votes,  and  declaring  the  result,  is  all  to 


12 


be  dispatched  in  a day,  if  practicable,  and  in 
two  at  most.  There  is  to  be  no  waiting  for 
votes  to  come  in  from  abroad,  no  provisions 
for  proxy  voting,  none  for  sending  the  ballot- 
box  away  to  receive  the  votes  of  students, 
sailors,  soldiers,  foreign  ministers,  or  other 
absentees.  No,  sir,  there  is  nothing  of  the 
kind,  although  Sec.  5,  Art  7,  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, had  just  been  adopted,  providing  that 
these  classes  of  citizens  shall  neither  gain  or 
lose  a residence  by  being  away.  No,  sir,  there 
is  nothing  in  the  proceedings  of  that  Legis- 
lature, or  any  subsequent  one,  till  the  present, 
which  has  the  slightest  look  towards  the  pos- 
sibility oi  such  a thing.  Every  thing  6hows 
that  the  thought  was  not  then  conceived  by 
the  wildest  dreamer.  But  on  the  other  hand 
the  exactly  opposite  idea,  viz:  that  each  elec- 
tor, in  order  to  enjoy  the  elective  franchise 
must  appear  in  person,  in  the  township  or 
ward  in  which  he  resides,  and  there  vote  per- 
sonally— this  idea  pervades  the  election  laws, 
and  is  incorporated  into  their  life  and  sub- 
stance. The  result  then,  to  which  we  are 
thus  conducted,  is  this,  1st,  that  we  have  in  this 
particular  view  of  the  case,  a practical,  con- 
temporaneous,and  continuousexposition  by  the 
Legislature  which  agrees  exactly,  with  the  one 
that  the  opponents  of  these  bills  approve  oi ; 
and  2d,  that  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United 
States,  in  McCulluck  vs  the  State  of  Maryland, 
4 Wheat.  816  by  Marshall,  Chief  Justice,  ut- 
tered good  sense  as  well  as  good  law,  when  it 
said:  An  exposition  of  the  Constitution  de- 

liberately established  by  legislative  acts,  ought 
not  to  be  lightly  disregarded.” 

I am  not  unmindful  of  the  fact,  6ir,  that  the 
advocates  of  this  soldiers’  voting  project, 
claim  that  we  have  in  this  State  legislative 

Srecedents  for  it.  It  is  stated  in  Senate  Doc. 

o.  1,  and  in  the  report  of  the  Honorable 
member  lrom  Lapeer,  Mr.  Heminway,  that 
the  Legislature  ot  this  State  has,  in  many 
cases,  under  the  present  Constitution,  author- 
ized citizens  to  hold  elections  outside  of  the 
limits  of  the  township  in  which  they  reside. 
In  the  report  of  Mr.Heminway,  it  is  said,  that 
this  was  done  in  1861,  in  case  of  Ann  Arbor, 
Pontiac  and  Coldwater;  of  Lansing  and  Sagi- 
naw in  1859 ; and  of  Port  Huron  in  1857— the 
citizens  of  each  ot  these  towns,  being  empow- 
ered to  vote,  in  a city  of  the  same  name,  lo- 
cated within  its  original  limits. 

It  seems  quite  sufficient,  in  reply  to  this 
argument,  to  say : 

1.  That  it  is  admitted,  that  each  of 
these  cities  is  located  in  the  original  boun- 
daries of  the  township  ot  the  same 
name,  and  that  the  citizens  of  the  township 
hold  their  elections  just  where  they  did  before 
the  city  was  established.  Now  then,  how 
does  the  case  stand?  Exactly  thus : for  cer- 
tain local  purposes,  a line  is  run  round  a few 
acres,  more  or  less;  but  elections  are  to  be 
held  just  where  they  were  before  the  line  was 
run,  or  the  city  incorporated.  So  far  as  elec- 
tions are  concerned,  the  city  is  put  into  the 
township,  and  not  the  township  into  the  city. 

2.  In  some  of  the  cases  spoken  of,  and  I 
do  not  know  but  in  all,  the  cities  were  incor- 
ported,  subject  to  the  right  of  the  people  of  the 
township  to  hold  elections  therein,  the  same  as 
before.  So,  for  the  purposes  of  elections,  the 
township  stands  in  all  respects,  just  as  it  would 
had  no  city  been  located  within  its  limits. 


3.  Two  or  three  acts  of  the  Legislature  of 
the  kind  named,  of  recent  date,  allowing  citi- 
zens to  keep  on  doing  lawful  things,  just  as 
they  had  been  doing  them,  cannot  De  said  to 
form  a legislative  precedent  for  a new  order 
of  things,  affecting  constitutional  powers,  and 
the  purity  of  elections.  A legislative  prece- 
dent to  come  within  the  rule  is  not  made  quite 
so  quick  or  quite  eo  easily.  In  order  to  con- 
stitute acts  of  the  Legislature  such  a practical 
exposition  of  the  Constitution,  as  is  entitled 
to  much  weight,  they  must  have  been  passed 
at  or  about  the  time  the  Constitution  was 
adopted,  and  acquiesced  in,  and  acted  under, 
by  the  people  and  all  the  departments  of  the 
government  since  that  time.  Why,  Sir,  just  look 
at  it.  If  three  or  four  acts  of  the  Legislature 
of  recent  date,  and  without  regard  to  the  ac- 
quiescence of  the  people  and  of  the  other  de- 
partments of  government,  and  their  action  on 
them,  are  to  be  held  as  evidence  of  what  the 
Constitution  i6,  then  the  Legislature  has  only 
to  pass  a few  successive  erroneous  acts  in  or- 
der to  remove  all  constitutional  restrictions 
on  itself  whatever,  and,  in  fact,  do  away  with 
the  Constitution  entirely. 

4.  As  we  have  already  intimated,  these  acts 
are  of  recent  date.  The  constitutionality  of 
no  one  of  them  has  yet  been  passed  upon  by 
the  Court.  This  lact,  in  connection  with 
preceding  considerations,  6hows,  that  they  do 
not  approach  anywhere  near  to  a precedent  of 
such  attributes,  as  the  rule  contemplates,  and 
are,  therefore,  entitled  to  no  manner  of  weight, 
in  the  settlement  of  the  question  in  hand.  And 
in  this  state  of  utter  weakness  for  such  a use, 
we  leave  them. 

! 6.  Another  consideration  of  great  moment 

in  favor  of  the  hitherto  universally  received 
exposition  of  this  provision  ot  the  Constitu- 
tion is,  that  it  agrees  with  the  sense  put  on  it  by 
the  members  of  the  legal  profession , who  lived  in 
the  JState  at  the  time  the  Constitution 
was  adopted  and , also , by  those  who 

came  here , or  entered  the  profession  soon 
thereafter — which  sense  the  profession  have  con- 
tinued to  put  upon  it , and  which  they  put  upon  it 
now , irrespective  of  party,  with  perhaps  a few 
seeming  exceptions  of  very  recent  origin. 

Lord  Coke  6ays:  “Great  regard  ought,  in 
construing  a statute,  to  be  paid  to  the  con- 
struction, which  the  sages  of  the  law,  who 
lived  about  the  time,  or  soon  thereafter,  put 
upon  it,  because  they  were  test  able  to  judge 
of  the  intention  ot  the  makers  at  the  time, 
when  the  law  was  made.” 

Such  being  the  rule , what  now  are  the 
facts  ? The  Constitution  of  this  State  was 
adopted  but  a little  over  thirteen  years  ago. 
The  greater  part  of  the  lawyers  who  lived  in 
the  State,  then,  live  here  now.  And  what  is 
more,  nearly  every  leading  member  of  the 
profession  in  the  State,  to-day,  was  in  the 
profession  here  at  that  time.  I know  several 
lawyers  of  distinction,  who  were  members  of 
the  convention  which  framed  the  Constitu- 
tion. I have  conversed  with  them,  on  this 
very  matter.  They  say,  emphatically,  that 
the  meaning,  which  they  and  their  contem- 
porary brethren  put  on  this  part  of  that  in- 
strument, was  exactly  the  same  as  the  one 
stated  in  the  exposition  1 have  offered,  I have 
talked  with  other  lawyers  of  standing,  both 
Democrats  and  Republicans,  not  of  that  con- 
vention, but  who  were  here  when  the  Con- 


13 


etitution  was  adopted.  These  all  say  that 
such  is  the  meaning  which  they  and  their 
brethren  put  upon  it.  I have  talked  with  good 
lawyers,  who  have  come  to  the  State,  or  en- 
tered the  profession,  6ince  the  adoption  of  the 
Constitution,  who  have  given  attention  to 
this  subject;  they  say  that  their  view  of  it  i6 
the  same.  If  I am  not  mistaken,  and  I be- 
lieve I am  not,  I have  conversed  with  every 
lawyer  of  this  house,  but  one,  on  this  point, 
and  I feel  confident  that  all  of  them  actually 
take  the  same  view  that  1 maintain,  except 
one,  who  says  he  is  not  sure,  that  he 
has  doubts  about  it.  All  of  the  Judiciary 
Committee  take  this  view,  save  one,  “the 
doubter.”  The  chairman  of  the  committee  of 
elections,  the  Hon.  T.  G.  Smith,  submitted  a 
report  to  us  last  winter  against  the  constitu- 
tionality of  this  very  project,  by  which  he  did 
himself  credit  as  a man  and  as  lawyer.  And  I 
will  venture  the  remark  here,  that  if  any  law- 
yer ot  this  house,  save  my  friend  “the 
doubter,’7  votes  lor  either  of  these  bills,  it  will 
be  because  his  sympathetic  impulses  carry  him 
beyond  the  limits  of  his  judgment,  or  fiom 
partisan  considerations.  All  of  them,  save 
the  doubter,  evince  a conviction,  that  this  pro- 
ject is  unconstitutional.  And  is  it  creditable, 
nay  is  it  possible,  nay  is  it  not  a libel  on  human 
nature  to  suppose  that  any  of  them,  with  the 
•anctities  of  his  official  oath  on  his  conscience, 
will  hesitate  to  act  on  his  convictions? — that 
any  one  of  them  will  fear,  (like  the  believing 
parents,  whose  blind  son  had  been  made  to 
see)  to  take  sides  on  a question  of  this  impor- 
tance, and  vindicate  his  belief,  lest  he  may, 
in  the  happenings  of  the  future,  seem  to  be 
lacking  in  party  fidelity,  and  on  that  account, 
perhaps,  be  turned  out  of  the  party  synagogue? 
Sir,  let  me  say  to  such  an  one,  if  6uch  an  one 
there  be : 1,  That  the  man,  who  is  untrue  to 
his  convictions,  must  lose  his  own  self-re- 
spect, and  he  that  so  acts  as  to  lose  his  own 
self-re6pect,  is  very  likely  to  lose,  by  the  same 
act,  the  respect  of  others;  and,  2,  that  the 
danger  to  him  in  this  matter  lies  on  the  side  of 
following  party  ends,  or  yielding  to  party 
lears.  For,  Sir,  let  him  be  assured,  betimes, 
that  however  much  certain  political  aspirants 
may  strive  to  make  this  a party  question,  they 
cannot  succeed  in  the  attempt.  They  may 
get  up  a little  stir  here,  perhaps,  in  that  direc- 
tion, and  the  vote  on  it,  when  taken,  may  be 
divided  by  party  lines  with  a few  exceptions ; 
but  these  lines  will  not  run  far  or  long,  out- 
side of  this  House.  The  sober  second  thought 
will  destroy  them.  Men  of  intelligence  and 
weight  of  all  parties,  all  over  the  State,  will  dis- 
approve of  this  project,  as  contrary  to  the  Con- 
stitution. And  instead  of  being  brought  in  to 
the  support  of  it  as  individuals,  or  as  a party, 
they  will  scout  it  in  both  capacities.  So  the 
man  is  in  much  greater  danger  of  being  mark- 
ed and  eschewed,  who  goes  for  it,  or  tries  to 
induce  others  to  go  for  it,  or  to  make  it  a 
party  measure,  than  the  man  who  stands  up 
square  and  true  to  his  convictions,  and  man- 
fully opposes  it.  Let  him  that  is  in  danger 
take  warning. 

But,  Mr.  Chairman,  I have  not  quite  done 
with  the  members  of  the  legal  profession,  who 
lived  here  contemporaneously  with  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution,  and  from  that  time 
to  this.  I have  said,  that  they  embrace  the 
most  conspicuous  and  influential  lawyers  of 


the  State.  And  so  they  do.  And,  Sir,  with- 
out raising  any  invidious  comparisons,  I could 
not  but  seem  to  myself,  as  lacking  in  fidelity 
to  the  occasion,  should  I omit  to  speak  of  one 
of  the  most  eminent  among  them  by  name. 
He  has  been  for  several  years  prominently  be- 
fore the  people,  who  have  reposed  in  him 
great  public  trusts,  and  duly  appreciated  his 
services  in  the  discharge  of  them.  Hi6  name 
is  a favorite  one  with  the  majority  of  this 
House,  and,  in  truth,  is  at  present  one  of  the 
talismanic  names  of  the  dominant  party  in  the 
State.  I have,  Sir,  the  honor  to  refer  here  to 
the  name  of  Austin  Blair,  of  Jackson,  Mich- 
igan. And  now  “ who  hath  ears  to  hear  let 
him  hear” 

BLAIR  vs.  BLAIR. 

It  seems  that  a while  previous  to  the 
meeting  of  this  Legislature  last  winter, 
Mr.  Blair  had  occasion  to  express  his 
views  deliberately,  as  to  the  constitution- 
ality and  expediency  of  this  same  pro- 
ject with  regard  to  soldiers  voting,  when 
away  from  their  place  of  residence;  and  in  do- 
ing so,  he  made  use  of  these  words,  namely: 
“ The  Legislature  cannot  authorize  a citizen  to 
vote  in  any  place , except  in  the  township  or  uard 
where  he  resides.”  He  continued:  “The  lan- 
guage of  Art.  7,  Sec.  1,  is  as  follows  : ‘ But 
no  citizen  or  inhabitant  shall  be  an  elector  or 
entitled  to  vote  at  any  election,  unless  he  shall 
be  above  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  and  has 
resided  in  this  State  three  months,  and  in 
the  township  or  ward  in  which  he  offers  to  vote , 
ten  days  next  preceding  such  election,”  ’ After 
making  this  quotation,  he  added : “7  think  this 
is  decisive .”  , 

Such  was  the  deliberate  opinion  of  Mr.  Blair, 
deliberately  stated,  as  to  the  constitutionality 
of  this  measure,  but  a short  time  before  the 
meeting  of  this  Legislature  last  winter.  What 
he  then  stated  as  to  the  expediency  of  it,  we 
shall  take  due  notice  of  in  its  proper  place. 

But,  Sir,  it  should  6eem  from  appearances 
that  Mr.  Blair  has  changed  his  mind.  He  then 
said  that  “the  Legislature  cannot  authorize  a 
citizen  to  vote  in  any  place  except  in  the  town- 
ship or  ward  where  he  resides;”  and  he  ad- 
duced the  words  of  the  Constitution , Article,  Sec- 
tion, and  clause,  to  support  what  he  said. 
But  he  now  advances  a directly  contrary  opin- 
ion, and  brings  forward  certain  novel  theories^ 
oj  construction  to  back  it — not  the  plain  words* 
of  the  Constitution,  taken  in  their  natural  and 
ordinary  import,  but  rather  certain  hitherto 
v/nknovm  theoi'ies  of  construction. 

Now,  Sir,  both  of  these  antagonistical  opin- 
ions cannot  be  correct.  If  a judge  gives  two 
directly  opposite  opinions  on  exactly  the  same 
set  of  facts,  and  under  the  same  law,  both 
cannot  be  good.  In  one  or  the  other,  he  must 
be  either  mistaken  or  dishonest.  If  a witness 
testifies  to  one  set  of  facts,  at  one  hearing  of  a 
case,  and  then  to  a directly  opposite  set  of 
facts,  at  another  hearing  of  the  very  same  case, 
both  of  his  statements,  of  course,  cannot  be 
true;  and  not  only  so,  you  v^ill  of  necessity 
be  led  to  query  whether  he,  at  bottom,  has 
any  truth  in  him  at  all — whether  he  really  has 
either  moral  or  mental  integrity  in  his  head  or 
heart. 

But,  Mr.  Chairman,  let  me  here  make  this 
inquiry : Are  we  to  infer  from  these  surprising 
disclosures  that  Mr.  Blair  is  so  sadly  lacking  in 


14 


mental  integrity  as  this  would  indicate,  leav- 
ing moral  integrity  out  oi‘  the  question ; that 
he  is  not  true  to  his  convictions;  that  his  mind 
is  not  true  to  itself;  that  it  is  so  made  up,  as 
not  to  be  able  to  clearly  see  and  duly  appreci- 
ate the  force  of  fundamental  principles,  or  ad- 
here to  them  against  temptations  from  with- 
out, or  the  strivings  of  personal  ambition  from 
within? 

Or  are  we  to  infer  that  Mr.  Blair  has  two 
opinions  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  this 
measure,  one  being  his  opinion  as  a lawyer, 
and  the  other  his  opinion  as  a politician, 
scheming  for  future  promotion,  and  that  he 
now  advances  one  and  now  the  other,  as  shall 
best  serve  his  purpose? 

We  daily  recognize  the  tact  that  a man  may 
and  should  change  his  mind,  when  there  is  a 
good  reason  for  it.  We  recognize  the  fact, 
too,  that  he  may  differ  from  himself  at  differ- 
ent times.  We  also,  on  the  other  hand,  rec- 
ognize the  fact  that  principles  do  not  change; 
and  that  this  provision  of  the  Constitution  is 
now  just  what  it  was  when  Mr.  Blair  pro- 
nounced it  to  be  decisive  against  a measure 
like  the  one  under  consideration.  We  also 
recognize  tkelurther  fact,  that  men  sometimes 
have  strong  motives  for  changing  their  opin- 
ions, when  they  have  no  good  reason  for  it; 
and  in  such  cases  they  may  assign  for  reasons 
what  have  the  form  thereof,  but  not  the 

ower.  How  good  Mr.  Blair’s  reasons  are  for 

is  new  opinion,  wc  have  seen  a little  already, 
aud  shall  see  more  fully  a little  further  on. 
In  the  meantime,  Mr.  Chairman,  I must  con- 
fess that  I am  reminded  here  of  the  habits  of  a 
certain  money  and  stock  broker,  a native  of 
France,  and  a person  of  note  in  his  way,  who 
resided  in  Boston.  You  go  into  his  office  and 

say  to  him : “ Mr. , how  is  Western  ?”  He 

would  reply : “ Do  you  wish  to  buy,  or  do  you 
wish  to  sell?”  You  answer:  “Buy.”  He 

continues:  “Well,  the  Board  closed  to-day 
at  $90,  with  an  evident  tendency  upward.  I 
will  sell  at  $90.50.”  But  if  you  say  to  him: 
“ 1 wish  to  sell,”  then,  he  would  answer: 
“ Well,  the  Board  closed  to-day  at  $90,  with  an 
evident  tendency  downward.  I will  give  you 
$89.50.”  But  let  me  again  inquire  of  any  who 
may  know,  if  it  be  indeed  true  that  Mr.  Blair, 
whom  the  most  of  us  have  hitherto  believed 
to  be  a man  of  fair  intentions,  has  at  length 
become  so  far  perfected  in  the  arts  of  the  mod- 
ern politician  as  to  be  capable  of  saying  to  any 
whom  it  may  concern:  “If  you  must  and 
will  know  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  the 
Constitution,  relative  to  this  measure,  I tell 
you,  as  a lawyer , that  the  Legislature  cannot 
authorize  a citizen  to  vote  in  any  place,  except 
in  the  township  or  ward  where  he  resides ; ” 
but  if  you  are  disposed  to  accommodate,  or  sell 
yourself  to  our  side,  that  is,  to  my  party,  within 
the  party,  I then  tell  you,  as  a politician , be- 
lieving that  “the  end  justifies  the  means,” 
and  as  one  hound  to  win , Constitution  or  no 
Constitution,  that  the  legal  validity  of  this 
measure  “need  not  be  doubted  ?”  Is  this 
the  ultimate  object  of  his  recommendation 
of  this  measure?  If  yea,  then  he  and  his  ad- 
herents might  well  pray,  in  the  language  of 
Burns : 

“ O wad  some  Pow’r  the  giftie  gie  us 

To  see  oursels  as  others  see  us! 

It  watt  frae  monie  a blunder  free  us, 

An’  foolish  notion,” 


Sir,  we  should  be  led  to  smile  at  this  ex- 
tremely unsightly  spectacle  were  there  not  a 
kind  of  moral  melancholy  intermingled  which 
turns  ridicule  into  mourning.  But  still  the 
position  remains  in  full  integrity  and  force, 
that  the  exposition  I have  offered  agrees  with, 
and  is  supported  by,  the  views  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  the  legal  profession,  who  lived  in 
the  State  at  the  time  the  Constitution  was 
adopted,  and  also  of  those  who  came  here  or 
entered  the  profession  soon  thereafter,  which 
views  have  universally  prevailed  until  a clique 
hit  upon  this  measure  to  preserve  party  su- 
premacy and  especially  personal  supremacy  in 
the  party. 

7.  Another  consideration  in  favor  of  the 
exposition  I have  offered  is,  that  it  is  agreeable 
to,  and  is  supported  by,  principles  of  the  common 
law  in  force  when  the  Constitution  was  adopted, 
and  still  remainin  force. 

I have,  in  a manner,  anticipated  this  consid- 
eration; but  it  is  of  too  much  weight  not  to 
be  specially  stated. 

Kent  vol.  1 p.  524  says : “ Statutes  are  like- 
wise to  be  construed  in  reference  to  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  common  law.”  He  adds:  “ This 
has  been  the  language  of  the  courts  in  every 
age.”  And  to  guard  against  mistake  or 
quibbling  here  it  may  be  well  to  remark  what 
every  common  sense  man  knows  to  be  true, 
that  it  is  well  settled,  and  questioned  by  no 
one,  that  “ in  expounding  a constitutional 
provision  the  same  rules  of  construction  and 
interpretation  should  obtain  as  are  adopted 
and  applied  in  the  construction  of  a statute. 
(Smith’s  Com.  :n  Stat.  and  Con.  construction 
p.  418.)  And  it  may  be  well  to  note  further 
that  our  Constitution  Art.  20  Sec.  1,  recognizes 
the  common  law  and  declares  it  to  be  in  force. 

What  then,  was  the  common  law  applicable 
to  this  subject  at  the  time  the  Constitution 
was  adopted?  Kent  Vol.  II  p.  369  6ays : “In 
the  case  of  elections  in  public  and  municipal 
corporations,  and  in  all  other  elections  of  a 
public  nature,  every  vote  must  be  personally 
given.”  He  cites  the  cases:  The  Dean  and 
Chapter  of  Ferns,  Davies’s  Kep’t.  129,  and  At- 
torney General  vs.  Scott,  1 Vesey,  413,  to  sub- 
stantiate this  important  doctrine.  The  words 
of  the  Constitution  in  question,  being  then 
construed  according  to  the  common  law,  it 
follows  that  the  voting  there  spoken  of  means 
voting  in  person,  and  that  under  that  instru- 
ment the  elector  must  vote  at  public  elections 
personally  or  not  at  all.  This  supports  my 
exposition,  while  it  gives  this  proxy  bill  its 
death  blow. 

Again.  The  provisions  of  the  old  Constitu- 
tion with  regard  to  public  elections,  as  well 
as  the  general  election  law  in  force  before  and 
at  the  time  the  present  Constitution  was  adop- 
ted, harmonized  exactly  with  the  principles  of 
the  common  law  effecting  the  same;  and 
in  pursuance  of  these  principles  and  provisions 
a practice  then  prevailed,  as  we  have  seen  in 
another  aspect  of  this  case,  which  possessed, 
1st,  all  the  attributes  of  a common  law  princi- 
ple ; 2,  all  the  authority  of  constitutional  and 
statutory  enactments ; and  3,  all  the  force  of  a 
construction  by  the  Supreme  Court  of  this 
State.  This  practice,  resting  on  such  solid 
ground,  and  proceeding  under  such  ultimate 
legal  sanctions,  definitely  prescribed  the  place 
and  manner  of  voting  by  requiring  each  elector 
to  be  personally  present  at  the  pods  in  the  town - 


15 


ship  or  ward  in  which  he  resides,  and  there  per- 
sonally  tender  his  vote , or  not  vote  at  all.  The  facts 
stated  here  are  admitted  by  all.  Now  observe, 
1.  That  it  was  to  this  practice,  then  in  use  and 
thus  established , that  the  framers  of  our  present' 
Constitution  referred  by  the  words  of  Sec.  1, 
to  wit : “ No  citizen  shall  be  entitled  to  vote 

at  any  election  unless  he  has  resided  in  the 
township  or  ward  in  which  he  offers  to  vote , ten 
days  next  preceding  such  election.”  2.  They 
took  it  for  granted  that  this  practice  must  re- 
main because  it  was  but  carrying  out  an  im- 
poitant  principle  of  the  common  law,  and  of 
the  provisions  of  the  positive  laws  of  the 
State,  which,  they  declare,  should  remain  in 
force— (Art.  20  Sec.  1;)  and  because  many  of 
them  now  tell  us,  and  none  deny  it,  that  they 
took  it  for  granted  that  this  practice  would 
continue. 

Now,  construing  the  words  of  Sec.  1 in 
question  in  reference  to  this  practice,  it  fol- 
lows that  inasmuch  as  no  different  provision 
is  made  in  the  Constitution,  the  right  of  suf- 
frage, established  by  it,  is  to  be  exercised  by 
the  elector  personally  at  the  polls  in  the  township 
oi'  ward  in  which  he  resides , and  no  where  else. 
And  this,  Sir,  puts  a complete  extinguisher  on 
this  field  system  now  sought  to  be  established; 
so  both  systems  are  clearly  forbidden  by  the 
Constitution  when  it  is  construed  in  reference 
to  the  principles  of  the  common  law,  as  the 
rule  requires. 

Now,  Sir,  no  man  of  common  discernment 
can  fail  to  remark  two  things  here,  because 
they  stand  out  so  very  prominently : 

1.  That  by  the  words  they  made  use  of  in 
Sec.  1,  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  so  re- 
ferred to  this  practice  as  to  recognize  its  per- 
manent validity  and  by  necessary  implication 
adopted  it  and  actually  made  it  a part  and 
parcel  of  that  instrument.  And, 

2.  Having  done  this,  they  felt  that  they  had  j 
done,  in  this  regard,  all  that  was  necessary  to 
be  done ; that  the  practice  being  thus  brought 
into  the  instrument,  it  was  there , and  must  con- 
tinue to  he  there , and  that  no  expressly  affirma- 
tive or  expressly  negative  provisions  could  do 
any  more.  Ana  there  they  left  it,  without 
unnecessary  words,  but  in  a simple  form  and 
there  it  now  stands  as  an  integral  part  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  State. 

And  sir,  let  me  remark  another  thing  here, 
namely : that  the  rule  requiring  statutes  and 
constitutional  provisions  to  be  construed  in 
reference  to  the  principles  of  common  law,  or 
established  custom  or  usage,  is  general  in  its 
application.  It  extends  to  contracts  so  as  to 
expound  the  meaning  of  their  words,  or  the  ! 
intention  of  the  parties.  The  application  of 
the  rule  applied  to  business  affairs  is  too 
familiar  to  require  illustration.  Parsons,  in 
his  work  on  Laws  of  Business,  p.  35  says: 

“ Any  custom  will  be  regarded  by  the  Court 
which  comes  within  the  reason  of  the  rule 
that  makes  the  custom  a part  of  the  contract. 
It  comes  within  the  reason  only  when  it  is  so 
far  established  and  so  well  known  to  the  parties, 
that  it  must  be  supposed  that  their  contract 
was  made  with  reference  to  it.”  Now,  in  the 
case  before  us,  we  are  not  left  to  supposition. 
Here  is  certainty.  The  framers  of  the  Con- 
stitution referred  to  the  usage  as  to  voting  in 
such  way  as  to  adopt  it.  This  makes  the  ar- 
gument perfect. 


Opinions  of  tlie  Conrts. 

8.  Another  consideration  in  favor  of  the  re- 
ceived exposition  of  the  words  of  the  Consti- 
tution in  question,  is,  that  it  is  sustained  by  the 
courts  of  all  the  other  States , whose  Constitutions 
are  similar  to  ours , where  the  subject  has  come  be- 
fore them , unless  the  court  of  the  State  of  Iowa  is 
an  exception. 

For  example:  The  Constitution  of  New 
Hampshire  provides  for  holding  meetings  of 
electors,  in  the  several  towns  of  the  State  for 
the  choice  of  public  officers.  It  also  provides 
that  each  elector  shall  have  the  right  to  vote 
in  the  presence  of  the  selectmen  of  the  town, 
in  open  meeting  in  the  town  or  parish  wherein 
he  dwells. 

Now  in  what  material  respect  does  this  pro- 
vision differ  from  the  provision  in  question  of 
j our  Constitution?  Our  Constitution  requires 
i that  a citizen  shall  have  his  legal  residence  in 
i the  township  or  ward  within  the  State,  where 
| he  votes,  and  that  he  shall  vote,  if  at  all,  in 
I such  township  or  ward.  Again,  I ask,  wherein 
j this  differs  in  any  material  point  from  the  pro- 
i vision  of  the  Constitution  of  New  Hampshire? 

| If,  now,  we  take  into  account  here,  as  we  cer- 
| tainly  must,  what  the  words  of  our  Constitu- 
j tion  necessarily  imply,  namely : the  recogni- 
! tion  and  adoption  of  the  established  exposi- 
I j tion  and  practice,  which  require  the  elector  to 
! appear  in  person  at  the  polls  in  the  township 
j or  ward  where  he  resides,  and  there,  with  his 
1 own  hand,  tender  his  vote  to  the  proper  officer 
j in  presence  of  the  inspectors;  I repeat,  that  if 
| this  established  practice  and  contemporaneous 
I exposition  are  taken  into  account,  the  two 
cases  become  not  only  identical  in  substance, 
but  almost  wholly  so  in  details. 

Now  let  us  see  how  the  Judges  of  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  New  Hampshire  regard  a 
measure  like  the  one  now  before  us,  in  its  re- 
lations to  their  Constitution,  which  we  see  is 
essentially  the  same  as  ours  as  far  as  this  meas- 
| ure  is  concerned.  The  Judges  of  that  court, 
in  an  opinion  given  under  date  of  June  23d, 
j 1863,  say:  “By  the  common  law,  in  elections 

of  public  and  municipal  corporations,  and  in 
all  other  public  elections,  every  vote  must  be 
personally  given.  (Citing  2 Kent  Com.  291 
[369 — 10th  Ed.]  The  Dean.,  &c.,  of  Ferns, 
Davies  129,  Ang.  and  A.  Corp.,  3d  Ed.,  95-97, 
Taylor  vs.  Griswold,  2 Green,  (N.  Y.)  226,234,- 
235;  Phillips  vs.  Wickham  1,  Page  578;  State 
vs.  Tudor,  5 Day,  333;  See  Attorney-General 
! vs.  Scott,  1 Yesey,  413.)  They  continue: 
“ The  history  of  the  origin  of  the  powers 
of  towns  in  New  England,  and  of  the  na- 
ture and  usages  of  their  meetings  (almost 
identical,  in  detail  even,  with  ours  in  Mich- 
; igan),  shows  that  in  this  respect  the  prac- 
\ tice  here,  before  and  at  the  date  of  the  adop- 
tion of  the  Constitution,  was  in  accordance 
with  the  general  rule  of  the  common  law. 
As  the  language  of  the  Constitution  is  to  be 
understood  in  the  sense  in  which  it  was  used 
at  the  time  of  its  adoption  (opinion  of  the 
Justices,  41  N.  H.,  551,)  and  as  at  that  time, 
both  by  the  common  law  and  by  the  settled 
usage  here,  the  right  ot  voting  for  public  offi- 
cers was  a right  that  must  be  exercised  per- 
sonally by  the  voter  at  the  meeting  held  for 
the  purpose,  it  follows  that  if  no  different  pro- 
vision is  made  in  the  Constitution,  the  right  of 
suffrage  established  by  it  is  to  be  exercised  by 
the  voter  in  person,  at  the  meetings  duly  held 


for  that  parpose.”  They  farther  say : “We  [ 
have  thus  far  coa3idered  the  provisioas  of  this 
bill  as  if  they  were  in  fact  what  they  purport 
to  be,  provisions  to  allow  the  elector  to  vote 
by  another  in  the  meeting  of  the  town,  &c.,  i 
in  which  he  is  entitled  to  vote.  But  the  bill,  ; 
in  effect,  permits  the  elector  to  vote  at  places 
other  than  those  dxed  by  the  Constitution ; 

* * * * anl  this,  we  think,  is  in  conflict  ; 
with  its  provisions  ! ” (Am.  Law  Reg.  for 
Oct.,  740.)  This  opinion  nts  our  case  now  in 
hand  exactly.  It  seems  to  deal  a decisive  blow 
at  every  material  point  in  and  about  this 
measure  now  sought  to  be  passed. 

Again.  The  Constitution  of  Pennsylvania, 
Article  3,  Section  1,  provides  that  “In  elec- 
tions by  the  citizens,  every  white  freeman  of 
the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  having  resided  in  1 
this  State  one  year,  and  in  the  election  district 
wher * he  offers  to  vote , ten  days  immediately 
preceding  such  election,  and  within  two  years 
aid  a State  or  county  tax,  which  shall  have  ; 
een  assessed  at  least  ten  days  before  the  elec-  j 
tion,  shall  enjoy  the  rights  of  an  elector.” 

You  will  observe  here  that  exactly  the  same 
form  of  words  is  used  in -the  Pennsylvania  Con- 
stitution, with  regard  to  the  place  of  voting, 
that  is  used  in  ours.  The  former  says:  “In 

the  election  district, where  he  offers  to  vote;  ” 
ours  says:  “ in  the  township  or  ward  in  which 
he  offers  to  vote.”  The  Constitution  of  Penn- 
sylvania does  not  describe  election  districts; 
it  makes  no  boundaries;  it  does  not  say  what 
they  are,  or  what  they  shall  be;  in  short,  it 
does  not  create  them;  neither  does  ours. 
Both  are  exactly  alike  in  these  respects.  That 
Constitution  recognizes  them,  as  existing  and 
to  exist;  our  does  the  same,  in  relation  to 
townships  and  wards.  That  takes  them  up 
and  makes  them  an  integral  part  of  itself ; 
ours  does  the  same  in  relation  to  townships 
and  wards,  making  them  “election  districts.” 
The  similarity  of  the  two  instruments,  as  to 
the  provisions  compared  here,  is  complete. 
So  far  all  is  plain. 

A law  was  passed  by  the  Legislature  of 
Pennsylvania,  providing  for  soldiers,  engaged 
in  the  service  of  the  United  States,  to  vote  in 
their  public  elections  when  absent  from  their 
election  districts,  whether  within  or  outside 
of  the  boundaries  of  the  State.  In  the  case, 
Chase  vs.  Miller,  the  question  as  to  the  consti- 
tutionality of  this  law  came  before  the  Su- 
preme Court  of  that  State  in  the  winter  of 
1862,  to  be  adjudged  and  settled.  The  opin- 
ion of  the  Court  was  delivered  May  23d,  1862, 
in  which  they  say : “The  Constitution  does 
not  define  an  election  district.  Election  dis- 
tricts acquired  their  first  constitutional  recogni- 
tion in  1838.  They  had,  however,  long  been 
familiar  to  our  ordinary  legislation.  Always, 
from  1799  down  to  the  present  hour,  election 
districts,  within  the  meaning  of  our  statute, 
have  denoted  subdivisions  of  Pennsylvania 
territory,  marked  out  by  know  boundaries 
pre-arranged  and  declared  by  public  authority.” 
(The  same  as  the  townships  and  wards*  in 
Michigan  when  our  Constitution  was  adopted.) 
The  court  continues : “Now,  whilst  the  Con- 
stitution did  not  stop  to  define  election  dis- 
tricts, it  took  up  and  incorporated  them,  as 
the  Legislature  had  theretofore  or  should  there- 
after define  and  regulate  them.  And,  there- 
fore election  districts  mean  in  the  Constitu- 
tion just  what  they  mean  in  the  statutes.”  j 

.1 


This  describes  our  case  here  in  Michigan  pre- 
cisely. Our  townships  and  wards,  for  the  pur- 
poses of  voting  are  our  election  districts. 
New  townships  and  wards  may  be  established 
by  the  Legislature,  old  ones  divided,  or  their 
boundaries  modified;  but  no  matter  what 
changes  take  place  in  this  respect,  they  still 
mean,  in  the  Constitution,  subdivisions  of 
Michigan  territory,  the  same  as  in  the  statute. 
And  as  the  court  of  Pennsylvania  says:  “ We 
must  understand  the  Constitution,  then,  as 
prescribing  to  the  qualified  voter  that  his  bal- 
lot must  be  cast  in  such  election  district;” 
that  is,  in  such  township  or  ward. 

That  court  further  says,  in  this  same  case: 
“ To  offer  to  vote  by  ballot,  is  to  present  one’s 
self,  with  proper  qualifications,  at  the  time 
and  place  appointed,  and  to  make  manual 
delivery  of  the  ballot  to  the  officers  appointed 
by  law  to  receive  it.  The  ballot  cannot  be  sent 
by  mail  or  express,  nor  can  it  be  ca3t  outside 
of  all  Pennsylvania  election  districts,  and  cer- 
tified into  the  county  where  the  voter  has  his 
domicil.  We  cannot  be  persuided,  that  the 
Constitution  ever  contemplated  any  such 
mode  of  voting,  and  we  have  abundant  reason 
for  thinking,  tnat  to  permit  it  would  break 
down  all  the  safe-guards  of  honest  suffrage. 
The  Constitution  meant,  rather,  that  the  vater 
in  propria  personae  should  offer  his  vote  in  an 
appropriate  election  district,  (township  or 
ward  in  Michigan)  in  order  that  his  neighbors 
might  be  at  hand  to  establish  his  right  to  vote 
if  it  were  challenged,  or  to  challenge  it  if  it 
were  doubtful.” 

“ The  amendment  [requiring  residence  in  the 
election  district  where  the  freeman  offers  to 
vote]  so  understood  introduced  not  only  a new 
test  of  the  right  of  suffrage,  to  wit,  a district 
residence,  (township  or  ward  in  Michigan) 
but  a rule  of  voting  also.  Place  became  an 
element  of  suffrage  for  a two-fold  purpose. 
Without  the  district  residence  no  man  shall 
vote,  but  having  had  the  district  residence, 
the  right  it  confers  is  to  vote  in  that  district .” 
[In  that  township  or  ward  in  Michigan.] 
“ Such,”  the  court  says,  “is  the  voice  or  the 
Constitution  ” And  such,  then,  is  the  voice 
of  the  Constitution  of  Michigan,  for  the  two 
cases  are  exactly  the  same. 

Again.  The  provisions  of  the  Constitution 
of  Connecticut  in  relation  to  this  subject  are 
very  similar  to  those  in  the  Constitution  of  New 
Hampshire.  And  the  General  Assembly  of 
Connecticut,  passed  an  Act  in  1832,  “provid- 
ing a mode  of  taking  the  votes  in  the  election 
of  State  and  other  officers  of  persons  absent 
from  the  State  as  volunteers  in  the  military 
service  of  the  United  States.”  But  the  Judges 
of  the  Supreme  Court  of  that  State  pronounced 
the  act  repugnant  to  the  Constitution  and 
void,  because,  as  a principal  reason,  it  author- 
ized votes  to  be  taken  at  places  other  than 
those  prescribed  in  that  instrument.  (Am.  L. 
Reg.  for  June,  1833,  p.  430.)  And,  Sir,  these 
decisions  indicate  the  course,  in  which  the  de- 
cisions of  the  courts  of  all  the  States  run 
with  regard  to  this  subject  where  it  h&3  come 
before  them  under  constitutional  provisions 
similar  to  our  own,  unless  the  court  of  Iowa 
forms  an  exception,  to  which  we  will  now  give 
a moment’s  attention. 

Article  3,  Section  1 of  the  Constitution  of 
that  State  reads  as  follows:  “Every  white 
male  citizen  of  the  United  States,  of  the  age 


17 


of  twenty-one  years,  who  shall  have  been  a 
resident  of  the  State  six  months  next  preced- 
ing the  election,  and  of  the  county  in  which  he 
claims  his  vote , sixty  days,  shall  be  entitled  to 
vote  at  all  elections,  which  are  now,  or  may 
be  authorized  by  law.” 

By  an  act,  approved  September  11th  1862, 
the  Legislature  of  Iowa  provided  that  the 
qualified  electors  of  the  State  in  the  military 
service  of  the  United  States,  be  permitted  to 
vote  at  certain  elections  at  polls  opened  and 
conducted  beyond  the  limits  of  the  county 
and  the  State  of  which  they  claim  to  be  resi- 
dents. 

The  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa,  in  Morrison  vs. 
Spininger,  already  referred  to,  say  on  grounds 
which  we  shall  soon  point  out : “ We  feel 
constrained  to  say,  that  this  law  can  be,  and 
should  be,  upheld.” 

The  first  question  which  naturally  arises 
here  is : Are  the  Constitutions  of  Iowa  and 
Michigan  alike  as  to  the  subject-matter  before 
us?  We  will  let  the  Supreme  Court  of  Iowa 
answer  this  question.  In  the  case  just  re- 
ferred to,  that  court  having,  in  a preceding 
sentence,  spoken  of  the  express  provisions  of 
the  Constitutions  of  Kentucky  and  Illinois 
regarding  this  question  says:  “The  Con- 

stitution of  Michigan,  on  the-  other  hand 
contains  no  such  express  provisions  or 
or  restrictions,  and  is  not  so  entirely  unlike 
our  own” — suggesting,  most  emphatically, 
that  in  their  opinion  there  is  a substantial  dif- 
ference in  the  two  instruments  as  to  this 
question.  Senate  Doc.  No.  1 in  quoting  from 
this  same  sentence,  is  careful  to  omit  that  part 
of  it  suggesting  this  diiference.  That  court 
is  at  the  pains  to  point  out  in  part,  what  this 
difference  is  as  it  stands  in  their  mind3.  It 
consists  in  the  difference  of  meaning  between 
the  words,  “ claims''’  and  “ offers .”  The  Iowa 
Constitution  says:  “in  which  he  claims  his 
vote,”  while  ours  says:  “ in  which  he  offers  to 
vote.”  In  illustration  of  this  difference  that 
court  says:  “Etymologically  it  (claims)  by 
no  means  implies  that  place  or  presence  are 
essential  to  its  potency  or  completeness.  On 
the  other  hand,  to  “ offer  ” to  do  a thing  is,  to 
bring  to,  or  before — to  present  for  acceptance 
or  rejection — to  exhibit  something  that  may 
be  taken  or  received,  or  not.  And  hence  the 
argument  drawn  from  the  case  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, is  not  by  any  means  conclusive  (against 
the  constitutionality  of  the  Iowa  act,  on  ac- 
count of  this  difference  in  the  Constitutions 
of  the  two  States).  For  (continues  the 
court)  while,  in  the  language  of  Woodward, 
J,  it  may  be  true,  that  to  offer  to  vote  by  bal- 
lot, is  to  present  one’s  self,  with  proper  qual- 
ifications, at  the  time  and  place  appointed  and 
make  manual  delivery  of  the  ballot  to  the  offi- 
cers appointed  by  law  to  receive  it — it  by  no 
means  necessarily  follows  that  the  same  would 
be  the  meaning  of  the  word  “ claims  ” as  used 
in  our  Constitution.  The  one  does  not  imply 
so  conclusively  as  the  other,  the  idea  of  a per- 
sonal presence  in  order  to  assert  the  right.” 

Such,  Sir,  is  the  difference  as  adjudged  by  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Iowa  between  the  Constitu- 
tions of  Pennsylvania  and  Michigan  on  the 
one  hand  and  of  Iowa  on  the  other,  with  re- 
gard to  this  question. 

The  next  question  is : Why  did  the  court  of 
Iowa  suffer  the  act  of  its  Legislature  permit- 
ting absent  soldiers  to  vote,  to  pass  as  consti- 


tutional? We  will  let  the  court  answer  this 
question  for  itself,  the  same  as  we  did  the 
other.  Having  cited  several  cases,  in  which 
the  books  abound,  showing  “ that  if  it  be 
doubtful  or  questionable  whether  the  Legislature 
has  exceeded  its  limits,  the  judiciary  cannot 
interfere,  though  it  may  not  be  satisfied  that 
the  act  is  constitutional,”  the  court  then  say : 
“In  view  of  this  well-settled  rule,  recognized 
in  the  foregoing  cases,  we  feel  entirely  satis- 
fied as  to  our  duty  in  the  present  case.  There 
is  certainly  a substantial  doubt — and  although 
we  might  not  be  satisfied  of  its  constitutional- 
ity.— yet  if  not  satisfied  of  its  ^constitution- 
ality it  is  our  duty  to  uphold  the  law.” 

Without  stopping  to  discuss  the  propriety 
of  the  application  of  this  rule  in  this  particu- 
lar instance,  there  is  no  doubt  as  to  the  valid- 
ity of  the  rule  itself  and  that  it  applies  to 
legislators  as  between  them  and  the  Constitu- 
tion, requiring  them  to  pause  at  substantial 
doubts  the  same  as  the  court,  as  we  have 
already  seen. 

It  is  also  observable  in  this  connection,  that 
the  court  of  Iowa  in  giving  its  opinion  in  this 
case,  speak  approvingly  of  the  Connecticut 
and  New  Hampshire  decisions,  which  I have 
adduced  to  support  my  position  against  this 
measure,  and  that  while  they  admit  by  impli- 
cation that  the  Pennsylvania  decision  is  good 
law,  under  the  Constitution  of  that  State,  they 
claim  that  the  provisions  of  the  two  Constitu- 
tions affecting  this  question  are  not  the  same! 
You  see  too  what  the  difference  is  between  our 
Constitution  and  that  of  Iowa,  as  adjudged  by 
the  court  of  the  latter;  that  in  the  opinion  of 
that  court  the  meaning  of  the  expression  “ in 
which  he  offers  to  vote,”  is  exactly  what  I have 
stated  it  to  be;  that  the  court  of  Iowa  was  in 
doubt  as  to  the  constitutionality  of  their  sol- 
diers’ voting  act,  after  all  the  advantages  it 
gained  from  the  word,  “claim,”  but  that  it 
finally  upheld  it,  because,  notwithstanding 
its  “ substantial  doubt,”  it  wa3  not  satisfied  of 
its  ^^constitutionality. ’ ’ 

Now,  Sir,  this  decision  stands  by  itself  and 
alone.  But  it  is  not  to  be  despised  on  that  ac- 
count. Let  all  the  respect  be  given  to  it  to 
which  it  is  justly  entitled,  where  it  belongs  and 
applies ; yet  it  should  not  be  expected  to  weigh 
very  much  with  this  body  in  support  of  the 
measure  now  before  us,  and  especially  as  it 
weighs  quite  as  much,  at  least,  against  as  for 
it,  and  when,  too,  the  united  voices  of  all  these 
other  courts  are  against  it,  as  well  as  the  great 
body  of  truth  and  argument  which  we  perceive 
to  be  arrayed  against  it,  and  know  the  same  to 
be  unanswerable. 

We  should  be  loth  to  believe,  on  ordinary 
proof,  that  a man  claiming  to  have  clear  views 
and  patriotic  motives  would  affect  to  entrench 
himself  behind  this  decision,  on  this  occasion, 
against  such  formidable  odds.  And  yet,  Sir, 
strange  to  say,  we  hear  Honorable  gentlemen, 
even  of  the  legal  profession,  connected  with 
this  Legislature,  say  that  they  can  go  for  this 
measure  under  shelter  of  the  Iowa  decis- 
ion, although,  in  the  very  same  sentence,  they 
tell  us  that  they  by  no  means  accept  it  as  good 
law  even  under  the  Constitution  of  that  State. 
Their  conduct  in  this  respect,  is  well  suited  to 
remind  us  of  the  habits  of  the  ostrich.  It  is  said 
of  that  animal  that  if  it  is  hotly  pursued,  it  will 
thrust  its  head  into  the  sand,  and,  although  its 
whole  body  is  exposed,  it  fancies  itself  secure, 


18 


because,  haring  thus  closed  its  eyes  and  ears 
to  the  danger,  it  docs  not  hear  or  see  it.  It  is, 
therefore,  called  the  silliest  of  birds. 

Mr.  Chairman,  the  decision  of  the  court  of 
Connecticut  referred  to,  is  spoken  of  in  the 
Message,  and  also  in  reports,  and  especially  in 
Senate  Doc.  No.  1,  as  sustaining  the  principle 
of  tins  House  bill,  or  of  the  field  system, 
where  the  Constitution  is  worded  like  ours. 
Is  this  so  in  fact?  Let  the  court  speak  ior 
itself.  We  have  seen,  Sir,  that  the  form  of 
words  in  the  Constitution  of  Pennsylvania 
relative  to  this  subject,  is  just  like  ours.  The 
court  of  Connecticut  use  these  words  with 
reference  to  that,  namely : “In  Pennsylvania  the 
place  only  was  prescribed  by  the  Constitution; 
but  that  teas  sufficient  to  render  an  act  of  the  Leg- 
islature authorizing  the  reception  of  soldiers ’ votes 
out  of  the  State  invalid .”  The  case  of  Pennsyl- 
vania is  our  case  exactly;  and  the  court  of 
Connecticut  in  pronouncing  thus  against  the 
constitutionality  of  the  Pennsylvania  act  pro- 
nounces with  equal  force  against  the  constitu- 
tionality of  this  measure.  Consequently,  if 
you  pass  this  measure,  you  will  do  so  in  defi- 
ance of  a judicial  opinion  as  controlling  in 
authority  as  a judicial  decision  can  be  not  pro- 
nounced by  the  Supreme  Court  of  our  own 
State,  or  of  the  United  States. 

To  prevent  misapprehension,  it  may  be  well 
to  observe  here  that  the  Constitutions  of  some 
of  the  States  do  not  fix  the  place  of  voting; 
they  prescribe  the  qualifications  of  the  voter 
without  making  the  place  of  voting  within  the 
State,  an  essential  element  of  suffrage;  but 
they  commit  the  power  to  the  Legislature  to 
regulate  the  place  where  votes  may  be  offered 
and  received.  The  Constitutions  of  Ohio  and 
Wisconsin  come  under  this  category;  and  it  is 
thought  by  some  good  lawyers  that  the  recep- 
tion of  votes  outside  of  the  limits  of  these 
States  may  be  constitutionally  authorized  by 
their  respective  Legislatures,  but  not  so  where 
the  Constitution  of  a State  directly  or  by 
implication  fixes  the  place  of  voting. 

Before  closing  this  part  of  the  argument,  I 
desire  to  call  the  attention  of  the  Committee 
to  the  language  of  Section  3 of  the  House  Bill 
now  before  us.  This  Section  reads  as  follows: 
“Each  elector  voting  by  virtue  of  the  provisions 
of  this  act,  shall  be  considered  as  voting  in  the 
town  or  ward  in  which  he  had  a residence  at 
the  time  of  his  entering  the  military  service— 
that  is,  he  shall  have  the  right,  so  far  as  au- 
thorized by  this  act,  to  vote  for  the  same  offi- 
cers and  no  others  that  he  might  lawfully  have 
voted  for  in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he 
resided  at  the  time  of  entering  the  military 
service.” 

The  doctrine  involved  in  this  Section  seems 
to  be  this,  namely : Acts  otherwise  repugnant 
to  the  Constitution,  become  constitutional  and 
valid,  simplv  by  an  act  of  the  Legislature  de- 
claring that  they  shall  be  considered  consti- 
tutional. This  doctrine  being  admitted,  it 
follows  that  if  it  be  indeed  true,  as  the  matter 
now  stands,  that  it  would  be  unconstitutional 
to  vote  by  proxy  at  public  elections,  or  to  send 
the  ballot  box  out  of  the  State  to  receive  the 
votes  of  our  citizen  soldiers,  an  act  of  the 
Legislature  declaring  that  the  same  shall  be 
“ considered'"  constitutional,  or  as  voting  in 
the  town  or  ward  in  which  the  persons  thus 
voting  had  a residence  at  the  time  of  entering 
the  military  service,  would  make  it  all  actual- 


ly so,  or  so  in  effect.  Such  seems  to  be  the 
doctrine  involved  in  this  Section. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  I confess  that  the  ab- 
surdity of  this  doctrine  is  so  glaring,  that  one 
can  hardly  be  justified  in  taking  up  time  in 
pointing  it  out ; and  I certainly  should  not  feel 
warranted  in  doing  so  on  this  occasion, 
did  I not  happen  to  know  that  many  being  de- 
ceived, accept  this  doctrine  as  tenable. 
Many  suppose  that  it  is  competent  for  the 
Legislature  to  declare  that  any  provision  of  the 
Constitution  shall  be  deemed  to  mean  whatev- 
er it  shall  see  fit,  and  that  such  declaration 
must  govern. 

Many  too  argue  in  this  way : That  the  ballot- 
box  of  any  township  or  ward  is  the  symbol  of 
of  such  township  or  ward  for  all  the  purposes 
of  public  elections  ; that  to  whatever  point  in 
the  United  States  the  ballot-box  shall  be  trans- 
ported by  the  authority  of  the  Legislature,  and 
opened  for  the  reception  of  votes,  there  the 
township  or  ward  to  which  it  belongs  is  sym- 
bolically present;  and  that  in  this  way  any 
township  or  ward  in  the  State  may  be  carried 
in  elfect  to  any  citizen-soldier  of  this  State, 
whether  within  or  without  its  geographical 
lines,  so  as  to  enable  him  to  vote  to  all  intents 
and  purposes,  in  the  township  or  ward  where 
he  resides,  agreeably  to  the  spirit  of  the  Con- 
stitution. 

Now,  Sir,  I will  let  the  Judges  of  the  Supreme 
Court  of  Connecticut  reply  to  the  doctrine  and 
reasoning  here  referred  to.  They  remark,  in 
the  case  already  cited,  as  follows  : “ Doubt- 
less the  General  Assembly  may  say  in  any  lan- 
guage they  choose,  that  a statute  (mark  that — 
‘•a  statute ”)  shall  be  considered,  held  and 
taken  to  embrace  some  subject-matter  or 
thing,  or  construed  to  be  in  accordance  with, 
or  a compliance  with  some  other  statute,  <fec., 
and  if  the  place  of  voting  could  have  been  fixed 
by  statute , the  provision  in  question  would  be 
valid.  But  applied  to  the  Constitution  that 
provision  of  the  law  is  an  anomaly , and  in  ef- 
fect, an  eflort  by  an  inferior  to  change,  extend 
and  indirectly  control  a clear,  full  and  exhaus- 
tive mandate  of  its  superior,  in  a material  par- 
ticular, even  in  respect  to  its  own  organization, 
and  inconsistent  with  the  fundamental  princi- 
ples of  constitutional  law. 

“If  the  General  Assembly  (the  Legislature) 
can  thus  add  to,  alter  and  control  one  consti- 
tutional provision  respecting  elections,  there 
are  no  others  beyond  their  reach.  They  may 
direct  votes  to  be  taken  at  any  time,  and  say 
that  they  shall  be  considered,  held  and  taken 
to  have  been  cast  on  the  first  Monday  of  April. 
They  may  authorize  minors  to  vote  and  say 
that  their  votes  shall  be  considered,  taken  and 
held  to  be  the  votes  of  electors  of  full  age  ; 
or  colored  men,  and  say  that  their  votes  shall 
be  considered,  taken  and  held  to  be  the  votes 
of  white  men  and  electors  ; and  so  may  au- 
thorize the  taking  and  counting  of  the  votes 
of  women  and  aliens.  Nor  would  there  re- 
main any  other  matter  of  constitutional  pro- 
vision or  purpose,  which  might  not  be  reached 
at  any  time  by  a temporary  and  fluctuating 
legislative  majority,  and  by  the  same  legisla- 
tive alchemy  of  changing  things  constructively, 
into  what  they  are  not  in  fact,  be  practically 
controlled  or  annulled.  Indeed,  the  same  pro- 
cess which  could  turn  votes  taken  in  a camp 
to  votes  taken  in  an  electors’  meeting  (in  a 
I township  or  ward)  might  turn  those  taken  in 


19 


fact  in  the  electors’  meeting  (or  in  a township 
or  ward)  into  the  votes  of  women,  or  aliens, 
or  minors,  or  colored  men,  and  exclude  them 
for  that  reason  from  the  canvass,  and  so  on, 
till  the  Constitution  and  constitutional  law  be- 
came a mockery.” 

Dogmas  Put  Forth  in  Support  of  this 
Pleasure  by  its  Advocates. 

Having  given  an  exposition  of  the  words  of 
the  Constitution  relative  to  this  question, 
which  I am  morally  certain  contains  the  truth, 
the  whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the  truth, 
and  having  substantiated  it  by  facts,  argu- 
ments, authority  and  law  not  to  be  impeached, 

I have  thus  made  out  my  case,  and  might 
with  propriety  here  rest ; and  it  may  be  that 
a due  regard  to  your  patience  requires  me  to 
do  so.  But,  Sir,  certain  theories  have  been 
framed  with  great  care  and  have  been  pressed 
on  our  attention  with  extreme  assiduity,  in  ; 
order,  if  possible,  to  evade  this  hitherto  uni- 
versally received  exposition,  and  thus  facili- 
tate the  passage  of  this  measure.  They  seem 
to  be  of  a mixed  nature.  That  is,  they  seem 
to  be  somewhat  of  the  nature  of  outside  ques- 
tions, and  somewhat  in  a line  with  these  meas- 
ures. But  they  are  made  up  of  errors  for  the 
most  part ; yet  they  have  just  enough  of  truth 
about  them,  or  the  semblance  of  truth,  to  give 
the  error  currency  and  effect  with  many 
minds.  I therefore  now  propose  to  take  them 
up  and  consider  them  separately. 

I.  In  support  of  this  proxy  bill  it  is  said  : 

1.  That  it  is  a well-settled  principle  of  law 
that  whatever  any  person  has  oi-iginal  author- 
ity to  do  himself  he  may  do  by  another. 

2.  That  the  Bill  providing  for  the  soldiers’ 
voting  by  proxy  is  based  on  this  well-estab- 
lished principle  of  law. 

The  first  of  these  propositions  is  correct 
beyond  all  question,  but  the  second  is  clearly 
erroneous.  And  the  error  lies  in  this,  that 
this  principle  of  law  with  regard  to  agency  ap- 
plies only  to  what  men  have  an  original  right 
or  authority  to  do  in  their  private  affairs,  and 
to  certain  mechanical  or  ministerial  acts,  6uch 
as  are  performed  by  a Deputy  Sheriff  and  a 
poster  of  notices.  It  does  not  apply  to  their 
political  acts  and  relations.  Walker,  in  his 
treatise  on  American  Law,  p.  246,  says : “One 
person  cannot  depute  another  to  vote  for 
him  ” — meaning  in  civil  and  political  elections. 
And  Kent  says,  Vol.  2,  p.  369,  as  we  have  be- 
fore seen,  that  “in  the  case  of  elections  in 
public  and  municipal  corporations,  and  in  all 
other  elections  of  a public  nature,  eveiy  vote 
must  be  personally  given.”  This  is  a principle 
of  common  law  every  where  recognized. 

Besides.  Here  is  another  consideration 
which  should  seem  to  be  decisive,  namely: 
The  right  to  vote  is  a delegated  right.  It  is  not 
an  original,  natural  on  necessary  right,  such, 
for  instance,  as  is  the  right  to  live.  In  our 
American  system  this  right  is  created  by  the 
several  State  Constitutions.  They  determine 
by  careful  definitions  the  classes  of  persons 
on  whom  this  right  shall  be  conferred,  and  by 
implication  that  it  shall  not  be  conferred  on 
any  others.  In  respect  to  the  right  of  voting 
the  Constitution  is  of  the  nature  of  an  enabling 
act.  It  gives  the  inhabitant  all  the  right  to 
vote  he  possesses.  It  enables  those  coining 
within  its  descriptions  to  exercise  this  right 
in  the  form  which  it  points  out.  Others, 


both  persons  and  forms,  are  excluded.  This 
right,  then,  dees  not  extend  to  all — far  from 
it.  In  this  State,  for  illustration,  the  people, 
in  framing  the  Constitution,  withheld  it  from 
aliens,  negroes,  Indians  of  any  tribe ; from  wo- 
men and  minors — in  short,  from  everybody 
except  such  as  answer  to  a certain  specific  de- 
scription. Such  as  come  under  this  descrip- 
tion are  called  citizens,  and  to  them  the  Con- 
stitution delegates  the  power  to  vote  at  State 
and  local  elections,  in  person,  but  not  by  proxy. 
It  no  where  confers  on  the  elector  the  right  of 
substitution.  It  thence  follows,  that  with  us 
the  right  to  vote  is  strictly  personal,  and  can- 
not be  delegated  or  performed  by  proxy. 
[Lyon  vs.  Jerome,  26  Wend.,  p.  485.] 

Furthermore.  The  right  to  vote  being  dele- 
gated by  the  Constitution  to  a carefully  speci- 
fied class,  without  the  right  of  substitution,, 
it  is  in  the  nature  of  a personal  privilege,  a 
personal  franchise,  or  an  office  in  the  enjoy- 
ment and  discharge  of  which  the  whole  com- 
monwealth is  much  interested,  and  great 
parity , care  and  discretion  are  required.  For 
this  reason,  it  is  personal  and  cannot  be  dele- 
gated to,  or  exercised  by,  an  agent.  In  the 
case,  Powell  vs.  Tuttle,  3 Comstock,  p.  396,  the 
Court  says:  “ An  authority  to  do  acts  merely 
mechanical  may  be  delegated,  but  not  so  where 
the  act  involves  the  exercise  of  judgment  and 
discretion.” 

Thus,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  question  seems  to 
be  settled  beyond  the  possibility  of  being  dis- 
turbed, that  the  office  of  an  elector  in  this 
State  is  strictly  personal,  and  that  its  duties 
cannot  be  performed,  or  meddled  with  by  an 
agent,  or  by  proxy,  any  more  than  those  of  an 
assessor,  a judge,  or  legislator. 

But  Honorable  gentlemen  profess  to  find 
support  for  this  proxy  bill  in  an  argument  of 
this  sort.  They  say:  “Here  is  an  elector 

without  hands.  He  comes  to  the  polls  and 
some  one,  at  his  request  and  in  his  presence, 
deposits  his  vote  for  him.”  Now  they  ask: 
“ Is  not  this  vote  lawfully  cast?  ” Grant  it. 
What  then?  Why,  they  ask:  “Is  not  this 

voting  by  another,  by  an  agent,  by  proxy,  and 
does  not  this  in  reality  admit  the  principle  of 
this  proxy  bill?”  By  no  manner  of  means. 
For,  as  the  Justices  of  the  Supreme  Court  of 
New  Hampshire  well  say,  in  the  opinion  be- 
fore cited:  “ If  it  were  allowable,  that  the  votes 
of  infirm  or  disabled  electors  be  deposited  for 
them  in  their  presence,  it  would  by  no  means 
follow  that  this  could  be  done  for  them  in 
their  absence ; for,”  they  continue,  “an  act 
done  by  me,  in  the  presence,  and  under  the  con- 
trol of  another,  for  that  other,  is  regarded,  not 
as  the  exercise  of  a delegated  authority,  but  as 
the  personal  act  of  the  party  in  whose  behalf 
it  was  performed;  “but,”  they  add,  “it  is 
otherwise,  where  the  act  is  doneby  a person’s 
direction  in  his  absence  and  beyond  his  control .” 
They  cite  Kidder  vs.  Prescott,  4 Foster  263 ; 
and  Hanson  vs.  Rowe,  6 Foster  327.  Thus  it 
appears,  Sir,  that  this  fancied  argument  is 
far  more  halt,  and  blind,  and  maimed,  and  pit- 
iable than  the  poor  cripples  from  whose  case 
it  is  derived. 

But,  Mr.  Chairman,  the  practice  of  voting  by 
proxy,  in  joint  stock  companies  or  monied 
corporations,  is  adduced  in  support  of  this 
proxy  bill.  Some  seem  to  be  much  influenced 
by  it.  But  it  seems  to  me  that  if  gentlemen 
will  think  a moment,  they  will  clearly  discover. 


20 


that  there  Is  no  real  analogy  between  the  two 
things.  Why  look:  The  principle  on  which 
voting  is  based,  in  joint  stock  companies, 
stands  alone.  It  i6  peculiar.  There  the  right 
to  vote  attaches  to  the  shares,  in  the  capital  | 
stock.  It  goes  with  them  as  they  are  trans- 
ferred from  one  to  another.  Very  generally 
each  share,  by  the  act  of  incorporation,  is  en- 
titled to  one  vote.  Hence  the  greater  the 
number  of  shares  one  holds,  the  greater 
the  number  of  votes  he  is  entitled  to  cast;  and 
vice  versa.  And  here  mark  this,  that  even  in  ! 
any  of  these  companies,  a shareholder  cannot  , 
vote  by  proxy,  unless  it  is  specially  provided  i 
for  in  the  act  of  incorporation.  A clause  is  ' 
almost  always  inserted  in  a charter,  or  general 
act,  that  members  may  vote  “ in  person  or  by 
proxy.”  But  if,  for  any  cause,  the  words  “by 
proxy,”  are  left  out,  as  they  are  in  State  Con- 
stitutions and  election  laws,  each  shareholder 
must  be  present  and  vote  iu  person,  or  not  at 
all.  In  Taylor  vs.  Griswold,  2 Green’s  N.  J. 
Rep.  223,  the  Supreme  Court,  after  full  and 
learned  discussion,  held  it  to  be  a principle  of  | 
the  common  law,  that  where  an  election  de-  | 
pends  upon  the  exercise  of  judgement  the  i 
right  can  not  be  deputed;  and  that  it  requires  1 
legislative  sanction  before  any  corporate  body  j 
can  make  a valid  by-law  authorizing  mem- 
bers to  vote  by  proxy. 

The  conclusion,  therefore,  Mr.  Chairman,  is 
plain,  and  not  to  be  eluded,  that  this  proxy 
Dill  has  no  support  from  law,  the  decisions  of 
the  courts,  analogy  or  usage,  but  that  all  these 
are  directly  against  it.  It  must,  therefore, 
fall  dead  to*  the  ground. 

II.  Another  of  these  mixed  theories  is  this : 1 
* All  political  power,”  say  they,  “ is  vested  j 
In  the  people  ” — grant  it — “the  people  make  j 
and  unmake  Constitutions” — grant  that,  also 
— “that  we,  the  members  of  the  Leg- 
islature, are  the  representatives  of  the  peo-  ; 
pie,  duly  commissioned  to  exercise  their  I 
powers  of  government” — true,  within  con- 
stitutional limits — “and  that  we,  by  virtue  I 
of  our  relations  to  the  people  as  their  j 
civil  and  political  representatives,  may  prop- 
erly do  whatever  it  is  competent  for  the  I 
people  to  do  or  authorize  to  be  done  as 
regards  the  exercise  of  governmental  powers.”  j 
Not  so,  by  any  means.  A more  startling 
nonsequiter  could  hardly  be  stated. 

Why,  Mr.  Chairman,  have  the  authors  of  ! 
this  theory  forgotten  what  country  they  are 
in,  and  the  genius  of  the  government  under  I 
which  they  live,  and  about  which  they  thus  j 
speculate?  In  monarchical  and  despotic  gov-  j 
ernments,  a similar  doctrine  has  been  held.  | 
Sir  William  Blackstone  remarks:  “We 

may  venture  to  affirm  that  the  power  of  Par- 
liament is  absolute  and  without  control.’' 
And  Coke  himself  says:  “ That  the  power  and 
jurisdiction  of  Parliament  is  so  transcendent 
and  absolute  that  it  cannot  be  considered 
either  for  causes  orpersons  within  any  bounds.” 
But,  Sir,  this  country  is  not  England,  nor  is  this 
government  the  English  government.  This  is 
the  United  States,  and  we  live  under  a system 
of  government  peculiar  to  America.  And  I 
submit  that  this  system  in  respect  to  the  point 
here  raised,  is  in  substance  this: 

The  people,  in  their  calm  and  clear  moments 
and  in  their  original  and  aggregate  capacity, 
ordain  articles  to  regulate  the  exercise  of  their 
sovereignty,  or  powers  of  government.  They 


divide  their  “powers  of  government  into 
three  departments : the  legislative,  executive 
and  judicial.”  This  is  so  with  the  general, 
as  well  as  with  each  of  the  State  governments. 
In  this  State  the  people,  by  their  organic  arti- 
cles, have  divested  themselves  of  the  powers 
of  legislation,  and  lodged  them  in  a “ Senate 
and  House  of  Representatives.”  to  be  exer- 
cised, however,  subject  to  the  true  intent  and 
meaning  of  these  articles.  For  the  people  took 
good  care  to  set  metes  and  bounds  in  these  arti- 
cles beyond  which  their  officers  and  representa- 
tives, in  any  department  of  government,  shall 
not  pass.  In  general  terms,  these  articles  pre- 
scribe the  organization,  powers,  and  duties  of 
the  Legislature,  as  well  as  the  other  depart- 
ments of  government.  And  these  articles  are 
the  Constitution.  It  must  remain  just  as  it  is 
in  each  “jot  and  tittle,”  until  changed  by  the 
people  in  the  manner  therein  specified.  And 
by  this  instrument,  just  as  it  stands,  must  this 
Legislature  be  strictly  governed,  and  to  it  its 
action  must  be  conformed,  otherwise  it  will 
be  of  no  effect.  So  the  Courts  hold.  For 
example:  The  Supreme  Court  of  New  York, 

when  composed  of  those  master  jurists,  Nel- 
son, Bronson,  and  Cowen,  unanimously  held  on 
this  point,  as  follows : “Under  our  form  of 

f ovemment,  the  Legislature  is  not  supreme, 
t is  only  one  of  the  organs  of  that  absolute 
sovereignty  which  resides  in  the  whole  body  of 
the  people.  Like  other  departments  of  the 
government,  it  can  only  exercise  such  powers 
as  have  been  delegated  to  it;  and  when  it 
steps  beyond  that  boundary,  its  acts,  like 
those  of  the  most  humble  magistrate  in  the 
State,  who  transcends  his  jurisdiction,  are  ut- 
terly void”  (Tyler  V6.  Porter,  4 Hill  140.) 

Thus  endeth  this  theory  of  Legislative  om- 
nipotence. 

III.  But,  Sir,  here  is  another  of  these  mixed 
theories.  It  lays  down  a new  rule  of  construc- 
tion— a rule  which  has  been  invented,  it 
should  seem,  for  the  special  purpose  of  se- 
curing, if  possible,  the  passage  of  this 
measure  in  some  form  or  other.  This  theory 
is  somewhat  complex,  but  may  be  clearly  sta- 
ted as  follows : 

1.  The  Constitution  of  the  United  States  is 
a grant  of  powers,  while  the  State  Constitutions 
grant  no  powers,  but  only  impose  limitations 
of  power. 

2.  It  thence  follows  that  in  ascertaining  the 
powers  of  the  Legislature,  under  the  State 
Constitution,  we  are  to  look  not  at  what  is  au- 
thorized to  be  done,  but  what  is  prohibited. 

3.  All  such  prohibitions  must  be  11  express” 
— “ direct”  in  distinction  from  implied  or  from 
affirmative  provisions;  otherwise  they  are  not 
biading  on  the  Legislature. 

4.  There  is  in  the  Constitution  of  Michigan 
no  '•'■express  prohibition”  against  the  proposed 
law  to  authorize  absent  soldiers  to  vote;  there- 
fore, such  a law  would  be  free  from  constitu- 
tional objection. 

Such,  Sir,  is  one  of  the  theories  of  the  cham- 
pions of  this  measure,  as  to  a rule  of 
constitutional  construction.  Is  it  correct? 
It  certainly  has  the  merit  of  novelty.  But  the 
question  is  not  whether  it  is  new  or  old, 
whether  it  is  an  acknowledged  principle,  or  a 
dogma  invented  for  the  occasion,  but  is  it  cor- 
rect or  erroneous?  This  is  the  question. 

Now,  Sir,  as  to  points  1 and  2 of  this 
theory : They  have,  it  must  be  confessed,  the 


21 


show  of  depth  and  philosophy  abont  them, 
not  a little  imposing.  And  it  is  not  pretended 
that  they  do  not  involve  important  distinctions 
and  doctrines.  But,  nevertheless,  I respect- 
fully submit : 

1.  That  they  are  erroneous,  so  far  as  they 
are  at  variance,  if  they  are  at  variance  at  all, 
with  the  well-settled  doctrine,  namely : That 
both  the  Federal  and  State  Constitutions  are 
acts  of  the  people  speaking  in  their  original 
capacity — the  former  being  the  act  of  the  peo- 
ple of  all  the  States,  the  latter  of  the  people 
of  each  seperate  State,  by  and  for  themselves ; 
that  by  these  Constitutions,  the  people  have 
divided  the  powers  of  sovereignty  between  the 
government  of  the  Union  and*  those  of  the 
States ; that  they  are  each  sovereign  and  inde- 
pendent with  respect  to  the  objects  committed 
to  it,  and  neither  of  them  sovereign  and  inde- 
pendent with  respect  to  the  objects  committed 
to  the  other— the  authority  of  the  Federal 
Constitution,  and  the  laws  of  Congress  and 
the  public  treaties  made  in  pursuance  of  it 
being  supreme,  in  case  of  conflict;  and  that 
(what  is  more  especially  applicable  to  this  dis- 
cussion) each  of  these  Constitutions,  in  its 
distinctive  sphere,  prescribes,  both  by  afflrma- 
ive  and  negative  provisions  how  the  public  au- 
thority shall  be  executed,  and  what  shall  be  the 
organization,  powers,  and  duties,  of  their  res- 
pective Legislatures,  as  well  as  the  other  de- 
partments ofgovernment,  State,  no  less  than 
national.  (4  Wheaton  316 ; Kent’s  com.  vol.  1, 
p.  504;  Webster  in  reply  to  Calhoun,  Feb.  16th, 
33.)  I repeat,  that  so  far  as  points  1 and  2 of 
this  theory  conflict,  if  they  conflict  at  all,  with 
the  views  just  stated,  then  just  to  that  extent, 
these  points  must  be  held  to  be  erroneous. 
But  I submit : 

2.  That  although  it  is  suggested  in  Senate 
Doc.  No.  1,  p.  2,  and  in  the  minority  report  of 
the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  of  this'.House  of 
the  25th  inst.,  that  the  question  hinges  on  the' 
doctrines  set  forth  in  points  1 and  2 of  this 
theory  yet,  as  a matter  of  fact  and  of  l»gic,  it 
is  clearly  otherwise,  and  that  the  real  impor- 
tance of  the  theory  for  the  purposes  of  this 
case  is  contained  in  points  3 and  4,  including 
the  inference.  We  may,  therefore,  dismiss  the 
former  and  turn  our  attention  to  the  latter. 

Well,  then,  as  to  point  3.  It  is  indeed  true, 
that  in  order  to  prohibit  the  State  Legislature 
by  the  Constitution  from  doing  an  act,  the 
prohibiting  clause  must  be  “ express ” — di- 
rect''' in  distinction  from  bein ^implied  or  from 
being  an  affirmative  provision?  Is  this  a 
sound  rule  of  construction?  May  not  an 
affirmative  provision  work  prohibitions?  May 
not  a prohibition  be  implied  if  the  implication 
be  a necessary  one?  Or  must  it  be  in  “ direct ,” 
or  “ express  ” terms,  as  thou  shadt  not?  The 
authors  of  this  theory  of  construction  aver 
that  it  must  be.  They  produce  no  authority 
to  support  it  except  their  own  dicta.  But  let 
us  hear  what  they  say.  On  pages  9 and  10  of 
Senate  Doc.  No.  1 of  this  Session,  are  these 
word  s : “It  seems  clearly  established  that  our 
Constitution  contains  no  “ express  ” ptohibition 
to  prevent  the  Legislature  from  passing  such 
a law  (a  law  authorizing  absent  soldiers  to 
vote).  Can  the  members  hesitate  to  pass  it  in 
the  absence  of  such  prohibition  ?’  ’ Here  the  ar- 
gument in  favor  of  such  a law  is,  that  there  Is 
no  “ express  prohibition  ” in  the  Constitution 
against  it.  That  instrument,  it  is  alleged,  does 


not  say  to  the  Legislature,  in  the  “ express  ” 
language  of  prohibition,  you  shall  not  pass  it, 
and  on  the  ground  of  the  “ absence  ” of  such 
an  “ express  prohibition,”  the  argument  for 
the  law  is  based  by  the  authors  of  this  theory. 
Members  of  this  House  stoutly  maintain  the 
same  position. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  friends  of  the  Con- 
stitution hold  that  there  is  nothing  better  set- 
tled in  the  whole  range  of  legislation,  or  juris- 
prudence than  this,  namely:  That  the  Con- 
stitution limits  and  restrains  the  action  of  the 
Legislature : 

1.  By  express  prohibition.  This  is  admitted, 
and  may  be  passed. 

2.  By  affirmative  provisions.  That  is  to  say, 
if  the  Constitution  says,  affirmatively , that  a 
thing  shall  be  done,  or  a right  exercised  in  a 
particular  way,  every  other  way  is  thereby 
excluded  and  prohibited  as  fully  and  as  firmly 
as  it  could  have  been  done  by  “ express  prohi- 
bitions.” What  is  the  difference  in  the  effect 
of  your  words,  whether  you  say,  affirmatively , 
to  your  boy,  John:  “You  shall  stay  in  your 
room  to-day,”  or,  negatively:  “ You  shall  not 
leave  your  room,  to-day ! ” Do  not  the  affir- 
mative words,  “ you  shall  stay  in,"  limit  Jonn’s 
action  just  as  much  and  as  effectually  as  the 
negative  words,  “you  shall  not  leave?”  And 
is  not  this  an  inherent  principle  of  language? 
Are  not  these  forms  of  expression  used,  inter- 
changeably, by  all  classes,  and  in  every  spe- 
cies of  composition?  Why,  look  at  the  com- 
mon sense  of  the  thing.  You  tell  John,  affirm- 
atively, “to  stay  in  his  room  to-day.”  Do 
you  not  say  to  him  by  this  affirmative  require- 
ment that  he  shall  not  do  otherwise?  Do  not 
these  affirmative  words  contain  a negative  as 
strong  as  can  be  stated  that  John  shall  not  leave 

‘ his  room  to-day ?”  And  is  he  at  liberty  to 
leave,  when  you  have  expressly  told  him  to  stay 
in,  simply  because  you  did  not  expressly  pro- 
hibit him  from  going  out?  Or  must  you,  in 
order  to  make  it  obligatory  on  John  to  stay 
in,  “ expressly  prohibit  ” him  from  going  out? 
Or  must  you  go  even  farther,  and  think  of 
each  thing  that  it  is  possible  for  him  to  do,  in- 
consistent with  his  staying  in,  and  re-utter 
your  “ exvress  prohibition''''  against  every  sepa- 
rate particular?  Why,  Sir,  every  one  well 
knows  who  can  speak  or  understand  the  Eng- 
lish language,  that  your  affirmative  require- 
ment, that  John  shall  stay  in,  obliges  him  to  do 
that  very  thing,  and  forbids  him  from 
doing  every  thing  else,  whatever,  in  any 
way  inconsistent  with  it.  And  now,  Sir, 
does  not  this  same  principle  hold  good, 
in  determining  what  limits  the  words  of 
the  Constitution  impose  on  the  power  of 
the  Legislature?  This  theory  of  construc- 
tion now  under  review  flatly  denies  it. 
Consequently,  we  may  appeal  to  the  de- 
cisions of  the  courts  to  settle  the  matter. 
What,  then,  say  the  courts  about  it  ? In  the 
case  of  The  District  Township  of  the  city  o- 
Dubuque  vs.  The  City  of  Dubuque,  7 Clarkf 
(Iowa,)  the  court  says : “ If  by  a law  or  Con- 
stitution, a thing  is  to  be  done  in  a particu- 
lar manner  or  form,  this  includes  a negative 
that  it  shall  not  be  done  otherwise.”  Also,  in 
the  5 of  Texas,  418,  the  court  says:  “Affirm- 
ative words  in  a statute,  may  be  construed  as 
a negative  of  what  is  not  affirmed.”  Again. 
In  3 Brevard,  p.  396  the  court  hold:  “ Where 
an  act  requires  a thing  to  be  done  in  a particu- 


22 


lar  way,  that  way  alone  must  be  pursued.” 
The  same  principle  is  laid  down  with  great 
clearness,  in  Head  and  Amory  vs.  The  Provi- 
dence Insurance  Co.,  3 Cranch,  p.  127.  Other 
cases  might  be  cited,  but  these  are  quite  suffi- 
cient to  show  us  that  the  courts  hold,  that 
affirmative  words,  as  thou  shalt  do  thus  and  so, 
firmly  bind  those  on  whom  they  operate  to  the 
modes  specified,  and  prohibit  all  other  modes, 
or  courses,  or  forms  inconsistent  with  them, 
quite  as  effectually  as  any  negative  forms  ot 
expression,  conceivable. 

And  right  here,  Mr.  Chairman,  another  con- 
sideration is  worthy  of  notice : Smith,  in  his 
Commentaries  on  Statutory  and  Constitutional 
Construction,  p.  663,  says:  “ Every  construc- 
tion, which  leads  to  an  absurdity,  ought  to  be 
rejected.”  And  Vattel,  among  his  rules  of 
construction,  has  this:  “We  should  not  give 

to  any  piece  a meaning  from  which  any  absurd 
consequences  would  follow,  but  must  interpret 
it  in  such  a manner  as  to  avoid  absurdity.” 

Now,  just  see  to  what  absurdities  the  rule 
of  construction,  contended  for  by  this  novel 
theory,  would  lead  to,  if  adopted  It  holds, 
that  in  order  to  prohibit  the  Legislature  from 
doing  an  act,  there  must  be  an  “ Express  pro- 
hibition,” in  the  Constitution  to  that  effect — 
that  it  must  say,  “ you  shall  not .”  Just  apply 
this  rule  practically,  and  see  bow  it  works: 
The  Constitution  says,  affirmatively,  that  “ the 
Governor  shall  hold  his  office  for  two  years.” 
It  does  not  say,  that  he  shall  not  hold  it  any 
longer.  Now  tell  me,  does,  or  does  not, 
this  affirmative  provision  of  the  Constitution 
prohibit  the  Legislature  from  passing  an  act, 
that  he  shall  hold  his  office  for  four,  five  or 
any  greater  number  of  years  than  two  ? Ac- 
cording to  this  new  theory  of  construction,  it 
is  competent  for  the  Legislature  to  do  so,  be- 
cause there  is  no  “ express  prohibition”  against 
it  in  the  Constitution.  Again : The  Constitu- 
tion says  affirmatively : “ The  judicial  power 
is  vested  in  one  Supreme  Court,  in  Circuit 
Courts,  in  Probate  Courts,  and  in  Justices  of 
the  Peace.”  Now,  is  the  Legislature  at  liberty 
to  take  away  this  power  from  these  tribunals 
and  re-invest  it,  tor  example,  in  the  Board  of 
State  Auditors  because  there  is  no  “ express  ” 
constitutional  prohibition  against  it  ? If  not, 
what  becomes  of  this  rule  of  construction  laid 
down  in  said  Doc.  No.  1?  Again:  the  Con- 
stitution provides  affirmatively , that  every 
white  male  citizen  and  inhabitant  and  every 
civilized  male  inhabitant  of  Indian  descent, 
answering  to  certain  specific  descriptions, 
shall  be  entitled  to  vote.  It  does  not  say  that 
other  inhabitants  shall  not  vote.  Now  if  this 
Legislature  should  pass  an  act  allowing  aliens, 
women,  minors,  negroes  and  Indians  of  regu- 
lar tribes  to  vote  in  our  State  and  local  elec- 
tions, would  the  law  be  constitutional  because 
there  is  no  “ express  prohibition”  in  the  Con- 
stitution against  it  ? If  not,  what  then  be- 
comes of  this  rule  of  construction,  that 
the  Legislature  may  lawfully  do  anything  in 
the  nine  of  legislation  not  “ expressly  prohi- 
bited1' by  the  Constitution;  and  what  too 
becomes  of  the  appeal  in  behalf  of  this  House 
Bill,  founded  on  the  “ absence  of  such  prohi- 
bition ? ” Sir,  what  ought  to  become  of  them  ? 
We  have  seen  that  this  kind  of  construction 
has  no  foundation  in  the  nature  of  human 
language;  that  it  has  no  support  lrom  the 
decisions  ©f  the  courts,  but  that  it  is  roundly 


denied  by  the  courts  as  well  as  by  the  nature 
and  use  of  language,  and  that,  finally,  it  is 
contradictory  to  common  sense  and  leads  to 
extreme  absurdities  wherever  it  is  applied. 
What,  then,  ought  to  become  of  it— this  very 
sum  and  substance  of  the  aforenamed  Docu- 
ment No.  1 ? You  say,  Sir.  let  it  fall,  although 
great  may  be  the  fall  of  it,  “because  it  is 
founded  on  the  sand.”  And  thus  endeth  that 
Document  and  its  “ lone  idea.” 

We  might  add,  that  the  powers  ot  the  Leg- 
islature arc  limited, 

3.  By  what  the  words  qf  the  Constitution  neces- 
sarily imply.  But  as  I shall  have  occasion  to 
6peak  of  this  important  source  ot  limitation  a 
little  further  on,  it  would  not  be  a good  use  of 
time  to  dwell  on  it  here. 

IV.  We  next  come  to  still  another  of  these 
mixed  theories.  This,  like  the  one  last  con- 
sidered, relates  to  a rule  of  construction.  It 
teaches  that  the  Legislature  may  be  restrained 
by  express  requirements  or  by  express  prohibi- 
tions in  the  Constitution,  but  not  by  implica- 
tion— not  restrained  by  any  thing  which  the 
words  of  the  Constitution  presuppose  or  imply. 
Such  is  the  theory. 

Sir,  let  no  one  fancy  from  the  extraordinary 
character  of  this  theory,  that  I am  setting  up 
“ a man  of  straw”  here.  This  theory  is  in 
print.  In  the  Message,  p.  11,  are  these  words : 
“ That  the  Legislature  has  the  power  to  fix 
the  time,  place  and  manner  of  holding  elec- 
tions and  to  establish  the  qualifications  of 
voters,  unless  prohibited  by  the  Constitution 
from  doing  so,  need  not  be  doubted.”  Here 
is  the  word  “ prohibited, but  neither  “ direct- 
ly” or  “ expressly,”  is  prefixed  to  it.  All  is 
not  yet  fully  ready  for  that.  Again : ib.  p.  12, 
are  these  words,  “ That  instrument  (the  Con- 
stitution) has  nowhere  required  that  the  elec- 
tion shall  be  held  in  any  particular  place.”  That 
is,  according  to  this  particular  theory,  it  is  not 
required  to  be  in  the  townships  and  wards,  and 
why  ? Because  it  is  not  done  in  “ direct  or 
express”  terms,  but  only  by  implication.  How- 
ever, we  have  not,  as  yet,  come  to  the  word 
“ direct,”  in  this  State  paper.  But  we  are  be- 
ing eautiously  led  to  it.  It  is  near  at  hand. 
For  on  page  13  we  read,  that  “ they  (words 
of  Sec.  1 Art.  7 of  the  Constitution  in  relation 
to  qualifications  of  voters  and  the  place  of 
voting)  speak  directly  as  to  age  and  residence, 
and  only  f“  directly”]  to  those  qualifications. 
All  else  is  incidental  and  explanatory .”  Here 
we  have  it.  And  the  obvious  suggestion  here 
is,  that  there  is  and  can  be  no  such  thing  in 
the  Constitution  as  an  implied  direction  to  the 
Legislature  of  the  nature  either  of  a restraint 
or  a rule  of  duty.  But  let  us  look  still  further. 
On  page  13  we  read:  “H  it  was  intended  to 
forbid  the  Legislature  from  authorizing  the 
reception  of  a vote  in  any  other  place  than  in 
the  town  or  ward  where  the  elector  resided,  it 
is  not  conceivable,  that  it  should  be  left  by  the 
Convention  to  a merely  casual  expression, 
which  does  not  directly  either  command  or 
forbid  any  thing.”  Here  the  theory  comes 
plainly  to  the  surface,  that  a provision  of  the 
Constitution  must  be  either  “ directly”  affirm- 
ative or  “ directly”  negative,  in  order  to  act 
on  the  Legislature  as  a command  or  prohibi- 
tion. Implications , however  clear  and  necessary, 
are , according  to  this  theory , qf  no  avail.  Noth- 
ing but  directly,  affirmative,  or  negative  terms, 
“as  you  shall,  or  shall  not,”  are  to  be  regarded. 


23 


But  once  more.  On  page  13  of  this  same 
Message,  is  this  language : “These  words  (of 
Sec.  1 Art.  7,  before  referred  to,)  no  doubt 
presuppose , that  the  offer  to  vote  will  be  made 
In  the  township  or  ward  in  which  the  elector 
resides.  But  they  neither  require  it  to  be  so, 
nor  forbid  it  to  be  otherwise.”  That  is  to  say, 
according  to  this  theory,  it  is  plain  beyond  the 
possibility  of  doubt,  on  the  very  face  of  Sec. 

1 Art.  7 of  the  Constitution,  that  the  makers 
of  that  instrument  took  it  for  granted,  and 
that  this  Section  assumes  it,  and  is  based  upon 
it  as  an  existing  and  permanent  fact,  that  the 
elector  would  appear  in  person  in  the  township 
or  ward  where  he  resides,  and  there  personally 
offer  to  vote;  and  yet  it  alleges  on  the  other 
hand  that  all  this  is  of  no  manner  of  import- 
ance as  a restraint  on  the  action  of  the  Legis- 
lature, and  why  ? Because,  forsooth,  it  does 
not  happen  to  be  stated  in  the  exact  form  of 
an  express  requirement  or  prohibition  ! Such  is 
the  theory  of  construction  set  forth  in  the 
Message  ! No  authority  is  adduced  to  support 
it.  No  reason  is  given  for  it,  founded  in  law, 
language,  usage,  fact,  or  common  sense.  And 
none  can  be  given  for  it,  springing  from  any 
of  these  sources.  It  rests  upon  the  solitary 
ipse  dixit  of  the  author;  and  the  degree  of  im- 
portance to  be  attached  to  it  from  this  cir- 
cumstance, each  one  will  judge  for  himself. 

Before  going  further  with  this  theory,  it 
may  not  be  amiss  to  call  attention  to  what  ev- 
idently suggested  it,  which  is  this : The  place 
of  voting,  and  the  personal  presence  of  the 
voter  there,  and  his  voting  personally,  are 
fixed,  not  by  expressly  affirmative  or  expressly  I 
negative  provisions  of  the  Constitution,  but 
by  what  the  words  of  that  instrument  in  said  j 
Sec.  1 necessarily  imply,  which  is,  in  fact,  but  ' 
a continuance  of  the  practice  relative  to  vo-  ! 
ting,  then  long  in  use,  and  agreeable  to  com- 
mon law  and  the  old  Constitution  as  amended 
in  1839.  The  framers  of  that  instrument  very 
well  knew  that  this  practice  was  fully  provided 
for,  and  would  be  perpetuated  by  such  an  im-  ! 
plication  as  the  one  contained  in  the  words 
they  usa.  Consequently,  they  there  left  the  ■ 
matter  to  go  on  as  aforetime. 

The  author  of  this  theory  of  construction, 
which  we  are  here  speaking  of,  evidently 
clearly  saw  just  how  this  matter  actually 
stands  in  the  Constitution,  and  that  this  neces- 
sary implication  as  a source  ot  restraint  on 
the  Legislature,  must  be,  somehow,  disposed 
of,  or  this  measure  could  not  be  passed.  Hence 
this  theory. 

Now  Sir,  the  friends  of  constitutional  law 
do  not  admit*  in  any  manner,  the  validity  of 
this  pretended  principle  of  construction,  and 
claim,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  Legislature  is 
not  only  limited  and  restrained  by  the  express- 
ly affirmative  and  negative  provisions  of  the 
Constitution,  but  that  it  is  also  limited  and 
restrained, 

, 3.  By  what  the  words  of  the  Constitution  neces- 
sarily imply. 

1.  The  courts  so  hold.  In  the  case, 
Sears  vs.  Cottrell,  5 Michigan,  p.  260,  the 
Supreme  Court  of  this  State  says:  “ An  act 
of  a State  Legislature,  not  prohibited  by  the 
express  words  of  the  Constitution,  or  by 
necssessary  implication , cannot  be  declared 
as  a violation  of  that  instrument.” 

Mr.  Chairman,  please  note  carefully,  the 
terms  of  this  pertinent  decision.  It  places 


“ the  necessary  implications  ” of  the  Consti- 
tution on  an  equal  footing  with  its  “express 
words  ” as  sources  of  restraint  on  the  action 
of  the  Legislature.  The  court  declares  that 
they  possess  equal  force  and  are  entitled  to 
equal  respect.  And  thus  it  appears  that  this 
is  the  well  established  law  of  the  land,  any 
new-born  theory  in  the  Message  or  elsewhere 
“to  the  contrary  notwithstanding.” 

And  even  in  the  Iowa  case,  so  much  relied 
on  by  the  friends  of  this  measure,  (O’Neal  vs. 
Watson)  the  Court  distinctly  recognizes  the 
same  doctrine.  It  says:  “The  Legislature 
clearly  has  the  power  to  legislate  on  all  right- 
ful subjects  of  legislation,  unless  expressly 
prohibited  from  so  doing,  or  where  the  prohi- 
bition is  implied  from  some  express  provision.” 
This  hits  the  case  in  hand  exactly.  Our  Con- 
stitution says:  “No  citizen  or  inhabitant  shall 
be  an  elector  or  entitled  to  vote  at  any  elec- 
tion, unless  he  shall  be  above  the  age  of  twen- 
ty-one years,  and  has  resided  in  the  State  three 
months,  and  in  the  township  or  ward  in  which 
he  offers  to  vote,  ten  days  next  preceding  such 
election.”  This  is  an  ‘ ‘ express ’ ’ negative 
“ provision;”  and  the  prohibition  implied  in  it, 
is,  that  no  elector  shall  be  permitted  to  vote 
who  does  not  personally  appear  at  the  polls  in 
the  town  or  ward  in  which  he  resides,  and 
there  personally  offer  to  vote,  as  will  presently 
more  fully  appear.  So  the  Iowa  case  confirms 
the  position,  that  the  Legislature  is  limited 
and  restrained  in  its  action  by  what  the  words 
of  the  Constitution  necessarily  imply. 

In  McCullock  vs.  the  State  of  Maryland  (4 
Wheat  316),  Chief  J ustice  Marshall,  speaking 
for  the  entire  Court,  pronounced  an  act  of  the 
Legislature  of  Maryland  void,  not  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  prohibited  bv  any  express  words  of 
the  Federal  Constitution,  (and  indeed  the 
Court  said,  that  there  were  none  of  that  char- 
acter against  the  act,)  but  because  it  was  in 
conflict  with  what  the  wording  of  that  instru- 
ment necessarily  implies.  And  in  remarking  on 
the  case,  that  great  prince  of  American  juris- 
prudence dwells  with  characteristic  vigor  and 
point  on  what  he  very  suggestively  terms  “ that 
vast  mass  of  incidental  powers  which  must  be 
involved  in  the  Constitution,  if  that  instrument 
he  not  a splendid  baublef 

Again:  In  Streeter  vs.  Paton,  7 Mich.  341, 
the  question  arose  whether  the  merely  affirma- 
tive provision  of  Art.  6 Sec.  1 of  the  Constitu- 
tion, vested  exclusive  judicial  jurisdiction  in 
the  courts  therein  named,  or  whether  it  is 
competent  for  the  Legislature  to  give  concur- 
rent jurisdiction  with  any  of  these  tribunals 
to  a Circuit  Court  Commissioner,  or  to  any  one 
else,  because  not  prohibited  from  doing  so  by 
any  expressly  negative  words. 

To  this  our  Supreme  Court  said:  “There 
are  no  negative  or  other  terms  used,  clearly 
and  beyond  all  doubt,  confining  the  power  to 
the  Courts  mentioned.  It  is  by  implication 
only,  it  is  so  confined ; and  not  by  any  express 
language  that  the  power  to  vest  any  part  of  it 
elsewhere  is  taken  from  the  Legislature,  if  the 
Legislature  is  in  fact  destitute  of  this  power. 
This  implication , standing  by  itself  would  he 
conclusive  ”— how  apposite  to  this  theory  be- 
fore us  and  how  decisive  against  it  ! 

Thus,  we  see,  Mr.  Chairman,  that  the  law 
on  this  subject  is  clear  and  strong  in  support 
of  our  proposition,  that  the  action  of  the  Leg- 
islature is  limited  and  restrained  by  what 


24 


the  words  of  the  Constitution  necessarily  imply , 
us  well  us  by  expressly  affirmative  and  negative 
provisions;  and  that,  consequently,  the  con- 
trary doctrine,  set  forth  and  advocated  in  the 
Message,  has  no  manner  of  legal  foundation. 
But, 

2.  Usage  and  common  sense  both  teach 
the  same  thing.  They  teach,  as  clearly  and 
as  positively,  as  do  the  courts,  that  the 
aower  and  action  of  the  Legislature,  are 
imited  and  restrained  by  what  the  words 
of  the  Constitution  necessarily  imply.  Our 
Constitution,  our  laws,  our  jurisprudence, 
our  literature,  our  every  day  transactions 
abound  in  illustrations  of  the  truth  of  this 
position.  For  example : The  Constitution  of 
this  State  sa)s,  “ The  property  of  no  person 
shall  be  taken  for  public  use  without  just 
compensation  therefor.”  In  Sec.  2 of  the 
same  Art.  is  prescribed  the  manner  in  which 
6uch  compensation  shall  be  determined,  when 
private  property  is  so  taken.  But  the  Consti- 
tution no  where  says,  in  express  terms,  that 
private  property  may  be  taken  for  the  use  and 
benefit  of  the  public.  But  yet  these  words 
“ pre-suppose”  the  existence  of  the  right;  they 
clearly  imply  it ; they  distinctly  recognize  it, 
and  go  on  the  ground  of  it ; consequently,  the 
right  is  contained  in  them  by  necessary  implica- 
tion. 

Again.  The  Federal  Constitution  confers  on 
Congress  the  power  “ to  establish  poet  offices 
and  post  roads.”  But  whence  the  authority 
and  duty  of  Congress,  under  and  by  virtue  of 
that  instrument,  to  errry  the  mail,  and  to  pun- 
ish those  who  rob  it,  or  steal  letters  from  a 
post  office  ? Why,  Sir,  all  the  authority  or 
duty  there  is  for  all  that,  is  implied  in  the  au- 
thority to  “establish  post  offices  and  post 
roads.”  And  our  whole  immense  post  office 
system,  and  all  the  laws  and  regulations  con- 
cerning it,  are  based  on  that  implication.  Our 
State  and  National  Constitutions  and  laws  are 
full  of  similar  illustrations  But  let  us  take 
for  a moment,  more  familiar  cases— such  as 
we  meet  with  in  every  day  life.  For  instance : 
If  you,  with  my  consent,  go  to  work  for  me 
without  any  express  agreement  as  to  compen- 
sation, it  is  “ presupposed' ’ that  I will  pay  you 
what  your  services  are  fairly  worth,  and  I am 
obliged  to  do  so,  by  necessary  implication.  If 
you  have  sold  goods  to  me,  of  any  description, 
and  I have  consented  to  receive  them,  with- 
out any  agreement  as  to  price,  it  is  “ presuppos- 
ed,”  that!  will  pay  you  what  they  are  reason- 
ably worth,  and  I am  firmly  bound  to  do  so, 
by  what  that  pre-supposition  necessarily  im- 
plies. If  I ask  you  for  a hundred  dollars  and 
you  let  me  have  it,  and  I go  away  with  it,  a 
word  not  being  said  by  either  of  us  as  to  re- 
funding it,  is  \&  pre-sitpposed  that  I will  account 
to  you  for  it,  and,  by  necessary  implication, 
resulting  from  such  pre-supposition,  I am 
obliged  to  do  so.  And  thus  it  is  that  this  prin- 
ciple of  pre-supposition  and  necessary  impli- 
cation operates  in  matter-of-fact  life. 

Take  one  case  more.  The  Federal  and  State 
Constitutions  both  say  with  entire  clearness, 

“ that  the  privileges  of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus 
shall  not  be  suspended  except  in  case  of  re- 
bellion or  invasion  the  public  safety  require 
it.”  But  you  will  please  note,  that  neither  of 
these  instruments  say  in  express  words,  that 
the  privileges  of  this  writ  may  be  suspended  at 
all ; and  yet  the  words  of  each  Constitution  j 


pre-suppose  that  it  may  be  suspended  in  the 
contingency  contemplated;  they  go  on  that 
basis ; and,  consequently,  this  pre-supposition 
enters  into  the  very  essence  of  the  provision. 

Now,  Sir,  since  this  is  so,  and  it  is  impossi- 
ble to  be  otherwise,  it  thence  plainly  follows 
that  if  the  words  of  the  Constitution,  Art.  7, 
Sec.  1,  “ pre-suppose  that  the  offer  to  vote  will 
be  made  in  the  township  or  ward  in  which  the 
elector  resides,”  as  the  Message  expressly  af- 
firms the  fact  to  be,  then,  that  must  be  the 
fundamental  law  by  necessary  implication,  and 
for  the  reason  already  illustrated,  namely  : 
That  where  the  words  of  the  Constitution 
“ pre-suppose ” a right,  privilege  or  duty  to  ex- 
ist, and  recognize  it  as  permanent,  and  proceed 
on  the  ground  of  it,  the  same  thereby  becomes 
a vital  part  of  the  instrument  itself  by  neces- 
sary implication ; and  the  case  becomes  still 
stronger,  if  such  a thing  be  possible,  where 
what  is  thus  pre-supposed  or  implied,  is  agree- 
able to  the  principles  of  common  law,  as  is 
the  fact,  in  this  particular  instance,  as  we  have 
before  fully  shown. 

And  in  the  pregnant  words  of  Chief  Justice 
Marshall,  this  proposition  is  “sustained  on  a 
principle,  which  so  entirely  pervades  the  Con- 
stitution, is  so  intermixed  with  the  materials 
which  compose  it,  so  interwoven  with  its  web, 
so  blended  with  its  texture,  as  to  be  incapable 
of  being  separated  from  it,  without  rending 
it  into  shreds.” 

Thus,  Sir,  the  theory  of  the  Message,  that 
the  power  and  action  of  the  Legislature  are 
not  limited  and  restrained  by  what  the  words 
of  the  Constitution  pre-suppose  and  imply, 

“ Melts  into  air,  into  thin  air; 

And,  like  the  baseless  fabric  of  a vision 

Leaves  not  a rack  behind.” 

V.  Another  of  these  evasive  theories  is  this ; 
“ These  words  of  the  Constitution , to  wit:  ‘ In  the 
township  or  ward  in  which  he  offers  to  vote,1  prop- 
erly mean  the  township  or  ward,  in  which  the  elec- 
tors vote  is  to  take  effect .” 

This  construction,  if  I rightly  understand 
its  history,  originated  with  a gentleman  of  ac- 
knowledged ability,  and  who  stands  high  and 
strong  in  the  domain  of  party  politics,  not  only 
of  this  State  but  of  the  nation.  It  seems  to  be 
quite  satisfactory  to  very  many.  I may,  there- 
fore, be  allowed  to  dwell  on  it  for  a few  mo- 
ments. And  I confess  to  a feeling  of  embar- 
rassment in  attempting  it,  because  I am  not 
sure  that  I know  exactly  what  it  means.  The 
distinguished  author  of  it  did  not  happen  to 
tell  us,  nor  as  far  as  I know,  has  any  of  those 
accepting  it.  We  must  then,  get-  at  it  as  best 
we  can. 

“To  take  effect”  means  to  be  efficacious. 
A vote,  therefore,  to  take  effect  in  a township 
or  ward,  must  mean,  if  indeed  it  has  any 
meaning  at  all,  one  of  two  things:  either  to 
operate  in  the  choice  of  township  or  ward  of- 
ficers only,  or  to  be  counted  in  the  township  or 
ward.  To  confine  the  votes  of  electors  to  the 
choice  of  township  or  ward  officers,  would,  of 
necessity,  put  an  end  to  all  County  or  State 
elections.  Taken  in  this  sense,  this  construc- 
tion would  defeat  the  object,  not  only  of  Sec. 
1,  referred  to,  but  of  the  whole  Constitution, 
and  thus  paralize,  and  even  destroy  the  govern- 
ment itself.  Consequently,  in  this  sense,  it  is 
to  be  rejected.  If  by  this  construction  is 
meant,  that  the  votes  of  electors  are  to  be 


25 


counted  in  the  township  or  ward,  where  they 
reside,  then  there  are  many  fatal  objections  to 
it: 

1.  It  does  not  take  the  words  of  the  Con- 
stitution in  their  natural  or  ordinary  import, 
which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  essential.  What 
honest,  straight-forward  man  of  common  sense, 
would  ever  imagine,  that  the  phrase,  “in 
which  he  offers  to  vote,”  means  “in  which 
his  vote  is  to  take  effect,”  that  is,  to  he  counted ! 
Why,  just  look  at  the  two  sets  of  words.  Com- 
pare them.  How  entirely  dissimilar  in  mean-  i 
ing!  For  example:  “He”  does  not  mean 
“his;”  nor  can  the  words  “ offers  to  vote,”  j 
be  so  twisted  as  to  mean  “ to  take  effect,”  or 
to  count  votes,  or  to  be  counted.  The  words 
of  the  Constitution  referred  to,  only  seek  to 
provide  for  getting  votes  into  the  ballott  box ; 
they  leave  it  to  the  Legislature  to  determine 
how  and  by  whom  they  shall  be  counted,  after 
being  cast  into  it.  Why,  Sir,  this  is  all  pretence, 
the  absurdity  of  which  is  really  too  glaring  to 
be  talked  about.  But  the  announcement  and 
advocacy  of  this  theory  can  be  accounted  for, 
perhaps  on  the  hypothesis,  that  the  friends  of 
this  measure  deem  it  important  to  become  all 
things  to  all  men,  if  by  any  means,  they  may  de- 
ceive some,  and  thus  carry  it.  But, 

2.  This  theory  of  construction  takes  plain 
words  out  of  the  Constitution  and  puts  dubious 
ones  into  it.  It  is  wholly  unallowable  to  do 
either.  Indeed,  any  theory  of  construction, 
which  adds  to  or  takes  from  the  text  of  that 
instrument,  is  not  to  be  tolerated  for  a mo- 
ment. We  may  expound  when  necessary,  but 
not  alter  or  amend.  In  King  vs.  Burrell,  12 
A.  & E.  468,  Judge  Patterson  says:  I see  the 
necessity  of  not  importing  into  statutes  words 
which  are  not  to  be  found  there.  Such  a mode 
of  interpretation,  (he  adds)  only  occasions 
endless  difficulty.”  And  in  a case  before  cited, 
Chief  Justice  Tindal  says:  “It  is  the  duty  of 
all  courts  to  confine  themselves  to  the  words 
of  the  statute,  nothing  adding  thereto,  and 
nothing  diminishing.”  Otherwise,  the  courts 
would  take  on  themselves  the  business  of  mak- 
ing laws,  as  well  as  interpreting  and  applying 
them.  In  like  manner,  legislators  are  to  take 
the  words  of  the  Constitution  just  as  they  na- 
turally or  fairly  read.  If  we  take  out  words 
from  it  or  put  them  in,  we  take  on  ourselves 
the  responsibility  of  altering  and  amending 
the  Constitution  instead  of  obeying  and  carry-  1 
ing  it  out.  If  the  Constitution  is  imperfect,  it 
is  the  business  of  the  people,  in  their  original 
capacity  to  amend  it,  in  the  mode  prescribed, 
and  not  ours ; and  until  the  people  shall  do 
that,  its  words,  just  as  they  stand,  must  gov- 
ern us. 

3.  This  proposed  reading  for  this  part  of  the 
Constitution,  is  mere  conjecture,  or  construe-  I 
tion,  which  means  drawing  conclusions  respect-  ] 
ing  a point  or  idea,  which  lies  outside  of,  or 
beyond  the  text.  The  rule  is,  that  where  the 
sense  of  the  words  of  the  text  is  plain  and 
reasonable,  as  in  this  instance,  a resort  to  con- 
struction is  not  admissible.  In  his  work  on  j 
Statutory  and  Constitutional  Law,  p.  227,  Seg-  j 
wick  says  : “ When  we  see  what  is  the  sense,  * I 
that  agrees  with  the  intention  of  the  instru- 
ment, it  is  not  allowable  to  wrest  the  words  to 

a contrary  meaning.”  Vattel  says : “ It  is  not 
allowable  to  interpret  what  has  no  need  of  in- 
terpretation.” He  continues:  “When  a deed 
(an  instrument)  is  worded  in  clear  and  pricise 


terms,  when  its  meaning  is  evident  and  leads 
to  no  absurd  consclusion,  there  can  be  no  rea- 
son for  refusing  to  admit  the  meaning,  which 
such  deed  (instrument)  naturally  presents.  To 
go  elsewhere  in  search  of  conjecture,  in  order 
to  restrict  or  extend  it,  is  but  an  attempt  to  elude 
it.”  Exactly  so.  And  how  completely  these 
apposite  words  of  this  great  authority  bring  to 
naught  this  evasive  theory  of  our  distinguish- 
ed partisan  politician. 

4.  By  looking  back  to  what  we  have  estab- 
lished in  the  course  of  this  argument,  we  see, 
that  this  theory,  or  the  proposed  reading  of  the 
Constitution,  is  contrary  to  the  universal,  uni- 
form, and  unquestioned  usage  from  the  time 
the  Constitution  was  adopted — contrary  to 
cotemporaneous  legislation,  to  the  opinion  of 
the  legal  profession,  universally,  at  and  from 
the  time  the  Constitution  was  proposed,  and 
to  the  opinions  of  all  the  courts  of  such  of  the 
States  as  have  spoken  on  this  subject,  whose 
organic  law,  on  this  point,  is  similar  to  ours. 

For  these  reasons  we  may  regard  the  pro- 
posed reading,  or  the  substitution  of  the  words 
“ in  which  his  vote  is  to  take  effect,”  for  the 
words,  “ in  which  he  offers  to  vote,”  as  a gross 
violation  of  the  text — as  a shere  conjecture, 
lying  outside  of  the  expression  of  the  text, 
having  the  effect,  if  not  the  deliberate  design 
to  evade  the  plain  meaning  of  the  Constitution, 
and  thus  secure  for  an  ulterior  end,  a law  not 
agreeable  to  its  letter  or  intent. 

VI.  Another  of  these  evasive  theories  is.  That 
a law  like  the  one  noio  proposed  is  necessary 
to  give  effect  to  Sec.  5,  Art.  7,  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, which  declares,  that  “no  elector  shall 
be  deemed  to  have  gained  or  lost  a residence 
by  reason  of  his  being  employed  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States  or  of  this  State;  nor 
while  engaged  in  the  navigation  of  the  waters 
of  this  State  or  of  the  United  States,  or  of  the 
high  seas ; nor  while  a student  of  any  seminary 
of  learning;  nor  while  kept  at  aDy  alms-house, 
or  other  asylum  at  public  expense;  nor  while 
confined  in  any  public  prison.” 

Now,  it  is  maintained,  that  for  the  want  of 
a statute,  corresponding  with  this  provision  of 
the  Constitution,  this  right  ol  absentees  to 
vote  is  not  available;  that  it  is  wholly  inert; 
and  that  “ it  is  not  to  be  supposed,  that  it  was 
the  purpose  of  the  Constitution  to  preserve  a 
naked  right  to  vote,  but  with  restrictions  pre- 
venting its  exercise.” 

This  view  of  the  case,  taken  all  alone,  seems 
plausible.  It  is  an  artful  way  to  beg  the  ques- 
tion. But  the  first  inquiry  here  is,  what  is  the 
true  intent  and  meaning  of  this  provision? 
When  we  know  that,  it  must  govern  us.  In 
ascertaining  what  the  intention  of  an  instru- 
ment is,  all  elementary  writers  on  law,  and  all 
the  courts,  as  well  as  our  own  common  sense, 
tell  us,  that  “ the  intention  of  the  law-giver  is 
to  be  deduced  from  a view  of  the  whole  and 
every  part  of  a statute,  taken  and  compared 
together.”  Kent  vol.  1,  p.  520,  12  Wheat.  332. 
Now,  we  have  already  shown  by  facts,  argu- 
ments, authority,  and  law,  not  to  be  shaken, 
that  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  Sec.  1,  Art. 

7,  is  that  each  elector  in  order  to  vote,  must 
appear  in  person  at  the  polls  in  the  township 
or  ward  in  which  he  resides,  and  there  person- 
ally tender  his  vote. 

Now,  the  same  facts,  arguments,  authorities, 
and  settled  decisions  of  the  courts,  or  nearly 
the  same,  by  which  the  sense  of  Sec.  1 is 


26 


established,  determine  the  meaning  of  Sec. 

5 to  be  exactly  this:  No  elector,  if  absent 
from  the  township  or  ward  in  which  he 
resides,  on  any  of  the  grounds  therein  named, 
shall  either  lose  or  gain  a residence  on  that 
account,  but  as  to  the  matter  of  voting,  as 
well  as  to  other  purposes  of  residence,  he  shall 
stand,  precisely,  where  he  would  have  stood, 
had  he  not  been  absent  at  all.  His  residence 
is  continued,  lii3  right  to  vote  where  he  resides 
is  preserved,  so  that  when  lie  comes  back  to 
the  place  of  bis  residence,  he  can  exercise  this 
right  at  once,  without  being  obliged  to  earn  a 
residence  a second  time.  Such,  I submit,  is 
the  true  meaning  ot  the  words  of  See.  5,  taken 
in  their  natural,  ordinary,  and  necessary  import, 
in  the  order  in  which  they  are  placed.  It  makes 
the  two  Sections  entirely  harmonious,  and  both 
taken  together,  sustain  the  exposition  I have 
stated. 

This  particular  theory,  then  being  met  and 
disposed  of  by  the  same  considerations,  in  the  j 
main,  as  the  last,  I refer  to  them  without  fur-  j 
ther  comment  upon  it. 

VII.  Another  theory  designed  to  elude  the  I 
received  exposition,  and  secure  the  passage  of 
this  measure  is  this:  “ The  present  contingency 

is  one  not  contemplated  by  the  Convention  which 
framed  the  Constitution,  or  by  the  people  who 
adopted  it ; ” that  public  policy  requires , that  the 
Constitution  be  construed  liberally , so  as  to  avoid 
as  far  as  possible , the  hardships  and  inconveni- 
cncies  connected  with  these  dark  and  bloody  times ; 
and  that  the  received  exposition  practically  dis- 
franchises a large  share  of  our  most  patriotic  and 
worthy  fellow  citizens— a hardship  which  the  pas- 
sage of  this  measure  would  remove. 

Now,  Mr.  Chairman,  I call  you  to  witness, 
and  I call  the  members  of  this  Committee  to 
witness,  that  I am  not  arguing  against  the  pro- 
priety of  soldiers'  voting,  in  itself  considered — 
not  at  all;  but  that  out  Constitution,  as  it  now 
reads,  prohibits  the  passage  of  either  of  these 
Bills.  This  is  just  where  I stand.  Keeping 
this  in  view,  let  us  examine  the  position  taken 
by  the  friends  of  this  project,  as  here  stated. 
Let  us  do  it  candidly,  being  only  desirous  to 
know  and  obey  the  truth. 

In  the  first  place,  we  all  know,  or  should 
know,  that  it  is  not  true,  that  the  Constitu- 
tion does  not  contemplate  a contingency 
in  public  affairs,  in  kind,  like  the  present. 

It  is  not  pretended,  that  the  framers  of 
that  instrument*  or  the  people  adopting  it, 
foresaw  that  any  particular  rebellion  or  inva- 
sion would  take  place ; but  it  is  plain  enough, 
on  the  lace  of  that  instrument,  that  they  foie- 
saw,  that  rebellion  or  invasion  of  some  kind, 
in  some  form  and  to  some  degree,  less  or  more, 
might  occur,  and  foreseeing  it,  they  provided 
for  it.  For  example ; They  provided,  that 

“ the  privileges  of  the  writ  of  habeas  coipus 
shall  not  be  suspended,  except  in  case  of  rebel- 
lion and  invasion  the  public  safety  requires  it.” 
These  words  clearly  show,  that  they  foresaw, 
that  times  such  as  these,  might  occur.  They 
also  provided  for  enrolling  and  equipping  the 
militia,  determined  who  shall  be  Cominander- 
in-Chief  of  the  military  and  naval  forces  of 
the  State,  and  authorized  him  to  call  them  out 
“ to  suppress  insurrection  and  repel  invasion .” 
These,  then,  are  some  of  the  main  points  to 
which  these  proofs  conduct  us : 1.  That  the 
Convention,  framing  the  Constitution,  and  the 
people  adopting  it,  had  these  terrible  contin-  I 


gencies  in  mind,  and  in  view  of  them  fixed  the 
place  of  voting,  and  required  the  elector  to  ap- 
pear in  person  and  vote  personally,  as  already 
pointed  out.  2.  The  received  exposition  does 
not  have  the  effect  to  disfranchise  soldiers  any 
more  than  it  does  students,  sailors,  or  foreign 
ministers.  It  disfranchises  no  one.  In  fact, 
it  has  just  the  contrary  effect.  It  faithfully 
continues  the  elective  franchise  for  these  vari- 
ous classes  of  absentees,  in  full  force,  to  be 
enjoyed  by  them  at  once  on  their  return.  Is 
this  a mere  empty  right — a right  of  no  value — 
a barefaced  mockery  ? While  away,  these  per- 
sons are  not  at  home  to  vote,  it  is  true ; nor 
arc  they  at  home  to  enjoy  its  comforts,  to  take 
care  of  their  families  and  business.  These  are 
great  evils,  they  are  great  hardships,  but  they 
are  incident  to  certain  vocations,  and,  espec- 
ially, to  a state  of  war.  They  illustrate  the 
enormous  crime  of  this  rebellion,  the  ill  desert 
of  6uch  as  aid  and  abet  it,  and  the  sympathy 
and  gratitude  due  to  those  who  endure  these 
hardships,  in  order  to  quell  it,  and  save  the 
Union. 

But,  Mr.  Chairman,  our  official  duty  as  legis- 
lators, is  plain.  The  people  have  placed  a 
Constitution  over  us,  and  made  us  6unject  to 
it.  We  must  take  its  words,  just  as  they  stand, 
and  naturally  mean.  By  this  must  we  be 
strictly  governed,  and  not  by  any  notions  of  our 
own  a6  to  what  is  policy,  what  is  convenient, 
or  inconvenient,  what  is  a privilege  or  hard- 
ship. And  so  the  courts  decide.  The  Inhabi- 
tants of  St.  George,  Dwarrisp.  597,  Mr.  Justice 
Taunton  says:  “ Policy  is  a very  questionable 
and  unsatisfactory  ground;  because  men’s 
minds  differ  much  on  the  nature  and  extent  of 
public  policy.”  He  continues;  “The  ground 
ot  public  policy  is  a very  unsafe  one.  It  is 
best  to  adhere  to  the  words  used  in  the  act  of 
Parliament.”  Also  Judge  Story  in  Conflict  of 
Laws,  says:  “Arguments  from  policy  or  incon- 
venience ought  to  have  little  weight.  The  only 
sound  principle  is  to  declare  ita  lex  scripta  est , 
(thus  the  law  is  written,)  to  follow  and  to 
obey;  nor  could  there  be  well  found  a more 
unsafe  guide  or  practice  than  mere  policy  and 
convenience.”  In  the  Queen  vs.  Justices  of 
Lancastershire  11  A.  & E.  157,  Mr.  Justice 
Patterson  says:  “I  cannot  tell  what  conse- 
quences may  result  from  the  construction 
which  we  must  put  upon  the  Statute ; but  if 
mischievous,  they  must  be  remedied  by  the 
Legislature.”  In  Rhodes  vs.  Smithurst,  4 
Mess,  and  W.  63,  Lord  Abenger  says ; “A  court 
of  law  ought  not  to  be  influenced,  or  govern- 
ed by  any  notions  of  hardship ; cases  may  re- 
quire legislative  interference,  but  judges  can- 
not modify  the  rules  of  law.” 

Now  exactly  the  6ame  principle  applies  as 
between  the  Legislature  and  the  Constitution. 
The  Legislature  cannot  be  justified  in  disre- 
garding or  evading  the  plain  meaning  of  any 
provision  of  that  instrument,  because  it  con- 
flicts with  the  opinions  of  policy,  expediency, 
convenience,  hardship,  or  justice  entertained 
by  its  different  members.  The  remedy  for  an 
imperfect,  unwise,  or  oppressive  provision  of 
the  Constitution,  if  such  exists,  is  by  an  ap- 
peal to  the  justice  and  patriotism  of  the  peo- 
ple. In  their  original  and  aggregate  capacity, 
they  can  correct  the  evil  by  amendment,  or  a 
new  instrument ; but  the  Legislature  cannot 
assume  their  rights  any  more  than  the  court. 
The  Legislature,  itself,  is  the  creature  of 


27 


the  Constitution,  the  same  as  the  court, 
and  must  follow  its  provisions  with  equal 
strictness,  and  by  the  same  rules  of  interpre- 
tation. 

This  theory,  therefore,  with  regard  to  the 
unanticipated  state  of  the  country,  public 
policy,  inconvenience,  and  the  like,  being  er- 
roneous throughout,  either  in  fact  or  in  law, 
is  entitled  to  nb  manner  ot  weight  against  the 
plain  sense  of  the  Constitution. 

VIII.  One  thing  more.  Were  this  measure 
passed , would  the  law  he  valid  for  the  election  of 
Congressmen  and  Presidential  Electors,  although 
incompatible  with  the  Constitution  of  Michigan ?” 

This  question,  so  far  as  I know,  has  not  been 
raised  by  anybody  here  or  elsewhere.  I don't 
know  as  any  one,  on  either  side,  will  think  it 
worthy  ot  consideration.  But,  being  aware  of 
the  ingenuity  and  boldness  of  the  champions  ot 
this  measure  on  this  floor,  I expect  that  they 
will  claim,  in  due  time,  that,  should  it  become  a 
law,  it  will  be  valid  as  to  the  election  of  mem- 
bers of  Congress  and  Presidential  Electors, 
however  repugnant  it  may  be  to  our  State  Con- 
stitution. 

Now,  as  I do  not  wish  to  take  the  floor 
again  on  this  subject,  permit  me  to  anticipate 
this  point  to  be  hereafter  raised  by  the  other 
side,  in  all  probability,  and  also  the  argument 
by  which  they  will  attempt  to  sustain  it.  With  j 
a view  to  this,  it  is  to  be  noted  here  that  Sec. 
IV.  1,  Art.  1.  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  reads  as  follows:  “The  times, places, 

and  manner  of  holding  elections  for  Senators 
and  Representatives  (in  Congress)  shall 
be  prescribed  in  each  State  by  the  Legislature 
thereof;  but  the  Congress  may,  at  any  time, 
by  law,  make  or  alter  such  regulations,  except 
as  to  the  places  of  choosing  Senators.”  And 
Sec.  I.  1,  Art.  II,  of  the  same  instrument, 
reads  thus:  “Each  State  shall  appoint,  in 
such  a manner  as  the  Legislature  thereof  may 
direct,  a number  of  electors  (of  President 
and  Vice-President)  equal  to  the  whole  num- 
ber of  Senators  and  Representatives  to  which 
the  State  may  be  entitled  in  Congress.” 

We  may  well  expect,  Sir,  that  the  friends  of 
this  measure  will  make  the  most  they  possibly 
can  out  of  these  provisions,  in  order  to  pro- 
mote its  passage.  And  what  positions  will 
they  take,  and  what  course  of  argument  will 
they  be  likely  to  institute  in  view  of  them? 

I opine,  that  all  their  efforts  in  this  respect, 
will  amount,  in  substance,  to  this,  namely : 

1.  “ The  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
is  the  supreme  law  of  the  land,  anything  in  the 
Constitution  or  laws  of  any  State  to  the  com 
trary  notwithstanding.” 

2.  By  these  provisions  of  the  Federal  Com 
stitution,  the  times,  places  and  manner  of 
holding  elections  for  the  officers  in  question, 
are  to  be  prescribed,  not  by  the  people  of  the 
several  States  acting  in  their  original  char- 
acter, not  by  the  Constitutions  of  the  different 
States  ; but,  on  the  contrary,  the  power  to  so 
prescribe  and  determine,  is  taken  away  from 
the  people  of  the  several  States,  in  their  pri- 
mary capacity— taken  away  from  State  Con- 
stitutions—and  committed  to  the  Legislatures 
of  the  respective  States,  subject  only  to  the 
revision  of  Congress ; so  that  State  Constitu- 
tions have  no  jurisdiction  or  control  in  the 
case  whatever,  while  the  Legislature  of  each 
State  has  full  jurisdiction,  independent  of  the 
Constitution  thereof,  having  derived  it  direct- 


ly from  the  paramount  authority,  to-wit,  the 
Federal  Constitution. 

3.  It  necessarily  follows  from  these  premises 
that  should  either  of  these  bills  be  passed  by 
this  Legislature,  the  law  will  be  valid,  how- 
ever much  it  may  conflict  with  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  State,  because  it  will  be  in  pursu- 
ance of  the  express  provisions  of  the  Federal 
Constitution,  whose  authority  is  supreme. 

Such,  Sir,  I prophesy,  is  the  substance  of  the 
argument  which  the  champions  ot  this  meas- 
ure will  try  to  set  up  in  its  behalf,  on  these 
provisions  of  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States.  In  reply,  it  should  seem  quite  suffi- 
cient to  say : 

That  Sec.  II.  1,  Art.  1.  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution, reads  in  this  way:  “The  House  of 
Representatives  (in  Congress)  shall  be  com- 
posed of  members  chosen  every  second  year 
by  the  people  of  the  several  States ; and  the 
electors  in  each  State  shall  have  the  qualifications 
requisite  for  electors  of  the  most  numerous  branch 
of  the  State  Legislature .” 

By  this  provision  of  the  United  States  Con- 
stitution, it  is  left  to  each  State  to  determine 
the  qualifications  of  electors  of  Federal  Rep- 
resentatives, subject,  however,  to  this  one  lim- 
itation, namely : That  the  qualifications  must 
be  the  same,  as  for  electors  of  State  Represen- 
tatives,” in  order  that  the  States  may  not  be 
tempted  to  pervert  this-  power.” 

As  before  suggested,  these  qualifications  of 
electors,  or  requisites,  or  conditions  of  suf- 
frage, differ  in  different  States ; in  some  there 
is  a property  qualification,  in  others,  not;  in 
some  color  is  made  a qualification,  in  others, 
not;  in  some  “place"  is  an  essential  requisite, 
in  others,  not.  But  whatever  these  qualifica- 
tions, requisites  or  conditions,  are,  in  any  State, 
they  must  be  the  same  for  electors  of 
Congressmen  as  for  electors  of  State  Repre- 
sentatives. You  will  please  note  here,  that 
the  qualifications  or  requisites  of  electors  of 
State  Representatives  are  made  the  standard — 
made  so  bv  the  Federal  Constitution. 

The  Constitution  of  this  State,  as  we  have 
already  fully  seen,  makes  “ place  ” an  element, 
or  condition  of  voting.  That  is,  it  makes  it  an 
essential  requisite  of  electors  of  all  public 
offipers,  elective  of  the  people,  (“the  most 
numerous  branch  of  the  State  Legislature " 
included,)  that  they  vote  “in  the  township  or 
ward”  where  they  reside.  Now,  right  here, 
be  it  observed : 

1.  That  by  the  provision  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution, last  quoted,  that  instrument,  in  ef- 
fect, takes  up,  adopts,  appropriates,  and  im- 
poses this  same  requisite  for  electors  of 
Federal  Representatives  from  Michigan  as  com- 
pletely as  it  would  have  done  had  it  been 
incorporated  into  its  very  text. 

2.  That  this  Legislature  cannot,  by  any  pos- 
sibility, avoid  this  cardinal  requisite  for  electors 
of  Representatives  in  Congress  by  any  act  of 
legislation,  because  it  is  firmly  tied  to  it  both 
by  the  Constitution  of  the  State  and  of  the 
United  States. 

3.  That  Congress  cannot  avoid  this  essential 
requisite  for  electors  of  Congressmen,  here  in 
Michigan,  (to-wit,  that  the  elector  shall  vote 
“in  the  township  or  ward”  where  he  resides) 
by  taking  the  matter  into  its  own  hands, 
because  that  body  is,  also,  firmly  bound  to  it 
by  an  express  provision  of  the  Federal  Con- 
stitution—Ait.  1,  Sec.  II.  1, 


28 


Thus,  Sir,  this  anticipated  argument  in  favor 
of  the  validity  of  this  measure  for  the  election 
of  Congressmen  wholly  iails,  when  examined 
and  put  to  the  te«t. 

I might  oiler  other  considerations  showing 
that  this  anticipated  argument  is  utterly  in- 
defensible, as  far  as  the  electiou  of  Federal 
Representatives  is  eoncerned;  but  it  is  not 
necessary,  as  it  is  already  ovei  thrown  and  dis- 
posed of;  nevertheless,  without  attempting  to 
discuss  the  question,  whether  or  not,  an  act  of 
the  Legislature  would  be  valid,  which  should 
be  authorized  by  the  Constitution  of  the  Uni- 
ted States,  but  unauthorized  by  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  State,  we  shall  do  well  not  to  for- 
get, 

1.  That  in  case  the  Constitution  of  the  State, 
and  of  the  United  States,  contain  provisions 
with  regard  to  the  same  subject,  affecting  the 
powers  of  the  Legislature  of  the  State,  they 
are  to  be  construed  with  reference  to  each 
other;  that  the  words  of  each  are  to  be  taken 
in  their  natural  and  ordinary  import;  and 
holding  to  this  rule,  that  interpretation  of  the 
afore-mentioned  provisions  of  these  respective 
instruments,  is  to  prevail,  which  shall  be  con- 
sistent and  harmonious,  one  with  the  other. 

2.  The  universally  received  exposition,  on 
which  I have  dwelt,  ot  Sec.  1,  Art.  7,  of  the 
Constitution  of  this  State  with  regard  to  elec- 
tions, and  of  Sec.  II.  1,  and  of  Sec.  IV.  1.  of  Art  . 

I.  of  the  Constitution  of  the  UnitedStatcs  rela- 
tive to  the  election  of  Federal  Representatives — 
I repeat  that  this  exposition,  as  denoted  by 
our  general  election  law,  gives  lull  effect  to 
every  word  of  these  several  provisions,  and 
makes  them  aud  the  Statute  all  consistent  and 
harmonious  with  each  other,  as  to  the  qualifi- 
cations of  electors,  the  time,  place,  and  man- 
ner of  holding  elections,  as  well  as  to  every 
other  particular  to  which  they  relate. 

3.  The  argument  in  favor  of  the  validity  of 
the  law  now  sought,  as  to  the  election  of  Con- 
gressmen, (which  I have  anticipated,)  would 
array  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States 
against  both  itself,  and  the  Constitution  of  this 
State;  it  would  also  array  the  action  of  the  Leg- 
islature against  both  the' State  and  Federal  Con- 
stitutions, and  make  the  subordinate  superior 
to  the  principal — the  creature  superior  to  the 
creator.  Such  an  innovation,  resulting  in  such 
antagonisms  and  absurdities,  is  wholly  unal- 
lowable, as  against  an  exposition  and  practice, 
co-eval and  co-extensive,  with  the  adoption  and 
jurisdiction  of  the  Constitution  of  the  State, 
which  gives  every  word  involved  a full,  natural 
and  reasonable  meaning,  and  makes  them  all 
blend  in  one  consistent  and  harmonious  whole. 
This  latter  is  a practical  exposition,  which 
possess  attributes  “too  firm  to  be  shaken  or 
controlled.” 

One  word  as  to  the  ejection  of  Presidential  Elec- 
tors. As  we  have  seen,  the  Constitution  of  the 
United  States  provides  that  they  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  each  State  in  such  manner  as  the 
Legislature  thereof  may  direct.  This  provision 
has  been  taken  in  its  most  comprehensive 
meaning.  A large  discretion  has  been  exer- 
cised under  it  by  the  Legislatures  of  the  differ- 
ent States.  They  have  determined-  who  shall 
appoint,  as  well  as  the  mode  of  appointing. 
For  this  reason,  there  is  some  diversity  among 
the  several  States  as  to  the  mode  of  choosing 
these  Electors.  In  some  of  the  States  they  are 
chosen  by  the  Legislature,  in  others  by  district  s, 


and  in  others  by  general  ticket.  In  this  State 
they  are  elective  of  the  people  by  general 
ticket.  The  bills  before  us  contemplate  this 
same  mode  of  electing  them. 

Now,  Sir,  I submit  with  deference,  that, 
granting  that  the  Legislature  may  repeal  that 
part  of  the  election  law  which  relates  to  the 
mode  of  choosing  these  Electors,  and  direct 
that  they  shall  be  appointed  in  some  other 
mode;  yet,  when  and  so  long , as  it  makes  them 
elective  of  the  people  at  our  general  election, 
and  by  the  qualified  electors  of  the  State, 
the  Constitution  of  the  State  comes  in  to 
prescribe  and  determine  their  qualifications 
or  requisites,  or  the  conditions  under  which 
they  shall  vote,  if  at  all;  and  because  that 
Constitution  requires  each  and  all  electors  of 
of  public  officers  to  vote  at  our  general  elec- 
tions, in  the  township  or  ward  where  they  re- 
side. it  thence  follows,  that  the  proposed  law, 
allowing  them  to  vote  elsewhere,  and  even 
outside  of  the  State  lines  at  such  elections, 
would  be  invalid  as  to  the  choice  of  Presiden- 
tial Electors  the  same  as  for  other  public  offi- 
cers. 

Consequently,  the  doctrine,  that  the  pro- 
posed law,  would  be  valid  for  the  election  of 
Federal  Representatives  and  Presidential  Elec- 
tors, even  if  unconstitutional  and  void  as  to 
the  election  of  other  public  officers,  cannot  be 
lawfully  upheld  here  in  Michigan,  whatever 
may  be  the  case  in  some  of  the  other  States. 

Now,  Sir,  to  recapitulate  somewhat,  at  this 
point  in  this  discussion:  It  has  been  my  aim 
thus  far, 

1.  To  clear  the  subject  in  hand,  of  seductive 
side  issues,  and  to  put  it  in  its  just  light. 

2.  To  state  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of 
the  Constitution  with  regard  to  it. 

3.  To  illustrate  and  sustain  that  intent  and 
meaning,  as  thus  stated,  by  facts,  arguments, 
authority,  and  law  as  settled  by  the  courts. 

4.  To  meet  and  overthrow  by  the  same 
means,  the  many  false  theories,  gotten  up  and 
brought  forward  by  the  special  champions  of 
this  measure  to  elude  the  plain  sense  of  the 
Constitution,  turn  the  minds  of  members 
away  from  the  real  merits  of  the  case,  and, 
thus,  to  secure  the  enactment  of  the  proposed 
law.  And  this  finishes  what  I have  to  say,  at 
this  time,  on  the  constitutionality  of  this  measure. 
I regret,  that  the  effort  is  so  far  short  of 
the  work  of  a master;  but,  Sir,  I have 
uttered  as  best  I could,  under  the  circum- 
stances, what  occurred  to  me.  The  subject 
unfolded,  as  I proceded,  and  as  a result,  I have 
detained  you  far  beyond  my  expectation;  but 
without  offering  any  apology  for  holding  the 
floor  so  long,  except  such  as  the  importance 
of  the  subject,  the  circumstances  of  the  occa- 
sion, the  relations  of  one  portion  of  this  body 
to  the  other,  and  my  freedom  from  party  ob- 
ligations and  party  trammels  naturally  suggest, 
I now  propose  to  add  a few  words  with  re- 
gard to 

Tlie  Expediency  of  this  Project. 

Many  think  it  unwise  to  pass  a law  of  the 
kind  proposed  because, 

1.  It  is  so  nearly  impracticable  to  carry  it  out. 
The  Committee  of  Elections  took  this  view 
last  winter,  in  their  able  Report  before  spoken 
of,  to  which  I refer,  as  presenting  a lucid 
statement  of  this  particular  point.  And  Mr. 
Blaik,  himself,  on  the  occasion  referred  to,  in 


:29 


speaking  of  this  point,  used  these  words: 
“It  is  well  nigh  impossible  to  have  the  sol- 
diers vote  because  of  the  great  number  of 
districts  in  which  votes  are  to  be  polled,  and 
returns  made,  and  because  the  soldiers  will  be 
subject  to  the  contiol  of  their  commanding 
officers,  and  may  be  in  line  of  battle,  or  on  a 
march  upon  election  day.”  This  is  one  of  the 
grounds  which  Mr.  Blair  then  assigned  for  his 
conviction,  that  such  a law  as  is  now  sought, 
would  be  inexpedient.  He  states  the  point 
fairly.  Is  it  less  important,  and  forcible  now, 
than  then?  If  you  say  yes,  please  adduce  the 
proof. 

2.  Many  regard  it  inexpedient  to  pass  this 
measure , on  account  of  the  opportunity  the  ex- 
periment would  afford  for  illegal  voting , it  being 
alike  impossible  to  enforce  any  efficient  system  of 
challenging , or  to  punish  offenders. 

Suppose  somebody  in  New  Orleans  knows 
the  name  and  place  of  residence  of  some 
Michigan  soldier,  who,  for  some  reason,  is  un- 
able to  be  on  hand  to  vote.  The  ballot  box 
from  Michigan  comes  there  for  votes.  This 
man  at  New  Orleans,  steps  forward,  and,  as- 
suming the  name  of  the  absent  soldier  from 
Michigan,  offers  to  vote.  There  is  no  one 
there  to  challenge  him.  He  votes.  This  is 
but  one  case  in  many  thousands,  perhaps.  In 
this  way  the  ballot  box  would  quite  likely  be 
stuffed  "with  illegal  votes.  Now,  how  can  any 
law,  which  we  may  pass  here,  prevent  such  a 
result  if  the  ballot  box  is  sent  there  as  pro- 
posed; and  how  can  punishment  be  inflicted 
on  the  offender  under  any  law  of  Michigan,  so 
long  as  the  laws  of  Michigan  have  no  effect 
outside  of  the  State  lines?  In  short,  what  law 
is  there  against  stuffing  a Michigan  ballot  box 
in  New  Orleans,  or  anywhere  else  outside  of 
the  lines  of  the  State?  Under  what  law  could 
the  offender  be  complained  of  ? What  court 
would  have  jurisdiction  of  such  a case?  Indeed, 
could  any  case  be  gotten  up  on  account  of  such 
an  act?  Would  it  be  an  offence  against  law? 
Would  it  not  be  a kind  of  mischief  which 
would  work  great  evils,  but  yet  could  not  be 
got  at?  Thisjis  what  is  claimed  as  quite  sure 
to  follow  from  the  passage  of  this  measure. 

3.  Many  argue  against  the  expediency  of  this 

measure,  because:  1.  No  discussions  can  be 
had  in  the  camps  on  political  topics , or  the  merits 
of  candidates.  2.  The  soldiers  are  not  in  circum- 
stances to  vote  independently , but  rather  as  their 
Commanders  shall  desire.  3.  This  measure  would 
thus  put  a very  dangerous  power  into  the  hands 
of  these  Commanders , which  they  could  easily  use, 
especially  by  confederating  with  a few  ambi- 
tious men  at  home,  to  get  a kind  of  voting 
monopoly,  hold  the  balance  of  power,  control 
elections,  and  thus,  the  State  and  national 
governments.  In  such  event,  the  sword,  the 
purse,  and  the  law  would  fall  into  the  same 
hands,  and  misrule,  or  a terrible  despotism, 
would  probably  be  the  result.  Such  is  the  way 
which  many  reason,  irrespective  of  party. 
Their  views  are  strengthened  by  reference  to 
examples,  occurring  in  the  past,  and  in  France 
and  Mexico  in  our  own  day.  It  should  seem 
that  Mr.  Blair  has  shared  in  these  general 
views.  For  in  speaking  of  this  measure,  not 
long  ago,  he  said:  11 1 confess  to  having  no 

great  confidence  in  the  votes  of  soldiers  far  away 
from  home , and  subject  to  all  the  influences  of  camps 
and  where  no  discussion  can  be  had.”  Mr. 
Blair  had  already  spoken  of  the  soldiers  being 


subject,  on  election  days  as  well  as  on  others,  to 
the  control  of  their  commanding  officers.  But 
Mr.  Blair,  for  some  cause,  now  holds  very 
different  language.  He  now  says:  “ If  these 
volunteer  citizen  soldiers  should  not  have  a 
voice  in  the  civil  administration  of  the  gov- 
ernment, then  it  would  be  well  to  inquire, 
who  is  worthy  of  it.”  He  now  tells  us,  in 
effect,  that  the  ballot  box  may  be  safely  sent 
among  these  soldiers,  although  subject  to  the 
control  of  their  Commanders,  and  right  into 
the  very  camps,  whose  influences  he  seems  to 
have  been  so  suspicious  of,  but  a short  time 
ago!  Then  he  declared,  that  he  had  no  great 
confidence  in  votes  taken  of  the  soldiers,  under 
such  circumstances;  but,  now,  forsooth,  his 
confidence  seems  to  repose  on  them  especially. 
Whence  this  conversion  ? Whence  this  casting 
discredit  on  the  votes  of  soldiers,  yesterday, 
and  panegyrics  on  them  to-day?  Can  there  be 
any  good  reason  for  it?  There  may  be  a strong 
motive  for  it ; but  is  there  any  good  reason  ? Are 
not  the  soldiers  as  far  away  from  home  now  as 
then?  Are  they  not  as  fully  subjected  to  all  the 
influences  of  camps,  and  are  not  these  influ- 
ences quite  as  bad,  now,  as  then?  Or  has  a 
continuance  in  army  life,  made  the  soldiers 
more  intelligent,  and  virtuous,  and  less  and  less 
under  the  control  of  their  Commanders,  so  that 
they  can  vote  more  under  standingly,  and  with  a 
greater  degree  of  independence  now  than  they 
could  have  done  at  the  last  general  election? 
And  is  this  why  Mr.  Blair  has  turned,  “ right 
about  face,”  on  this  question?  Or  is  there  less 
opportunity,  now,  than  then,  for  an  ambitious 
office-seeker,  at  home,  to  conspire  with  Com- 
manders in  the  camps,  so  as  to  control  elec- 
tions to  his  liking — so  as  to  secure,  for  exam- 
ple, the  choice  of  such,  and  60  many 
Representatives  and  Senators  tor  the  next 
Legislature,  as  shall  accomplish  his  wishes, 
and  thus  effect  his  advancement?  Is  it  indeed 
true,  that  such  an  improvement  has  really  taken 
place?  And  is  that  the  actual,  producing  cause 
of  Mr.  Blair’s  radical  change  of  mind?  The 
point  of  my  inquiry  is,  not  whether  Mr.  Blair 
had  a motive  for  this  change,  for  that  is  ad- 
mitted ; but  whether  he  has  a justifying  reason 
for  it.  He  submitted,  in  his  Message,  certain 
theories  in  support  of  his  new  views;  but 
having  handled  and  examined  them,  we  find 
that  they  are  just  about  as  innocent  of  truth 
as  a pretty  bauble  is  of  solid  matter.  Now, 
we  inquire,  again,  does  any  justifying  reason 
anywhere  exist  for  this  “ change  of  base,”  on 
the  part  of  Mr.  Blair?  The  truth  is,  Sir, 
man  follows  the  promptings  of  his  dominant 
motive-,  and  the  character  of  the  motive  de- 
pends on  the  real  character  of  the  man.  If  he 
is  a man  of  truth  and  “right  reason” — if 
these  compose  the  substance  of  his  moral  and 
intellectual  being — then  his  dominant  motive 
will  spring  from  truth  and  reason,  and  he  will 
follow  their  light  whithersoever  it  shall  lead 
him.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  if  he  is  greedy 
of  gain,  or  of  political  preferment, — if  either 
of  these  passions  is  dominant  in  him,  his 
ruling  motive  will  spring  from  it,  and  he  will 
follow  its  promptings,  change  fronts,  and  shift 
about  for  good  reasons,  or  without  them,  or 
against  them  as  the  case  may  be,  so  long 
as  he  remains  a man  of  this  type.  I 
remember  a case  in  point.  I was  once 
present  at  a meeting  of  a set  of  Rail- 
road directors.  They  had  a confidential  adviser 


30 


the  very  contents  of  whose  being1  was  a desire 
for  gain.  He  was  also  present.  They  submit- 
ted a certain  financial  project  to  him  for  his 
opinion.  The  case  was  a plain  one,  and  be  at 
once  decided  against  the  scheme,  and  gave  his 
reasons,  which  were  good:  just  as  Mr.  Blair 
did,  a short  time  ago,  against  this  project. 
But  this  money-loving  adviser,  of  a sudden, 
saw  how  he  could  make  ten  thousand  dollars, 
in  half  an  hour,  out  of  the  railroad,  if  the 
plan  of  the  directors  were  adopted.  Controlled 
by  his  ruling  motive , he  changed  his  mind  os- 
tensibly, and  in  ten  minutes  after  he  gave  his 
first  opinion,  he  gave  another  diametrically 
opposite.  The  plan  was  adopted,  because  the 
directors  had  a bias  that  way,  and  in  less  than 
two  hours  their  adviser  had  made  $10,000  out 
of  the  concern  and  got  his  money,  which  went 
so  far  to  ruin  it,  and  that  is  all  the  good  his 
new  opinion  did  them.  Now  this  old  sharper 
had  a motive  lor  changing  his  opinion,  and  it 
controlled  him,  but  he  had  no  justifying  reason 
for  it;  and  he  knew  that  in  that  process  he 
received  a lie  into  the  inmost  sanctuary  of  his 
nature,  and  gave  utterance  to  it  in  his  second 
opinion. 

Hoes  this  illustrate  any  part  of  Mr.  Blair’s 
course  in  this  matter?  Mr.  Blair,  as  well  as 
the  sharper,  changes  “ his  base.”  Mr.  Blair 
gives  no  more  justifying  reasons  for  it,  than 
the  sharper.  We  see  the  motive  ($10,000), 
which  determined -the  sharper  to  contradict 
himself  on  all  material  points.  What  is  Mr. 
Blair’s  motive?  Is  it  to  provide  lor  himself 
votes  against  the  time  of  need?  Has  he  daring 
enough  to  try  to  navigate  the  uneven  political 
sea,  in  two  contrary  opinions  on  such  a ques- 
tion as  this,  when  the  motive  in  which  the  last 
originated,  stands  out  so  plainly  and  the  means 
for  carrying  it  out  are  60  very  revolutionary? 
Why,  one  would  naturally  suppose,  that  he 
would  have  been  admonished,  betimes,  by  the 
fate  of  the  adventurer,  who  undertook  to  get 
across  a rough  river  in  two  tubs,  having  one 
foot  in  each.  The  poor  fellow  see-sawed,  and 
pitched  in  opposite  directions,  first  one  side 
being  up,  and  then  the  other,  as  the  waves 
happened  to  rise  or  fall,  till  at  length  he  reach- 
ed a point,  where  the  waters  divided,  and  his 
tubs,  taking  opposite  courses,  split  him  right 
up,  and  thus  finished  him. 

And  is  it  not  more  than  possible,  Sir,  that 
when  these  two  entirely  contradictory  posi- 
tions of  Mr.  Blair,  on  a constitutional  question, 
involving  the  integrity  of  the  Constitution  it- 
self, the  purity  of  elections,  and  the  stability  of 
the  government,  become  generally  known  and 
compared ; when  the  nature,  tendency,  and  ob- 
ject of  the  last  position  shall  be  well  under- 
stood, as  the  same  will  soon  oe;  then,  in  that 
day,  shall  not  the  voice  of  an  indignant  people 
be  heard  coming  up  from  all  parts  of  the  State, 
louder  than  the  voice  of  many  waters,  saying: 
“ The  double-minded  man,”  the  man  of  no 
settled  principles,  the  man,  who  now  advances 
one  opinion,  and  now  another  directly  con- 
trary, the  man,  who  now  goes  for  one  course 
of  action,  and  now  for  an  entirely  opposite 
course — such  a man  is  “unstable  in  all  his 
ways?”  He  hath  no  sure  foundations.  He  is 
not  to  be  built  on  more  than  a quicksand. 
Avoid  him.  These  extremely  exigent  times 
call  for  men  for  high  places,  of  clear  heads  and 
pure  hearts,  of  vigorous  wills  and  solid  bottom, 
who  are  founded  on  the  rock  of  unchanging 


truth  and  right  reason,  and  who  can  “ stand 
fast  in  one  mind,”  having  fit  qualifications  lor 
conducting  the  country,  successfully,  through 
this  season  of  special  exigency  and  trial.  And 
this  leads  me  to  consider, 

4.  The  dangerous  precedent , which  the  passage 
of  the  proposed  law  and  the  practice  under  \ t} 
would  afford  as  to  the  management  of  elections. 

Mr.  Chairman,  I was  bom  and  brought  up  in 
a State,  the  most  thoroughly  and  nobly  Whig, 
of  any  State  in  the  Union — the  State  of  Ver- 
mont. I was  taught,  from  the  first,  to  regard 
the  British,  the  Democrats,  and  the  Devil,  as 
being  pretty  much  on  a par.  And  I confess, 
that  I remain  very  much  of  the  same  mind 
still,  although  I am  free  to  admit,  that  I have 
learned,  that  there  are  many  honorable  excep- 
tions to  this  general  proposition  among  the 
Democrats,  and  that  the  Whigs  were  not,  and 
that  the  Republicans  are  not  all  as  pure  and 
wise,  as  I once  supposed  them  to  be.  But  I 
never  had  any  affinity  for  the  distinctive  spirit 
or  dogmas  of  the  democratic  party.  And  I 
never  cast  a democratic  political  party  vote  in 
my  life,  and  it  is  not  likely  I ever  shall.  I al- 
ways  had  a kind  of  feeling,  more  or  less  dis- 
; tinctand  influential,  that  pretty  much  all  that 
i is  peculiar  to  that  party,  whether  in  spirit  or 
theory,  is  the  result  of  the  fall  of  man ; and 
yet,  in  spite  of  this,  I rejoice  to  be  able  to  re- 
cognize many  excellent  men  among  the  Demo- 
crats; nay,  some  of  God’s  noblest  offspring. 

Now,  Sir,  it  wa6  a standing  charge,  on  the 
part  of  the  Whig  party  against  the  Democrats, 
that  the  latter  would  do  anything — change 
their  tenets,  6hift  grounds,  deny,  to-day,  what 
they  swore  to,  yesterday,  trample  the  Consti- 
tution, and,  especially,  stuff  the  ballot  box,  and 
I corrupt  the  elections,  in  short,  that  they  would 
! do  any  thing,  no  matter  what,  in  order  either 
to  preserve  or  gain  party  ascendancy;  and 
lurthermore,  (and  as  a natural  consequence) 
i that  the  irreverence  for  age  and  experience, 
tor  learning,  -wisdom  and  religion,  the  disposi- 
tion to  break  through  all  law  and  all  principle, 

I and  all  constitutional  restrictions,  so  prevalent 
in  the  land,  is  attributable  to  the  spirit  and 
: conduct  of  the  democratic  party,  and  its  mem- 
j bers.  Nor  did  the  matter  stop  here.  The 
Whigs,  at  length,  being  joined  by  a few  of  the 
more  considerate  and  conscientious  of  the 
| Democrats,  organized  the  Republican  party. 

Of  course,  the  Whigs  carried  over  into  the  new 
i party,  all  their  old  accusations  and  prejudices 
against  the  Democrats,  and  have  increased  the 
stock  by  such  additions,  as  they  have  been  able 
from  time  to  time  to  accumulate.  And  the 
| opportunities  have  not  been  either  few  nor 
small;  so  that,  now,  accusations  and  charges 
against  the  Democrats,  and.  especially,  for  ir- 
regular and  corrupt  proceedings  at  elections, 
really  constitute  an  important  department  of 
the  literature  of  the  Republican  party ; and  I 
have  no  thought  of  attempting  to  deny,  that 
it  is  all  substantially  true.  And,  now,  let  it 
be  granted,  that  it  is  indeed  so ; that  the  Dem- 
ocrats are  just  as  bad  as  the  Republicans 
charge  them  to  be.  Let  us  suppose  too,  that 
this  measure  is  passed  by  Republican  votes 
against  Democratic,  and  that  the  law  has  gone 
into  effect,  and  the  ballot  box  has  been  sent 
out  of  the  State,  and  all  over  the  United  States, 
lor  votes.  Now,  see  what  a precedent  is  thus 
afforded  by  Republicans  to  these  lawless  Dem- 
ocrats. Aud  suppose,  too,  one  thing  more, 


31 


namely,  that  in  the  ups  and  downs  of  party, 
these  reckless  Democrats,  full  of  all  subtilty 
and  mischief,  again  come  into  power.  Now, 
with  such  a precedent  as  this  before  them, 
originated  and  established  too,  by  the  circum- 
spect, law -loving  and  law-abiding  Republicans, 
what  would  these  Democrats  not  do  with  the 
ballot  box,  and  in  the  conduct  of  elections,  in 
order  to  choose  their  candidates  and  carry 
their  points ! They  will  not  restrict  the  ballot 
box,  when  sent  out  of  the  township  or  ward  to 
the  soldier,  and  the  camp.  They  will  not  be 
guilty  of  such  narrow  and  odious  partiality  as 
that.  Not  they.  For  they  will,  at  once,  so 
amend  the  law,  as  to  authorize  the  ballot  box 
to  be  sent  to  all  citizens  out  of  the  town  or 
ward  in  which  they  reside,  wherever  they  are, 
in  this  or  in  foreign  lands,  and  polls  to  be  opened 
in  other  States,  in  the  chief  places  of  concourse, 
in  the  streets,  in  the  opening  of  the  gates,  in 
the  cities,  at  all  points,  at  home  and  abroad, 
where  a democratic  ballot  box  can  be  filled  up 
for  the  benefit  of  that  party  in  Michigan.  And 
from  that  time  on,  they  would  overrun  us,  rive 
us  from  head  to  foot,  cut  us  up  root  and 
branch,  and  trample  us  down.  And  should 
you  remonstrate  against  it,  and  ask  why 
do  ye  so,  they  will  point  you  to  this  law,  this 
very  precedent,  which  you  establish,  and  say : 
“Here. is  our  justification;”  and  you  will  be 
speechless,  smitten  “ with  shame  anjl  confu- 
sion of  face.”  Will  you,  then,  by  the  passage 
of  this  measure,  deliberately  establish  such  a 
precedent  as  that  for  these  audacious  Phils- 
tines,  who  may  soon  become  your  political 
masters?  Will  you  thus  deliberately  arm  your 
deadly  foes,  who  persistently  seek  your  fair 
places,  your  dominion,  your  political  life? 
You,  Sir,  may  have  rashness  enough  to  venture 
it.  The  majority  of  this  body  may  be  rash 
enough  to  venture  it.  But,  thank  Heaven,  I, 
for  one,  am  not;  and  believing  “discretion  to 
be  the  better  part  of  valor,”  I shall  not  con- 
sent to  it. 

And  this  leads  me  to  speak  of  another  con- 
sideration, which  appeals  especially  to  Repub- 
licans, namely: 

5.  This  measure  will , if  passed  and  carried  out , 
he  a source  of  annoyance  and  grief  to  a large  por- 
tion of  the  people  of  the  State,  and  will  serve  to 
give  increased  aggravation  to  other  extreme  Re- 
publican measures , and  thus , tend  strongly  to 
weaken  the  Republican  party,  and  displace  it  from 
power. 

Sir,  we  are  now  under  a Republican  State 
and  National  Administration.  I am  glad  that 
it  is  6Q,  if  we  must  have  party  domination. 
This  is  a Republican  Legislature.  I am  glad 
of  it,  and  for  the  same  reason.  The  Republi- 
can party  is  held  responsible  for  the  acts  of 
this  body,  and  for  the  acts  of  the  State  and 
National  governments,  in  all  ot  their  depart- 
ments. I fully  recognize  and  deeply  realize 
the  force  of  this  pregnant  fact.  That  party  is 
one.  If  one  portion  of  it  suffers,  the  whole 
suffers.  And  the  history  of  political  parties 
teaches  this  lesson  With  special  distinctness, 
namely:  That  generally  speaking,  extreme  or 
abnormal  acts  of  any  department  of  govern- 
ment, about  which  the  feelings  of  the  people 
at  large  are  much  exercised,  naturally  give  rise 
to  more  or  less  of  doubt  and  censure  in  the 
public  mind.  If  one  extreme  act  after  another 
is  committed,  and  especially,  it  a course  of  ex- 
treme acts  and  measures  are  set  on  foot  and 


persisted  in,  which  are  of  general  application, 
the  tears  of  the  honest,  impartial  many,  are 
thus  awakened;  their  patience  becomes  tried 
and  their  confidence  gradually  withdrawn  from 
the  party  in  power.  In  this  way  a majority  is 
very  sure  to  be  prepared,  sooner  or  later,  to 
take  sides  against  the  ruling  party,  chargeable 
with  such  acts,  and  to  show  its  opposition,  on 
the  first  opportunity,  by  ousting  it  from  con- 
trol. Consequently,  the  party  in  power,  if  it 
wishes  to  retain  its  ascendancy,  should,  and  if 
wise,  certainly  will,  ever  keep  this  principle 
clearly  in  view,  and  will  be  careful  to  restrain 
its  acts  and  measures  within  the  bounds  of  wise 
moderation,  and  not  suffer  itself  to  go  to  ex- 
tremes, in  any  instance,  unless  compelled  to 
do  so  by  unavoidable  necessity. 

Now,  Sir,  what  is  the  position  of  the  Repub- 
lican party  in  this  regard,  at  this  juncture? 
This  is  certainly  true  of  it,  namely : That, 
owing  principally,  if  not  wholly,  to  these 
strangely  anomalous  times,  the  Republicans, 
in  the  control  of  both  State  and  National  af- 
fairs, have  instituted  and  pursued  many  extra- 
ordinary measures,  not  a tew  of  which,  have 
been  extreme.  Such,  for  example,  as  the  sus- 
pension of  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus,  in  States 
far  distant  from  the  field  of  military  opera- 
tions, where  the  courts  were  in  full  operation — 
military  arrests  of  citizens,  not  connected  with 
the  army,  on  account  of  speaking  their  opin- 
ions—the  Proclamation  of  Emancipation— the 
Drafts — making  paper  money  a legal  tender — 
Federal  taxation,  &c.  Understand  me,  Sir.  I 
do  not  speak  here  of  these  national  measures 
to  condemn  them — not  at  all;  but  to  remind 
gentlemen  of  the  tendencv,  which  such  ex- 
treme measures  have  to  strain  public  confi- 
fidence,  and  that,  on  this  account,  good  judg- 
ment forbids,  that  they  be  needlessly  multipled. 
And  to  impress  these  two  points  on  the  minds 
of  the  members  of  the  Committee,  let  me  here 
refer  to  another  extreme  measure  of  the  times, 
namely:  the  exemption  of  the  Government 
Bonds  from  National,  State  and  local  taxes, 
when  held  by  institutions  or  individuals,  as  an 
investment — an  exemption,  which  has  this 
startling  effect : to  take  the  burden  of  taxa- 
tion, growing  out  of,  and  to  grow  out  of, 
these  mountains  of  State  and  National  debts, 
from  the  shoulders  of  the  rich  and  monied 
men  and  institutions  of  the  country,  and  put 
it  on  the  backs  of  farmers  and  mechanics,  and 
especially  on  the  latter.  The  result  is,  that 
the  farmer  and  mechanic  are  forced  to  pay 
National,  State  and  local  taxes  for  the  benefit 
of  the  rich  and  forehanded,  while  these  same 
rich  and  forehanded  institutions  and  persons 
are  permitted  to  go  free  from  all  these  taxes  to 
the  full  extent  of  the  enormous  funded  debt 
of  the  General  Government!  We  can  better 
perceive  the  practical  working  of  this  system 
by  taking  a single  case.  The  General  Govern- 
ment owes  Dives,  for  example,  $50,000,  and  he 
holds  the  bonds  of  the  government  as  evidence 
of  the  debt.  The  government  pays  him  inter- 
est in  gold,  which  is  equal  to  about  ten  per 
cent.,  and  to  get  the  money,  it  levies  a tax  on 
everything,  which  the  mechanics  in  the  vicini- 
ty make  and  produce;  so  that  every  hoop, 
which  the  cooper  shaves,  every  horse-nail, 
which  the  blacksmith  makes,  every  peg,  which 
the  shoemaker  drives,  every  stitch,  which  the 
tailor  or  dressmaker  takes,  every  mortise, 
which  the  carpenter  beats,  every  straw  which 


32 


the  girl  braids,  is  taxed  for  the  benefit  of  Dives,  f ' 
while  Dives,  himself,  is  exempted.  These 
haid- working  and  struggling  laborers  are  I 
watched  and  hound  bv  the  inevitable  tax- 
gatherer,  are  forced  to  keep  an  exact  account  | 
of  everything  they  do,  little  and  great,  make  a i 
sworn  statement  of  it,  monthly,  and  pay  a 
heavy  per  centage  on  it,  for  the  benefit  of  rich 
and  well-to-do  exempts,  from  whom  they  never, 
personally,  received  a single  penny.  Now  this 
Is  one  of  the  Republican  measures  of  the  day; 
and  I recognize  in  it,  and  in  its  practical  work- 
ings, elements  of  dissatistaction  and  difficulty, 
sufficient  to  try  the  strength  of  the  hold  which 
the  Republican  party  has  on  the  confidence  of 
the  people.  I am  not  now  finding  fault  with 
the  system.  That  is  not  my  object.  I refer 
to  it  and  to  its  workings  as  facts  to  show,  that 
we,  Republicans,  have  already  quite  as  many 
extreme  measures  on  our  hands,  as  we  can 
take  care  of,  and  retain  our  party  supremacy. 

Again.  When  we  come  home  to  our  own 
State,  we  have  this  bounty  system,  State, 
county,  city  and  town — these  relief  funds— all 
of  which  involve  the  necessity  ol  heavy  taxes. 

In  addition  to  these  unusual  measures, we  have 
these  extraordinary  acts  tor  building  railroads, 
by  which  a numerical  majority  in  a town, 
county  or  city,  as  the  case  may  be,  can  compel 
the  minority  against  their  judgement  and  will, 
to  put  from  a fifth  to  a tenth  of  all  they  are 
worth,  or  are  supposed  to  be  worth,  iuto  a 
joint  stock  company.  If  these  railroad  acts 
arc  not  unconstitutional,  they,  certainly,  are 
such  an  extreme  exercise  of  Legislative  power, 
as  are  suited  to  strain  public  confidence  in  the  ! 
party  having  control.  And  now  last,  but  not 
least,  comes  this  extraordinary  measure  lor 
voting  by  proxy,  or  sending  the  ballot  box  all 
over  the  country  to  gather  up  votes. 

The  thought  I wish  to  enforce  here  is,  that 
it  is  impolitic  for  the  party  in  power  to  pass 
this  measure,  because,  on  the  one  hand,  it  is 
not  needed , in  order  to  retain  Republican  as- 
cendency in  the  State,  and  on  the  other,  the 
Republicans  will  lose  by  it  a great  deal  more 
than  they  can  gain — because  it  will  produce 
such  a strain  on  the  public  confidence.  It  is 
an  old  saying,  that  “ it  is  the  last  feather  which 
breaks  the  camel’s  back.”  Now,  I do  not  go 
so  far  as  as  to  say,  that  this  measure,  if  it  shall 
be  passed  and  go  into  effect,  will  break  down 
the  Republican  party  in  the  State,  or  displace 
it  from  power;  but  I do  sincerely  believe  that  1 
coming  in  at  this  crisis,  on  top  of  others  re- 
ferred to,  it  will  give  them,  in  the  common 
mind,  new  significance  and  aggravation,  and 
will,  thus,  operate  greatly  to  the  injury  of  the 
Republican  party.  It  will  be  a source  of  much 
annoyance  and  irritation  to  a powerful  minor- 
ity, and,  also,  to  the  more  intelligent  and  con- 
siderate of  the  Republicans.  This  minority, 
fruitful  in  expedients  and  Argus-eyed,  will,  of 
course,  make  out  of  it,  all  the  party  capital  of  i 
which  it  is  capable.  And  it  is,  exactly,  the 
thing  for  them  in  this  respect,  at  this  particu-  j 
lar  time.  For  mark,  here,  their  chief  charge  j 
against  the  Republicans,  namely,  that  they  are  | 
not  worthy  of  political  power,  and  that  in  their 
hands  it  is  not  safe,  either  for  the  people,  or 
for  the  government,  as  a system  of  polity ; and 
that  facts  show  it  to  be  so.  Now,  should  this 
measure  be  passed,  it  will  be  to  them  a mine, 
rich  in  proof  of  the  truth  of  this  charge.  It 
will  be  exposed  on  all  sides,  and  will  pay  well  i 


for  every  fair  attack  on  it.  It  is  not  at  a dis- 
tance, either  in  respect  of  space  or  interest. 
It  is  here  and  every  well-directed  blow  will 
tell  against  it,  and  consequently  against  the 
party  responsible  for  it.  Its  grossly  uncon- 
stitutional features,  its  tendency  to  cast  aside 
the  safe-guards,  which  the  experience  and  wis- 
dom of  ages  have  found  necessary,  as  a pro- 
tection to  the  ballot  box  and  the  purity  of 
elections,  will  be  pointed  out  and  brought 
home  to  the  people,  and  enforced  upon  them, 
as  an  index  of  the  dominant  spirit  and  practi- 
cal tendencies  of  the  Republican  party  of  the 
present  day.  These  vigilant  foes,  whose  lead- 
ers have,  each,  an  hundred  eyes,  and  are  well 
tutored  in  the  arts  of  political  warfare,  will 
show  by  this  measure,  if  passed,  that  the  Re- 
publican party  contemns  the  common  law,  and 
the  people,  or  the  greater  part  of  them,  will 
( admit  the  validity  of  the  proof  and  feel  its 
force.  They  will  show  by  it,  that  the  Republi- 
can party  has,  at  length,  become  so  emptied  of 
I moral  sense  and  common  honesty,  as  to  set 
I aside  the  obvious  sense  of  the  words  of  the 
Constitution,  taken  in  their  natural  and  or- 
I dinary  signification,  and  to  get  up  and 
| follow  groundless  subtleties  in  their  stead ; 

! so  far  emptied  of  moral  sense  and  common 
! honesty,  as  to  break  through  long  estab- 
lished, universal  and  unbroken  legal  usage, 

| commensurate  with  the  adoption  and  juris- 
diction o’f  the  Constitution,  and  acquiesced  in, 

| and  partaken  of,  by  all  the  departments  of  the 
j government;  so  far  emptied  of  these  essential 
I qualities,  as  to  attempt  to  annul,  or  elude  by 
legislation  the  constitutional  remedy,  specially 
i prescribed  by  the  people  against  illegal  voting; 

| so  far  emptied,  as  aforesaid,  as  not  to  heed 
the  opinions  of  the  legal  profession,  as  held 
and  expressed  on  this  subject  from  the  time 
the  Constitution  was  proposed,  including  the 
carefully  considered  opinions  of  Mr  Blue 
himself,  given  but  a short  time  ago ; so  far 
emptied  and  demoralized,  as  aforesaid,  as  to 
ignore  and  brave  every  principle  of  interpre- 
tation established  by  the  experience  and  com- 
mon sense  of  mankind;  and,  finally,  to  tram- 
ple the  decisions  of  all  the  courts  of  all  the 
States  which  have  spoken  on  this  subject,  un- 
der Constitutions  similar  to  our  own. 

And  having  shown  all  this,  which  they  can 
easily  do  (especially,  as  it  is  all  so  true  and 
palpable,  that  very  few  intelligent  Republicans 
will  think  of  doubting  it),  they  will  not  let  it 
rest,  but  will  dwell  on  it.  They  will  tell  of  it, 
and  repeat  it,  and  use  it  in  all  manner  of  con- 
nections to  your  disadvantage.  They  will  take 
good  care  to  spread  before  the  people  all  the 
various  items  of  proof  connected  with  this 
measure,  tending  to  substantiate  their  propo- 
sition, that  the  Republicans  of  this  day  are 
not  fit  to  have  and  exercise  control,  and  that  it 
is  not  safe  for  the  people  to  let  it  remain  in 
their  hands.  And  be  assured,  Sir,  they  will 
make  this  proof  tell  on  the  minds  of  the  peo- 
ple of  this  State.  For  be  it  remembered,  that 
the  larger  part  of  the  adult  population  of  the 
State  have  been  personally  concerned,  more 
or  less,  in  the  matters  out  of  which  nearly  all 
this  proof  grows.  For  example:  They  en- 
grafted the  amendment  of  1889  into  the  old 
Constitution,  as  a special  remedy  against  ille- 
I gal  voting;  they  know  what  the  doctrine  of 
j common  law  was  in  relation  to  personal  ap- 
I pearance  and  personal  voting,  at  the  time  the 


33 


last  Constitution  was  made;  they  helped  make 
the  present  Constitution.  They  well  know 
what  they  meant  by  the  expression  “in  the 
township  or  ward  in  which  he  offers  to  vote;” 
and  that  they  said  honestly  in  a common  sense 
way,  just  what  they  meant ; they  well  know 
how  it  was  understood  at  the  time;  how  all 
the  lawyers  understood  it;  what  the  universal 
practice  has  been  under  it;  and  what  conclu- 
sive force  all  this  has  in  ascertaining  the  true 
sense  of  the  Constitution.  Consequently  the 
people  will  know  of  their  own  personal  knowl- 
edge, that  the  afore-mentioned  proof  con- 
nected with  this  measure,  going  to  substan- 
tiate the  charge  of  the  Democrats  against  the 
Republicans,  is  unimpeachable. 

Having  satisfied  the  people  of  the  gross  un- 
constitutionality of  this  Republican  measure, 
and  its  dangerous  tendencies,  especially  as  to 
the  purity  ot  elections,  the  Democrats  will 
next  inquire,  what  all  this  shuffling;  all  these 
studied  evasion;  all  these  idle  pretences; 
all  these  disorganizing  processes  are  really 
for — to  what  end  are  they  directed?  And 
they  will  charge,  that  it  is  all  simply  to  keep 
yourselves  in  power,  and  office,  if  it  be  a pos- 
sible thing,  and  your  fellow  citizens  of  another 
political  name,  out ; nay  more,  that  it  is,  also, 
to  enable  a clique  in  the  Republican  party  in 
the  State,  to  control  and  use  that  party  for 
their  own  personal  advancement. 

Such,  Sir,  in  plain  English,  the  Democratic 
party  will  charge,  is  the  real  object  aimed  at 
by  this  extraordinary  measure.  And  they  will 
prove  it  to  be  so,  because  it  is  true,  and  the 
proof  is  abundant.  And  what  is  more,  a ma- 
jority of  the  people  will  believe  it;  for  they 
cannot  account  for  these  things  in  any  other 
way.  Having  reached  this  vantage  ground, 
and  standing  firmly  on  it,  the  Democrats  will, 
thereupon,  put  this  question  to  the  people, 
namely : Is  that  party  fit  to  have  and  exercise 
political  control,  that  will  deliberately  use 
such  fiieans  to  accomplish  such  ends ; and  is 
it  safe  for  you,  the  people  of  Michigan,  to  suf- 
fer the  control  to  remain  in  its  hands — in  the 
hands  of  a party,  whose  managing  clique, 
rather  than  be  superseded  by  a vote  of  the 
people,  given  according  to  the  reasonable  re- 
quirements of  the  Constitution,  would  tear 
the  very  frame-work  of  the  government  in 
ieces  for  the  sake  of  bossing  its  ruins?  And, 
ir,  being  well  satisfied  of  the  facts  on  which 
this  pungent  appeal  will  be  made,  many  a 
hitherto  good  Republican  will  yield  to  its  ap- 
palling force. 

And,  Sir,  there  is  this  further  consideration 
to  be  taken  into  account  in  this  connection. 
The  public  mind  in  this  State  will  not  cofine  its 
inquiries  to  this  one  measure ; nor  will  the 
Democrats  suffer  it  to  be  thus  confined.  The 
people  having  seen  that  the  Republicans,  in 
order  to  pass  this  measure  and  secure  by  it,  if 
ossible,  a continuance  in  power,  wilfully 
roke  through  a most  formidable  body  of 
restrictions,  imposed  by  the  Constitution,  by 
long  and  universal  usage  and  common  sense ; 
it  will  naturally  put  them  on  the  inquiry  as  to 
other  Republican  measures,  and  especially 
such  as  may  be  called  extreme.  They  will  say 
to  themselves : “We  see  how  bad  it  is  in  this 
instance,  and  is  it  not  reasonable  to  suppose 
that  it  has  been  and  w ill  continue  to  be  as  bad 
or  worse  in  others?”  Moreover  they  will* 
continue : “If  Republicans  here  will  conduct 


in  this  manner,  is  it  not  reasonable  to  sup- 
pose, that  they  have,  and  will,  conduct 
in  a similar  manner  elsewhere?  We  see,  that 
they  passed  this  measure  against  fundamental 
law  and  common  sense,  and  judging  from 
what  we  thus  see  and  know,  is  it  not  fair  to  in- 
fer that  a large  part  of  what  they  do,  and  es- 
ecially  their  extreme  measures,  whether  of 
tate  or  national  policy,  proceed  on  no  better 
grounds?”  In  this  matter,  the  people  will 
say : “ We  see  that  the  Republican  leaders  were 
governed  by  motives  of  personal  aggrandize- 
ment, with  little  or  no  regard  to  the  rest,  or 
the  public  good.  “ Is  it  not  probable,”  they 
will  then  ask,  “that  this  same  motive  has  and 
will  continue  to  control  them  in  other  things?” 
And,  finally,  the  decisive  question  will  be 
reached  by  them,  to-wit:  “Now,  since  these 
things  are  so,  is  it  safe  to  trust  these  Republi- 
cans with  power  any  longer?” 

On  these  grounds,  and  in  these  ways,  Mr. 
Chairman,  will  this  measure,  if  passed,  be 
the  occasion  of  casting  suspicions  in  the  pub- 
lic mind  against  Republican  rule,  both  State 
and  national,  of  a very  injurious  character  to 
the  Republican  party.  Public  confidence  in 
it,  will  be  impaired.  One  member  after  an- 
t other  will  withdraw  from  it,  till  at  length  it 
will  lose  its  strength  and  empire. 

Mr.  Chairman,  there  is  another  thing  con- 
nected with  this  measure,  which,  if  it  passes, 
will  operate  very  injuriously  to  the  Republi- 
can party.  It  is  implied,  perhaps,  in  what  I 
have  already  said ; but  I feel  called  upon  to 
bring  it  out  more  distinctly,  and  warn  Repub- 
licans of  its  damaging  consequences.  It  may 
be  distasteful  to  some  of  you,  but  that  will 
not  be  my  fault.  What  I refer  to,  is  this: 
The  difficulty  you  will  have  in  making  the 
people  believe  that  you  are  really  honest  and 
sincere  in  this  business,  and  especially  your 
leaders.  The  good  people  will  not  readily, 
believe  that  you,  leaders,  are  60  deficient  in 
legal  knowledge,  or  common  sense,  as  to  really 
adjudge  this  measure  constitutional,  in  the 
face  of  all  the  arguments  and  light  standing 
forth  against  it,  so  plain,  that  “ a way-faring 
man,”  although  of  the  common  class,  “need 
not  err  therein.”  And,  surely,  you  ought  not 
to  expect  an  intelligent  people  to  believe  in 
the  constitutionality  of  this  measure,  when 
you  do  not  believe  in  it  yourselves.  And  you, 
in  effect,  will  confess,  publicly,  in  this  hall, 
and  before  our  respective  constituents,  that, 
you  do  not  believe  in  its  constitutionality,  and 
that  all  your  words,  in  that  direction,  are  a 
miserable  sham.  You  will  do  it,  now  and  here. 
For  let  me  put  this  to  you : If  you  foresaw, 
that  the  practical  effect  of  this  measure  would 
be  such  as  to  give  the  Democrats  the  victory, 
in  the  next  election,  so  as  to  throw  the  Re- 
publicans out  of  power,  and  put  the  Demo- 
crats in,  and  if  the  Democrats  were  seeking 
its  passage,  on  that  account,  how  do  you 
think  its  constitutionality  would  then  look  to 
you?  How  would  the  Constitution  then  read? 
Do  you  not  think  it  would  read,  under  such 
circumstances,  in  the  natural,  common  sense 
way,  ju3t  as  it  has  always  been  read?  Would 
you  not  then  be  clear  and  positive  as  to  the 
sense?  Would  you  have  any  doubts  to  be 
cleared  up  by  the  court  after  election?  Now 
if  any  friend  of  this  measure  is  otherwise 
minded;  if  he  verily  thinks  that  he  should,  in 
such  case,  go  for  it  and  defend  it,  the  same  as 


34 


ho  does  now,  “ let  him  speak,  for  him  have  I 
offended.”  I pause  for  a reply.  No  one 
speaks.  This  silence  is  significant.  It  is 
regnant  with  admissions.  The  people  will 
ear  of  it,  and  note  it.  They  will  detect  in  it 
the  very  plague-spot  at  the  bottom  of  this  bus- 
iness— the  lack  of  true  honesty  of  mind,  on 
the  one  hand,  and  the  presence  of  unholy  per- 
sonal and  party  ambition  on  the  other.  The 
reaction  on  the  Republican  party  will  be  un- 
fortunate. A shade  will  be  thus  thrown  over 
it.  But  the  instigators  and  leaders  in  this 
thing,  will  be  marked.  The  detested  blotch 
of  insincerity  will  be  on  them.  And  if  their 
names  shall  again  come  up  fora  place  01  trust, 
is  it  not  likely  that  you  will  hear  those 
prophetic  words  of  the  Message,  passing  and 
re-passing  among  the  people:  “They  would 
not  be  fit  to  make  laws,  who  will  not  obey 
the  fundamental  law.”  And  thus,  Sir,  is  it 
not  quite  likely,  that  the  political  career  of 
the  head  ones  in  this  scheme,  will  be  wisely 
and  righteously  cub  off  by  the  sober  judgement 
of  the  people?  It  may  be,  however,  that  be- 
cause “ a lie  will  sometimes  run  a mile  while 
Truth  is  getting  on  her  boots,”  some  of  this 
clique  may  secure  an  election,  after  all,  by  the 
help  of  this  measure,  especially,  as  the  court 
cannot  get  at  the  law,  till  after  election  ; 
but  if  any  of  this  clique  do  thus  secure  an 
election,  it  will  be  at  the  expense  of  the  Re- 
publican party — an  expense,  which  will  be  al- 
most suicidal.  But  very  little  will  that  disquiet 
them  provided  they,  themselves,  win.  Why, 
Sir,  we  can,  in  that  kind  of  imagination,  which 
•is  true  to  nature,  even  now  hear  them  solo- 
quize  in  the  words  of  the  expressive  dog- 
gerel: 

“ Of  all  my  father’s  family 
I love  myself  the  best; 

If  Providence  provides  for  me, 

What  care  I for  the  rest.” 

Sir,  I am  very  ready  to  kill  off  the  Demo- 
crats in  a political  sense.  But  please  excuse 
me  from  attempting  it  by  the  use  of  6uch 
means  as  will  kill  myself  twice,  while  I kill 
them  but  once.  I do  not  propose  to  dig  a pit 
for  them,  where  I shall  first  fall  into  it  myself. 
I do  not  propose  to  take  steps  against  them 
that  shall  cost  me  bitter  repentence ; that  shall 
compromise  my  sense  of  manly  uprightness, 
my  idea  of  a high  minded  statesman,  or  that 
shall  take  aught  from  my  own  self-respect,  or 
awaken  in  my  conscience  a sentiment  of  self- 
impeachment and  self-condemnation.  God 
save  me  from  such  apostacy — from  such  trea- 
son to  truth  and  honor  l 

Sir,  I have  seen  enough  of  men  and  things 
to  satisfy  me,  that  the  wisest  way,  the  strong- 
est way,  the  most  efficacious  way,  is  the  hon- 
est way;  and  that  honesty  in  politics,  as  well 
as  in  other  things,  “is  the  best  policy.”  The 
doctrine  that  one  may  do  eyil/that  good  may 
come,  is  quite  as  weak,  foolish,  and  wicked  in 
politics  as  in  morals  and  religion.  Besides, 
we  have  fallen  on  so  serious  times,  the  God  of 
nations  is  dealing  with  us  so  earnestly,  that 
“pious  frauds,”  even  in  party  politics,  are 
shockingly  incongruous,  and  should  seem  to 
expose  us  to  still  more  terrible  chastisements. 

Viewed,  then,  in  the  light  of  policy,  this 
measure  is  a bad  matter  for  the  Republican 
party,  which  will  be  held  responsible  for  it. 
And  the  more  you  revolve  it,  the  worse  it  will 
look ; the  more  you  befriend  it,  the  more  in- 


jury it  will  do  you.  Before  you  go  far  with  it, 
you  will  be  as  glad  to  get  quit  of  it,  as  Gen. 
Ethan  Allen  was  to  get  rid  of  his  quid  of  pep- 
per! 

As  yon  remember,  that  old  hero  was 
taken  prisoner  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution, 
by  the  British.  He  was  permitted  to  quarter 
with  officers  in  the  British  army  of  his  own 
rank,  according  to  military  etiquette.  He 
was  an  outspoken  man— blunt,  and  fearing 
nobody,  He  was  withal,  a sharp  joker,  ana 
quick  and  apt  at  repartee.  In  all  tnese  things, 
he  generally  got  the  better  of  bis  British  mess- 
mates, who  were  always  trying  “to  come  up 
with  him.”  One  day  they  sat  down  to  dinner. 
Allen  6aw  a tea-cup  full  of  cayenne  pepper, 
but  did  not  know  what  it  was.  It  looked 
rather  attractively  to  him,  and  be  fancied  that 
it  must  be  as  agreeable  to  the  palate  as  to  the 
eye.  So  he  dipped  his  broad  table  knife  into 
it,  and  took  a large  quid  of  it  into  his  mouth. 
A wink  and  suppressed  smile  went  round  the 
table.  John  Bull  felt  sure  that  he  had  got 
Brother  Jonathan  at  last.  Allen  saw,  that  he 
had  caught  himself  in  a bad  trap.  The  pepper 
began  to  bite.  But  having  great  self-po66ession 
and  an  iron  will,  he  determined  to  brave  it  out. 
He  worked  the  pepper  with  his  tongue  about 
his  month  as  fast  as  he  could,  hoping  that  it» 
fury  would  thus  soon  be  spent ; but  the  more 
he  worked  it,  the  more  it  burnt.  The  tears 
began  to  run.  His  burning  month  gasped  for 
cool  air.  He  could  hold  out  no  longer.  So, 
quackling  and  strangling,  he  cried  out; 
“ Gentlemen,  with  your  permission,  I will  take 
this  Hell  Fire  out  of  my  mouth,  and  pocket  it 
to  light  my  pipe  with!” 

This  measure,  Sir,  may,  now,  seem  to  you 
rich  in  promises,  “ but,  at  last,  it  will  sting 
like  a serpent,  and  bite  like  an  adder.”  It 
may  seem  all  right  to  you,  as  a party  expe- 
dient, but,  if  passed,  “ the  end  thereof  will  bo 
the  ways  of  death”  to  the  Republican  party  in 
Michigan.  Yon  may  rush  into  these  abnormal 
acts,  and,  in  in  your  infatuation,  fancy  that  the 
people  will  not  know,  that  they  will  not  con- 
sider, and  that  all  will  be  secure ; but  know 
ye,  that  for  all  these  things,  the  sovereign  peo- 
ple will  bring  you  into  judgment.  And  when 
your  fear  cometh  as  desolation,  and  your  de- 
struction cometh  as  a whirlwind,  remember 
the  warnings  this  day  received,  and  that  I,  for 
one,  am  clear  of  the  responsibility  of  your 
overthrow. 

6.  Another  consideration  showing  the  inexpe- 
diency of  passing  this  measure  is  to  be  found  in 

The  Tendency  It  would  Have  to  Tn* 
centre  and  demoralize  the  Public 
Mind. 

1.  In  relation  to  constitvliondL  law : — For  th© 
Constitution,  as  we  have  seen,  prescribes  th© 
boundaries  of  legislative  and  judicial  authori- 
ty, in  short,  the  organization,  the  powers,  and 
duties  of  all  the  various  departments,  and  or- 
gans, which,  in  the  aggregate,  form  the  com- 
plex machine  of  government.  It  also  carefully 
asserts  and  defines  those  individual  rights, 
which  not  even  the  law-making  power,  not 
even  the  people  themselves,  shall  be  permitted 
to  infringe.  Consequently, our  lives,  our  liber- 
ties,. our  property,  our  institutions,  our  social 
order,  our  security,  our  peace,  our  welfare,  as 
individuals  and  as  a people,  all  vest  on  const!- 


35 


tutional  law.  And  just  so  far  as  this  is  broken 
down,  or  set  at  naught,  or  eluded,  just  to  that 
extent  all  is  lost.  Fidelity,  therefore,  to  con- 
stitutional law,  is  the  first  duty  of  every  indi- 
vidual in  his  capacity  as  a citizen ; and  if  this 
be  so  with  the  private  citizen,  how  emphati- 
cally true  is  it,  in  case  of  legislators,  and,  in 
fact,  all  public  officers.  For  our  perpetuity 
and  stability  as  free  States  depend  much  more 
on  the  spirit  of  obedience  to  law  among  the 
leading  and  influential  classes,  than  on  jails, 
forts  and  armies.  And  how  is  it,  that  “the 
British  Constitution  and  the  English  nation 
have  outlived  its  feudalism,  its  despotism  and 
its  barbarism,  of  a thousand  years,  and  now 
promise  a thousand  years  more  of  constitu- 
tional freedom?”  It  is  chiefly  owing  to  the 
spirit  of  obedience  to  law,  manifested  in  its 
courts,  and  by  its  ruling  and  influential 
classes. 

And  that  man  is  a very  imperfect  student  of 
history  and  of  human  nature,  who  has  failed 
to  learn  this  important  lesson,  namely : That 
no  state  of  mind  can  be  more  pregnant  with 
evil  than  that,  which  can  knowingly  violate  or 
elude  the  Constitution,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
seek  to  excuse  or  justify  it  by  artifices,  by 
ingenious  theories,  by  cunning  speculations, 
by  specious  arguments,  derived  from  notions 
of  mere  policy.  Wherever  this  state  of  mind 
exists,  and  has  sway,  it  will  never  be  wanting 
in  objects  of  paramount  importance,  in  ex- 
tremely exigent  occasions,  such  as  seem  to  it 
to  be  strongly  characterized  by  that  kind  of 
necessity,  which  now  calls  for  the  exercise  of 
doubtful  powers,  and  now  knows  no  law  what- 
ever. In  this  way,  one  part  after  another  of 
the  Constitution  is  set  at  naught,  till  at  length 
it  is  stripped  of  its  force,  and  is  either  over- 
thrown, or  treated  as  inoperative  and  void: 
Just  as  the  Supreme  Court  of  New  York,  by 
Judge  Bronson  in  Oakley  vs.  Aspinwall,  3 
corns.  547,  568,  says:  “If  the  Legislature  or 
the  courts  may  take  that  office  upon  them- 
selves, (of  supplying  the  defects  or  amending 
the  Constitution)  or  if,  under  color  of  con- 
struction, or  upon  any  other  specious  ground, 
they  may  depart  from  that  which  is"  plainly 
declared,  the  people  may  well  despair  of  ever 
being  able  to  set  a boundary  to  the  powers  of 
the  government.  Written  Constitutions  will 
be  worse  than  useless.” 

The  judge  continues:  “ Believing,  as  I do, 
that  the  success  of  free  institutions  depends 
on  a rigid  adherence  to  the  fundamental  law, 

I have  never  yielded  to  considerations  of  ex- 
pediency in  expounding  it.  There  is  always 
some  plausible  reason  for  the  latitudinarian 
constructions  which  are  resorted  to  for  the 
purpose  of  acquiring  power — some  evil  to  be 
avoided,  or  some  good  to  be  attained,  by 
pushing  the  powers  of  the  government  beyond 
their  legitimate  boundary.  It  is  by  yielding 
to  such  influences  that  Constitutions  are  grad- 
ually undermined,  and  finally  overthrown. 
My  rule  has  ever  been  to  follow  the  funda- 
mental law,  as  it  is  written,  regardless  of  con- 
sequences. If  the  law  does  not  work  well,  the 
people  can  amend  it;  and  inconveniences  can 
be  borne  long  enough  to  await  that  process. 
But  if  the  Legislature  or  the  courts  undertake 
to  cure  defects  by  forced  and  unnatural  con- 
structions, they  inflict  a wound  upon  the  Con- 
stitution which  nothing  can  heal.  One  step 
taken  by  the  Legislature  or  the  judiciary  in 


enlarging  the  powers  of  the  government,  opens 
the  door  for  another,  which  will  be  sure  to 
follow;  and  so  the  process  goes  on,  until  all 
respect  for  the  fundamental  law  is  lost,  and  the 
powers  of  the  government  are  just  what  those  in 
authority  please  to  call  themf 

But  let  us  now  consider, 

2.  The  tendency,  which  this  kind  of  legisla- 
tion here  sought,  must  have  to  uncentre  and 
demoralize  the  public  mind,  not  only  with  re- 
gard to  fundamental  law,  and  the  management 
of  public  affairs,  but 

In  Relation  to  Morals,  Generally. 

This  general  tendency  appears  from  this: 
The  fundamental  law,  as  we  have  seen,  is 
founded  in  right  and  justice.  It  does  not 
not  create  them,  but  denotes  or  expresses 
them;  and  its  one  great  object  is  to  establish 
such  fixed  regulations,  as  shall  naturally  lead 
the  people,  and  all  public  officers,  to  intend 
right  in  all  their  purposes,  and  compel  them 
to  do  right,  and  act  justly  in  their  character  as 
citizens,  and  in  all  their  private  and  official  re- 
lations. Now  then,  if  by  your  theories,  by 
your  acts,  and  by  your  examples,  you  teach 
the  people,  that  the  fundamental  law  is  not  to 
be  held  sacred  and  inviolate ; that  there  is  no 
intrinsic  principle  in  or  about  it,  that  should 
necessarily  restrain  those  under  its  jurisdic- 
tion from  trifling  with  it,  from  eluding  it,  and 
setting  it  at  naught,  provided  there  is  an  ur- 
gent motive  for  it ; if  such  is  the  effect  of  what 
you  say  and  do,  in  this  regard,  the  tendency  of 
it  is  to  break  up,  in  their  minds,  the  very  foun- 
dations of  all  morality.  The  habits  and  ten- 
dencies of  mind  and  feeling,  thus  formed,  will 
naturally  extend  themselves  to  the  first  prin- 
ciples of  right  and  justice,  honor  and  truth, 
in  all  their  applications  to  human  character 
and  human  relations.  If  you,  in  these  high 
places,  cease  to  abide  by  the  fundamental  law, 
or  to  properly  maintain  and  respect  it,  you 
must  not  be  surprised  at  seeing  many  of  the 
people  advance  a step  further,  and  others  fur- 
ther still,  and  so  on,  until  license  and  anarchy 
shall  fill  the  land.  And  if  you  will  sow  the 
seed,  you  should  not  complain  of  the  abun- 
dance of  the  crop. 

In  a conversation  the  other  day  with  an 
Honorable  member  of  this  House  on  this  sub- 
ject, he  frankly  admitted,  that  the  principles 
in  the  case,  the  law  and  the  argument  were 
with  me;  but  he  was  also  bold  enough  to  add, 
that  “he  was  of  the  notion,  that  it  would  do 
to  stretch  the  Constitution,  somewhat,  in  this 
particular  case.”  But  my  Honorable  friend  evi- 
dently had  not  traced  such  kind  of  legislation 
out  to  its  natural  consequences.  It  did  not 
seem  to  occur  to  him,  nor  does  it  seem  to 
occur  to  others,  agreeing  with  him,  that  they 
are  proposing  an  extremely  dangerous  exper- 
iment-one which,  if  carried  out,  will  strong- 
ly tend  to  conjure  a spirit  of  misrule, 
which  will  not  “ down”  at  their  bidding.  Why, 
it  may  seem  a very  small  thing  to  many  to 
unbar  the  cage  and  let  the  grim  lion  out;  but 
when  fairly  loose  and  abroad,  who  shall  lay 
his  hand  on  his  mane  and  put  him  in  again? 
Once  out,  he  will  rioit  and  destroy  us. 

There  was  a large  pond,  on  one  of  the  hills 
of  New  England,  covering  a great  number  of 
acres.  There  was  a small  out-let  at  one  end 
of  it.  The  ground  from  this  end  broke  off  a 
few  rods  from  the  pond,  forming  a slope  of 
arable  land  to  a rich,  valley  below.  A man  had 


36 


a little  Baw  mill  on  this  rivulet.  He  became 
short  of  water.  He  needed  but  a little  more. 
If  lie  could  not  get  it,  his  business  and  means 
of  living  would  be  cut  off.  In  a case  so  urgent 
as  his,  he  thought  it  would  do  to  cut  away  the 
fixed  boundary  of  that  great  pond,  “ some- 
what,”— only  a little,  however.  He  tried  it. 
The  water  pressed  down.  The  earth  gave 
way.  The  channel  deepened  and  widened 
with  frightful  rapidity.  The  waters  rushed 
out  of  their  ancient  boundaries,  raging  as  they 
went,  and  sweeping  away  crop6,  fences,  cattle, 
houses,  barns,  and  mills,  and  deluging  and 
laying  waste  the  beautiful  region  beneath. 
These,  Sir,  are  but  feeble  illustrations  of  the 
evils  which  will  sooner  or  later  come  upon  us, 
if  we,  as  rulers  and  a people,  once  begin  to 
break  through  the  ultimate  boundaries  of  law. 

If  you,  Sir,  or  others,  fancy  that  these  are 
but  the  words  of  an  alarmist,  when  no  real 
danger  is  to  be  apprehended  from  these  un- 
constitutional measures,  then  just  turn  to  the 
present  condition  ot  the  people  ot  the  insurg- 
ent States.  Carefully  trace  its  history,  in  its 
origin,  progress,  and  results,  so  far  as  devel- 
oped. By  such  an  examination  you  will  find, 
that  they  were  first  taught  by  their  leaders, 
in  one  way  and  another,  to  disrespect  funda- 
mental law,  and  that  this  fearlul  habit  was 
thus,  by  degrees,  formed  in  the  popular  mind. 
The  evil  seed,  it  is  true,  was  sown  in  a genial 
eoil,  where  it  took  quick  and  deep  root,  and 
brought  forth  fruit  an  hundred  fold,  in  a short 
time.  But  yet,  it  was  all  natural.  And  when 
the  habit  was  once  formed,  and  had  taken 
possession  of  them,  the  distinction  between 
right  and  wrong,  as  a natural  result,  was  easi- 
ly lost  sight  or,  “ the  boundaries  of  vice  and 
virtue  were  confounded,  and  the  whole  sub- 
stance of  morals”  with  them  fell  a prey  to 
blind  and  irrational  passions.  The  traces  of 
honor,  virtue,  humanity,  and  patriotism  disap- 
peared, more  and  more,  from  their  conversa- 
tion, from  their  manners,  from  their  legisla- 
tion, from  their  executive  and  judicial  admin- 
istrations, from  their  public  speeches,  frbm 
their  popular  publications  and  current  litera- 
ture. “ Hence,  that  intrepidity  in  guilt,  which 
has  cased  the  hearts”  of  that  people,  and  es- 
pecially of  their  leaders  and  influential  classes, 
“ as  with  tripple  brass.”  Tbe  consequences  are 
now  felt.  The  fabric  of  society  there  totters  to 
its  base,  if  it  be  not  already  forever  overthrown ; 
“ the  very  earth  rocks  and  trembles  under 
their  feet,  and  the  whole  heavens  are  enveloped 
in  darkness,  No  imagination  can  portray,  no 
mind  can  grasp  the  horrors,”  which  that  spirit 
of  lawlessness,  thus  let  lose  and  propagated, 
has  already  produced;  “nor  when  the  angel 
in  the  Apochalyps,  to  whom  the  keys  are  en- 
trusted, shall  be  commissioned  to  open  the 
bottomless  pit,”  will  he  disclose  a much  more 
appaling  spectacle  of  depiavity  and  wretched- 
ness than  is  at  present  exhibited  throughout 
the  greater  part  of  the  rebel  States. 

Sir,  this  is  history.  It  is  not  the  moanings 
of  a croaker,  having  no  corresponding  reality. 
No,  Sir!  The  widowed  and  fatherless  multi- 
tudes among  us;  the  desol olate  homes  all  over 
the  tree  States ; the  hard  marches,  the  watch- 
ings, the  hunger,  and  the  shed  blood  of  thou- 
sands of  our  brethren,  testify  that  this  is  all 
matter-of-fact  history. 

And,  now,  Sir,  with  such  a living  contem- 
poraneous example  confronting  them,  one 


whose  attendant  consequences  shake  the  foun- 
dations of  the  adhering  States,  and  even  en- 
danger their  very  existence,  what  can  the  ac- 
tuaries of  this  lawless  measure,  with  their  no 
less  lawless  advocacy  of  it,  really  have  in  heart ! 
What  can  they  be  thinking  of!  Are  they  am- 
bitious to  repeat  this  Southern  experiment 
here  in  the  North?  If  nay,  why  then  do  they 
thus  strive  to  put  in  operation,  7/ere,  the  causes, 
which  produced  6uch  a terrible  condition  of 
things  there?  If  you  would  avoid  such  a dread- 
ful end,  why  enter  on  the  way,  which  leads  to 
it?  If  you  will  sow  the  wind,  you  must,  in 
turn,  reap  the  whirlwind.  This  follows  from 
the  necessary  law  of  cause  and  effect. 

And,  permit  me,  Sir,  in  closing  to  direct 
attention  to 

Another  Aspect  of  this  General  Sub- 
ject. 

We  claim  to  be  a Christian  people — to  re- 
cognize the  constant  superintendence  and  su- 
premacy of  God,  and  our  entire  dependence  on 
Him,  both  as  individuals  and  as  a Nation.  And 
yet,  Sir,  so  it  is,  that  here  in  this  Christian 
country,  nothing  is  thought  so  vulgar,  60  much 
out  of  taste,  in  a body  like  this,  as  a serious 
appeal  to  the  principles  which  regulate  tho 
divine  administration  with  regard  to  human 
affairs. 

But,  Sir,  that  man  is  a shallow  statesman, 
and  as  dangerous  as  he  is  shallow,  who  fails  to 
recognize  these  principles  of  the  divine  gov- 
ernment, and  act  with  a careful  reference  to 
them.  For  be  it  remembered,  Sir,  that  the 
God  of  Heaven  is  certainly  quite  as  much  the 
God  of  Nations,  as  He  is  the  God  of  nature ; 
and  that  the  laws  ordained  by  Him  for  the 
regulation  of  communities  and  Nations,  are 
quite  as  fixed  and  operative  as  those  establish- 
ed by  Him  in  nature.  The  latter  we  learn  by 
experiments  and  observation.  The  former  are 
taught  us  in  the  Scriptures,  sometimes  by 
direct  precept,  and,  sometimes,  by  real  cases, 
where  the  principle  of  the  particular  law  or 
laws  are  applied  and  the  operations  and  results 
recorded.  Among  these  established  laws  or 
principles  of  the  divine  administration,  rela- 
tive to  Nations,  is  this,  namely : Whenever 
rulers  and  persons  of  authority  and  influence 
lead  the  people  away  in  mind,  heart,  or  action 
from  the  straight  paths  of  sincerity  and  good 
faith,  of  uprightness  and  obedience  to  the 
dictates  of  truth  and  justice,  then  both  rulers 
and  the  ruled,  the  leaders  and  the  lead  are  to 
be  chastised,  in  some  form  or  other  by  the 
divine  hand,  but  with  all  long-suffering  and 
patience,  with  a view  to  bring  them  to  their 
senses  and  effect  their  reformation.  If  the 
corrections  be  heeded,  and  reformation  ensues, 
they  are,  thereupon,  restored  to  divine  favor 
and  protection ; otherwise,  they  are  left  to  go 
on  from  bad  to  worse,  and,  thus,  work  out  their 
utter  destruction.  Accordingly  we  read,  I.  K. 
14:16,  “And  He  shall  give  Israel  up  because 
of  the  sins  of  Jeroboam,  who  did  sin,  and  who 
made  Israel  to  sin.”  Also,  II.  Ch.  83:9—11, 
“SoMannaseh  made  Judah  and  the  inhabi- 
tants of  Jerusalem  to  err,  and  to  do  worse 
than  the  heathen,  whom  the  Lord  had  destroy- 
ed before  the  Children  of  Israel” — (Just  as  the 
selfish,  partisan  politicians  not  in  rebeldom 
exclusively,  but  even  in  the  free  States,  nay  in 
Michigan,"  are,  to-day,  leading  the  people  to 


37 


imitate  the  rebels  in  their  disrespect  for  law, 
and  for  men,  who  love  truth  and  their  country 
more  than  they  do  party  and  its  black  arts.) 
“ And  the  Lord  spoke  to  Manasseh  and  to  the 
people;  but  they  would  not  hearken” — (any 
more  than  the  desperate  partisans  and  their 
blind  adherents  of  these  times.)  “Wherefore, 
the  Lord  brought  upon  them  the  captains  of 
the  host  of  the  King  of  Assyria,  which  took 
Manasseh  among  the  thorns,  and  bound  him 
with  fetters  and  carried  him  to  Babylon”— that 
ancient  Richmond,  whither  a large  portion  of 
the  Jewish  captives  were  led  by  their  haughty 
conquerors,  and  where  they  suffered  such 
brutal  outrages,  that  the  name  of  Babylon  be- 
came to  them  the  symbol  of  cruelty,  calamity, 
and  wretchedness— just  as  the  modem  Baby- 
lon, Richmond,  Va.,  will  hereafter  be  to  the 
people  of  this  Union.  Again.  We  read  in 
Jer.  18:  “If  that  Nation  against  whom  I have 
pronounced,  turn  from  their  evil,  I will  repent 
of  the  evil,  that  I thought  to  do  unto  them.” 
This  passage  expresses  one  of  the  cardinal 
principles  of  the  divine  government  with  re- 

Sard  to  the  Nations  of  which  I have  spoken. 

ut,  again,  note  this:  “Because  my  people 
have  forgotten  me,  they  have  burned  incense  to 
vanity,  and  they  have  caused  them  to  stumble 
in  their  ways  from  the  ancient  paths,  to  walk 
in  paths,  in  a way  not  cast  up ; to  make  their 
land  desolate  and  a perpetual  hissing ; every 
one  that  passeth  thereby  6hall  be  astonished, 
and  wag  his  head,  I wiU  scatter  them  as  with 
an  east  wind  before  the  enemy ; I will  show 
them  the  back,  and  not  the  face,  in  the  day  of 
their  calamity.”  Now,  Sir,  please  note  the 
points  in  this  ominous  statement,  and  their 
natural  connection : 1.  The  offence — forgetful- 
ness of  God,  on  the  part  of  the  Nation.  2.  The 
mischievous  consequences— departure  from 
the  good,  old,  safe,  constitutional  way — a 
stumbling  out  of  the  right  ways  into  forbid- 
den ways,  that  lead  to  ruin.  The  people  falling 
into  this  course,  will  make  their  land  desolate, 
and  themselves  miserable,  just  as  the  rebels 
have  done,  and  just  as  we  shall  do,  if  we  for- 
sake the  right  paths.  The  rebels  are  hissed, 
and  deserve  to  be  hissed.  Every  one  that 
passes  through  their  land,  makes  his  remark 
on  it,  “ is  astonished  and  wags  his  head.”  If 
we  forget  God,  here  in  the  free  States — our  de- 
pendence on  Him,  His  principles  of  govern- 
ment, the  morality  and  spirit  of  beneficence 
He  requires — we  shall  likewise  depart,  and 
plunge  into  a similar  destruction;  the  two 
things  are  tied  together.  3.  God  will  sooner 
or  later  turn  his  back  on  the  Nation,  that  for- 
gets Him,  and  His  teachings  and  methods,  and 
continues  in  it.  He  will  withhold  His  favor 
and  protection  from  it,  and  finally  give  it  up 
to  its  enemies  to  be  scattered  and  swept  away. 

This  is  a fixed  principle  in  His  administra- 
tion. 

Here  we  have,  Sir,  some  of  the  principles 
which  enter  into  the  divine  economy  with  re- 
gard to  Nations.  And  whoever  will  carefully 
study  the  history  of  by-gone  and  contempo- 
raneous Nations,  will  be  deeply  impressed 
with  the  all-mastering  grasp  of  these  princi- 
ples, and  also,  with  the  infinite  steadiness  and 
inflexibility  with  which  they  have  been  ap- 
plied and  enforced,  in  the  ongoings  of  Provi- 
dence. 

It  is  extremely  proper,  Sir,  that  we  be  re- 
minded, in  this  connection,  of 


Certain  Very  Alarming  Symptoms  in 
Our  Case. 

We  have  national  fasts.  We  come  together 
and  acknowledge  and  lament  the  corruptions 
of  the  age.  We  discant  on  its  luxury  and 
venality,  the  irreligion  ot  the  rich,  the  immor- 
alities of  the  poor,  and  the  forgetfulness  of 
God,  which  pervades  all  classes,  and  especially 
the  intolerable  crimes  of  the  South,  and  of 
their  coadjutors,  infesting  the  adhering  States. 
All  this  is  well,  so  far  as  it  springs  from  sin- 
cerity, and  should  not  be  omitted. 

Again.  As  public  officers,  and  as  a people, 
we  solemnly  avow  our  allegiance  to  the  gov- 
ernment, to  constitutional  law,  and  the  duty  of 
fidelity  to  it.  As  public  officers,  we  sware  be- 
fore our  final  Judge,  that  we  will  support  the 
Constitution,  and  will  faithfully  discharge  the 
duties  of  our  office.  In  this  act  we  invoke  the 
divine  vengeance,  if  we  fail  to  fulfill  this  awful 
pledge. 

But,  having  uttered  these  confessions,  ac- 
knowled  the  divine  supremacy,  sued  for  divine 
succor,  and  taken  these  solemn  oaths ; one  set 
of  us  straightway  enters  into  the  business  of 
stealing  from  the  government  directly ; another 
confederates  together  to  defraud  the  govern- 
ment under  the  specious  guise  of  contracts, 
land  grants,  and  money  appropriations ; anoth- 
er set  seek  to  profit  pecuniarily,  by  bringing 
about  certain  legislation,  or  procuring  certain 
judicial  decisions,  no  matter  how  corrupt  and 
dangerous  they  may  be ; another  set,  (and  their 
name  is  legion)  make  use  of  their  influence 
or  official  position  for  objects  of  personal  am- 
bition; to  pervert  the  government,  and  make 
it  a vast  engine  of  party  aggrandizement  and 
party  sway ; to  render  the  Constitution  in  a 
great  degree  void,  or  full  of  mischief  or  the 
grounds  of  it,  by  the  constructions,  which  they 
put  upon  it— by  deliberately  striving  to  make 
it  mean  anything,  no  matter  what,  if  so  be,  it 
will  suit  their  partisan  purposes  for  the  time 
being.  Among  this  multitudinous  6et  are 
they,  who  make  a mock  of  the  Constitution ; 
who  delight  in  ridiculing  such  as  would  un- 
derstand, respect, and  hold  fast  to  the  principles 
of  constitutional  law,  whether  State  or  na- 
tional ; who  point  at  such,  and  call  them  de- 
risive names.  It  matters  not  how  much  learn- 
ing one  has,  how  deeply  he  may  be  read  in  the 
science  of  interpretation,  how  profound,  and 
just  his  views  are,  how  large  and  ripe  his  ex- 
perience, how  able  he  may  be  as  a publicist, 
how  pure  his  life,  how  exalted  his  patriotism, 
how  eminent  his  services ; yet,  if  he  ventures 
to  offer  his  views  on  a constitutional  question, 
and  if  they  are,  in  any  way,  unfavorable  to 
their  personal  or  party  schemes,  then,  if  he  is 
not  renowned  as  a lawyer,  they  jeer  him  as 
being  a bundle  of  self-conceit,  and  as  an  in- 
stance of  the  superlatively  ridiculous ; but,  on 
the  other  hand,  if  he  happens  to  be  a lawyer, 
then  they  deride  him  as  forgetting  the  spirit 
and  sticking  in  the  mere  letter,  as  being  a 
heartless  abstractionist,  as  obsolete,  and  be- 
longing to  a cast-off  age.  Nor  is  this  all.  If 
as  a citizen,  a patriot,  and  a statesman,  he  re- 
cognizes his  allegiance  to  his  country  as  para- 
mount to  his  allegiance  to  party,  and  if  con- 
sequently, he  shall  say  to  his  fellow-citizens : 

“ Come,  let  us,  in  this  hour  of  our  country’s 
extreme  peril,  forget  our  partisanship  and 
save  our  country ; let  us  hold  our  individual 


38 


party  preferences  in  due  subordination,  and  as 
a band  of  brothers,  give  our  ungrudging  sup- 
port to  the  government  and  to  each  other, 
until  treason  is  coerced  to  submission  and 
civil  authority  restored;”  if  he  but  says  and 
does  this,  why,  according  to  this  set,  he  is 
strangely  out  of  joint;  the  screws  are  loose 
all  about  him,  and  he,  indeed,  “hath  a devil,” 
and  is  to  be  scouted  and  driven  out  as  the  bane 
and  plague  of  the  elect  and  precious  party, 
whether  Republican  or  Democratic.  And  still 
another  set  among  us,  greatly  embarass  the 
government  and  abridge  its  efficiency  by  sow- 
ing the  seeds  of  groundless  discontent,  and, 
thus,  “render  aid  and  comfort  to  the  ene- 
my.” This  class  stigmatize  an  enlightened 
zeal  for  the  energy  and  efficiency  of  the  Govern- 
ment, (even  in  this  hardest  of  all  struggles  for 
self-preservation,)  as  the  offspring  of  a temper 
fond  of  despotic  power,  and  hostile  to  the  I 
principles  of  constitutional  liberty.  They  | 
seem  to  forget,  that  extreme  crises  in  public  j 
affairs,  call  for  extraordinary  remedies — not  j 
unlawful  remedies,  but  such  as  the  nature  and 
shifting  necessities  of  the  case  require.  They 
seem  to  forget,  that  the  vigor  of  the  Govern- 
ment is  essential  to  the  security  of  liberty, 
nay,  to  its  own  existence;  that, in  the  contem- 
plation of  a sound,  and  well-informed  judge- 
ment, the  true  interests  of  liberty,  the  people,  j 
and  the  Government  can  never  be  separated;  J 
and  that  a dangerous  ambition  more  often 
lurks  behind  the  specious  mask  of  zeal  for  the 
rights  of  the  people,  than  under  the  forbidding 
appearance  of  zeal  for  the  firmness,  vigor  and 
efficiency  of  the  Government.  This  class  of 
men  seem  to  forget,  too,  that  history  teaches 
us  that  the  former  has  been  a much  more  cer- 
tain road  to  the  introduction  of  despotism, 
than  the  latter;  that  of  those  men,  who  have 
overturned  the  liberties  of  republics,  the 
greatest  number  have  begun  their  career  by  1 
paying  an  obsequious  court  to  the  people— to  ; 
the  sacred  and  imperiled  rights  of  “the  dear,  | 
the  dear  people;”  commencing  Demagogues 
and  ending  Tyrants.*  “These  are  of  their 
father  the  Devil,  and  the  works  of  their  father 
they  will  do.” 

How  to  be  Ruined  as  a Nation— Who 
Most  to  be  Feared— How  to  be  Saved. 

Now,  Sir,  let  us  be  admonished  betimes,  as 
public  men  and  as  a people,  that  we  are  not  to 
be  delivered  from  these  great  public  troubles,  ' 
the  Nation  saved,  and  the  smiles  of  Heaven  re- 
gained, so  long  as  this  order  of  things  shall  ! 
prevail.  No,  Sir,  not  by  any  means ; lor  we  ! 
know  that  all  these  things  are  from  beneath, 
and  tend,  necessarily,  under  the  divine  economy 
respecting  States  and  Nations,  to  bring  down  1 
the  penal  retributions  of  Heaven,  and  reduce 
the  Nation  to  disintegration  and  final  ruin — 
yes,  Sir,  to  disintegration  and  final  ruin.  And 
I here  submit  with  a sad  heart,  that  we,  as  a 
Nation,  have  quite  as  much  to  fear,  in  the  ag- 
gregate, from  the  numerous  classes  or  sets  of 
men  in  the  adhering  States,  to  which  I have 
just  referred,  as  we  have  from  the  rebels.  For 
the  rebels  are  without , and  act  openly;  but 
these  are  within,  and  under  the  guise  of  zeal, 
par  excellence,  for  the  loyal  cause,  they  gnaw 
at  the  roots  of  the  tree  of  civil  and  social  life, 

* Vide  Federalist. 


and,  thus,  sap  the  very  foundation  of  things. 
We  may  bring  the  rebels  to  lay  down  their 
arms,  and  to  become  dutiful  citizens  again ; or 
if  they  remain  incorrigible,  we  may  extermi- 
nate them.  But  how  shall  we  protect  our- 
selves, our  country,  and  posterity  against  these 
increasing  multitudes  among  us  in  “ sheep’s 
array”  of  all  parties,  who  make  merchandize 
of  the  calamaties  of  their  country,  and  seek 
to  fatten  on  the  blood  of  their  neighbors ; or 
whose  lust  of  place  and  of  power,  is  as  insa- 
tiable as  the  grave,  whose  implacable  selfish- 
ness never  tires,  and  whose  personal  and  party 
intrigues  know  no  limit,  right,  law,  or  end,  but 
success!  These  political  partisans  fasten  on 
the  government  and  the  people  like  a host  of 
vampires.  They  environ  and  love  us,  “as  the 
wolves  the  trembling  lambs”  to  devour  us. 
They  are  the  Jeroboams,  who  cause  the  people 
to  err.  They  are  the  Achans,  who  prevent  the 
success  of  our  arms,  and  cause  the  God  of  bat- 
tles to  turn  His  back  upon  us  and  not  His  face, 
in  the  day  of  our  calamity. 

“As  we  wax  hot  in  faction 

In  battle  we  wax  cold  ; 

Wherefore  men  fight  not  as  they  fought 

In  the  brave  days  of  old.”f 

Let  us,  therefore,  as  a people  no  longer  fol- 
low such  as  seek  to  divide  and  distract  us — 
who  seek  not  us,  but  ours.  Let  them  no 
longer  have  dominion  over  us.  Let  us  rather 
come  to  our  senses,  now,  before  the  day  of 
deliverence  shall  have  passed  by,  and  learn, 
that  there  is  no  other  way  given  under  Heaven 
whereby  the  Nation  can  be  saved,  except  by  our 
renouncing  all  these  hidden  things  of  dishon- 
esty, all  these  by-ends,  and  all  this  political 
party  shuffling,  and  accepting  and  following,  in 
all  good  conscience,  in  our  relations  as  individ- 
uals, as  public  servants,  and  as  members  of  the 
State,  those  solid  principles  of  morals,  pru- 
dence and  patriotism,  sanctioned  by  the  divine 
administration,  and  “ which  have  stood  the 
test  and  sustained  the  virtue  of  6ix  thousand 
years.” 


Last  Appeal. 

Now,  Sir,  since  all  these  things  are  so,  and 
cannot  be  otherwise,  a voice  proceeds  out  of 
them  louder  than  thunder,  and  as  solemn  and 
impressive  as  the  roar  of  Eternity,  calling  on 
all  undutiful  ones  to  whefin  I have  referred,  to 
desist.  Thus  far  they  have  withstood  this 
more  than  human  appeal.  “ Unmoved  by  the 
uproar  of  elements,  and  undismayed  by  that 
voice,  which  astonishes  Nature  and  appals  the 
guilty,  they  continue  absorbed  in  their  specu 
lations,”  in  their  partisan  schemes,  and  per- 
sonal promotion — continue  in  their  political 
shuffling,  nay,  in  gambling  with  the  very  blood 
and  life  of  the  Nation  on  private  account,  mak 
ing,  it  should  seem,  “ all  the  more  haste,  lest 
the  shades  of  a premature  night  may  fall  upon 
them,”  and  cut  them  off  from  the  consumma- 
tion of  their  designs.  But,  Sir,  let  us  even 


39 


now,  one  and  all,  in  this  last  great  straggle  o 
our  fatherland  for  constitutional  existence, 
honorably  lay  aside  these  evil  ways,  and  espec- 
ially the  sins  of  personal  and  party  ambition, 
which  so  easily  beset  us,  and  returning  to  the 
old  path,  which  is  the  good  way  of  our  fathers, 


pull,  an  honest  pull,  and  a pull  all-together,  to 
rescue  our  common  country,  with  its  free  in- 
stitutions, from  impending  overthrow,  and  to 
yet  make  it  the  model  Nation,  the  light  and 
pride  of  every  people  in  the  whole  earth,  lead- 
ing the  way  to  their  liberties,  their  happiness, 
their  perfection,  and  their  glory. 


fit  should  be  remembered  that  this  speech  was  made  in  the  darkest  hour  of  this  great  national 
struggle,  when  reverses  were  frequently  occurring;  when  attention  seemed  to  he  much  turned,  in  the 
Army  as  well  as  out  of  it,  from  the  one  great  purpose  of  saving  the  Union,  to  the  matter  of  Presi- 
dent-making, and  to  party  politics  connected  therewith;  and  before  the  present  order  of  things  was 
inaugurated  under  the  auspices  of  the  single-eyed  and  earnest-hearted  Grant,  from  which  success 
naturally  results;  and  for  which  let  God  he  devoutly  praised;  and  let  the  Administration,  Grant,  and 
our  noble  brothers  in  the  field,  receive,  each  according  to  his  measure,  the  abundant  honor,  and 
gratitude  due  them  from  the  present,  and  all  coming  generations. 


' 


y C(  : ' V 

o ! • 

’ 


